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The report argues that while India's shift to electric vehicles can reduce emissions by 33%-55% compared to internal combustion engines, full decarbonisation depends on increasing the share of clean electricity in the grid. It estimates that meeting the charging needs of the projected 2030 EV stock would require approximately 14 GW of dedicated wind and solar capacity. The analysis highlights significant regional disparities in the cleanliness of EV charging across 10 Indian states, with Karnataka leading in clean energy share and Uttar Pradesh, the largest market by volume, providing only 18.3% of charging electricity from clean resources.

The report investigates the factors behind the acceleration of coal power approvals in China between 2022 and 2024, including rising power demand and energy security concerns. It details China's strategy to maintain supply continuity through flexibility retrofits and carbon-reduction pilots while proposing a transition toward clean power generation and storage technologies to replace coal's role in system reliability.

The 2025 Utility Roundtable highlighted the need for African power utilities to move beyond dependency on foreign aid by adopting new financing strategies, addressing structural inefficiencies like commercial losses, and strategically integrating renewable energy into fragile grids through regional collaboration and private sector engagement.

In June 2025, solar power became the largest source of electricity in the EU, generating 22.1% of the total supply. This milestone coincided with record-high wind generation for May and June and a record low for coal's share of electricity. However, the first half of 2025 saw an overall increase in fossil fuel generation, driven by higher gas use and lower hydropower output due to drought.

The BRICS bloc generated over half of the world's electricity in 2024, with China dominating renewable energy production. While solar and wind capacity have grown exponentially in China, India, and Brazil since 2015, progress has stalled in Russia and South Africa. Hydropower's share of BRICS renewable generation fell from 82% in 2015 to 45% in 2023 as solar and wind expanded. China leads the bloc in total renewable energy jobs, though Brazil has the highest proportion of such jobs relative to its population.

The document argues that while Africa possesses immense renewable energy potential, over 600 million people lack electricity, and only 2% of global renewable energy investments in the last two decades have gone to the continent. It identifies critical barriers to private sector engagement, including currency mismatch, regulatory instability, and inadequate grid infrastructure. Using Nigeria as a case study, the report highlights the success of off-grid solar solutions compared to the struggling privatised on-grid sector. It recommends institutionalising predictable policies, expanding innovative finance like green bonds and blended finance, and investing in grid-compatible infrastructure and local technical capacity to accelerate the energy transition.

JLA Hydro, with Belgian funding, restored a 1960s-era 60 kW hydropower plant in Murhesa, DRC, which had been inactive for 15 years. The project involved civil works, the installation of a custom crossflow turbine, and the creation of a regulated minigrid. The restored power now supports a health centre, schools, and several food production and processing facilities, demonstrating the efficiency of hydropower rehabilitation for rural electrification.

The document analyzes the legal requirements of Article 9 of the Nature Restoration Law (NRL), which mandates the restoration of at least 25,000km of free-flowing rivers in the EU by 2030. It details the process for creating barrier inventories, prioritizing the removal of obsolete structures, and ensuring these actions align with other EU frameworks like the Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the Habitats Directive. The briefing emphasizes the need for longitudinal, lateral, and vertical connectivity and warns against using the Renewable Energy Directive to justify the retention of obsolete barriers.

The 'Banking on Renewables' report critiques the current funding models of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), arguing that the rush to increase renewable energy capacity often leads to 'green extractivism' and human rights violations. It proposes three core criteria for public funding: financing a total transition to 100% renewables (excluding 'false solutions' like CCUS), ensuring democratic and decentralized energy systems, and centering people and the planet. Through case studies in India, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Indonesia, the report contrasts large-scale projects that displace communities with community-led initiatives that improve local livelihoods. It concludes with a ten-point action plan urging MDBs to increase grants over loans, adopt a strict renewable energy taxonomy, and mandate Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for all projects.

The document analyzes the competitive landscape of green investment in Southeast Asia, highlighting China as the leading public investor in clean energy between 2013 and 2023. It details the specific technological strengths of investor nations—such as Japan's lead in geothermal and solar and China's dominance in wind and hydropower—while examining the strategic frameworks used, including China's Belt and Road Initiative and Japan's Asia Zero Emissions Community. The report also notes significant financing gaps in the region, where annual renewable investments of USD 8 billion fell far short of the USD 27 billion required to meet 2025 targets.

In 2024, fossil-powered capacity fell below half of the total electricity mix for the BRICS group, driven by renewable growth in China, India, and Brazil. However, new BRICS members—including Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria—show a stark gap between net-zero pledges and action, currently constructing ten times more fossil fuel capacity (25 GW) than wind and utility-scale solar (2.3 GW). Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are central to this expansion, backing 62% of all power capacity under construction in new member geographies, with particularly high involvement in hydropower (93%) and coal (88%).

In 2024, global electricity generation reached new record highs for solar, wind, hydro, gas, and coal. Solar was the fastest-growing source, increasing by 474 TWh to reach a 6.9% share of the global mix, with China contributing 53% of this growth. Wind generation also hit a record of 2,494 TWh, though growth slowed due to weather conditions. Hydro rebounded to an all-time high of 4,416 TWh following 2023 droughts, largely driven by China. Nuclear generation grew by 2.5% to 2,768 TWh, but its global market share fell to a 45-year low of 9%. Gas and coal both reached record generation levels in 2024, though their shares of the global electricity mix declined to 22% and 34% respectively, as electricity demand grew faster than their production.

The report examines the 2024 power sectors of China, the US, EU, India, Russia, Japan, and Brazil. Key trends include China's massive solar growth despite record coal generation, the US's first-time transition to wind and solar overtaking coal, the EU's record decline in coal, and Brazil's high renewable share. While India and China continue to see demand growth met partly by coal, the EU and US show a stronger shift toward clean energy, though the US remains reliant on gas.

In 2024, clean power reached a milestone of 40.9% of global electricity generation, driven by a record surge in solar and a rebound in hydropower. Despite this growth, global power sector emissions reached a record high of 14.6 billion tonnes of CO2 because extreme heatwaves drove a 4.0% increase in electricity demand, forcing a 1.4% rise in fossil fuel generation to meet the additional cooling needs.

In 2024, global electricity demand rose by 4% to 30,856 TWh, driven largely by China and extreme heatwaves. Low-carbon sources reached a historic high of 40.9% of global generation, with solar and wind combined surpassing hydropower. Despite this, global power sector emissions hit a record high, increasing by 1.6% due to a rise in fossil generation linked to cooling demand during heatwaves.

In 2024, clean power surpassed 40% of global electricity generation for the first time since the 1940s, driven by record solar growth. Despite this, global power sector emissions reached an all-time high of 14.6 billion tonnes of CO2 because heatwaves drove a 1.4% increase in fossil generation to meet cooling demand. Solar generation doubled over the last three years, reaching 2,131 TWh, while emerging drivers like AI data centres, EVs, and heat pumps structurally increased demand growth. China and India are increasingly decoupling their electricity demand growth from fossil fuel expansion, with China's clean generation meeting 81% of its demand increase in 2024.

The Mediterranean region's renewable power capacity is projected to double from 315 GW in 2023 to 626 GW by 2030, primarily driven by solar and wind. However, this trajectory falls 374 GW short of the TeraMed Initiative's 1 TW goal. To bridge this gap, the region would need to install an additional 54 GW of wind and solar annually beyond current plans, totaling 98 GW per year, which significantly exceeds the historical maximum annual deployment of 45 GW.

The report argues that the Korean Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) is undermined by a reliance on low-quality international carbon credits, which lead to over-crediting and depressed carbon prices. Using the EU ETS as a benchmark, the authors demonstrate how the EU phased out international credits to prioritize domestic reductions. A specific analysis of cookstove projects eligible for K-ETS finds they likely overestimate emission reductions by a factor of 18.3. The report also highlights systemic issues with hydropower and gas leak reduction projects, including lack of additionality and environmental harm. It recommends that South Korea ban international credits from the K-ETS, strengthen emission caps, and avoid using unreliable bilateral cooperation projects under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement to meet its 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

The document outlines a training curriculum focused on 'energy justice' and 'energy sufficiency' to ensure the transition to renewables does not replicate the injustices of fossil fuel systems. It explores the risks of 'energy extractivism'—where resources are exploited in the Global South for consumption elsewhere—and provides examples of community-owned energy models in The Gambia, Brazil, Denmark, and the UK. The module guides participants through a process of identifying barriers to just transitions and developing local projects based on circular design and 'people power'.

The report details how climate change drives biodiversity loss through mechanisms like ocean acidification and species range shifts, while biodiversity loss weakens the planet's carbon sinks. It critically assesses 'false solutions'—including monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsetting, and geoengineering—arguing that these policies often cause further ecological damage and land grabbing. The document calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, energy sufficiency, and the protection of Indigenous Peoples' land rights to address the polycrisis holistically.