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The document analyzes the vulnerability of the ASEAN region to climate change and evaluates the current mitigation and adaptation strategies of its member states. It argues that while ASEAN countries have ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), there is a significant disconnect between climate goals and trade policy. The author recommends reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers on environmental goods, reforming fossil fuel subsidies, and utilizing WTO flexibilities for technology transfer to bridge this gap.

The document analyzes the extreme vulnerability of CARICOM states to climate change, noting that while the region contributes only 0.33% of global greenhouse gas emissions, its key trade sectors—tourism, agriculture, and the blue economy—face existential threats. It identifies a gap in the region's trade policy, which currently lacks a clear articulation of how to serve climate resilience. The paper suggests that CARICOM can leverage its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to identify WTO negotiating priorities, such as technology transfer, climate finance, and the removal of trade barriers for environmental goods. It specifically recommends that the WTO recognize the unique vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and move beyond a developed-country agenda to support SIDS' offensive interests in carbon markets and the blue economy.

Global investments in energy transition technologies reached a record USD 1.3 trillion in 2022, yet this remains insufficient to meet climate goals, with annual needs estimated at over USD 5 trillion. While renewable energy investments are growing, they are heavily concentrated in a few regions—primarily East Asia and the Pacific—and specific technologies like solar PV and wind. Conversely, fossil fuel investments continue to rise, and subsidies remain high, particularly in Europe and the MENA region. The report emphasizes the need for a fundamental shift in financing for the Global South, calling for more innovative public finance instruments, the mobilization of institutional capital, and a transition away from fossil fuel funding to ensure a just and inclusive energy transition.

Global energy transition investments reached a record USD 1.3 trillion in 2022, but this is less than one-third of the annual USD 5 trillion needed to meet the 1.5°C Scenario. While renewable energy investments grew to nearly USD 0.5 trillion in 2022, they remain heavily concentrated in solar and wind technologies and a few regions, primarily East Asia and Pacific. Developing and emerging markets receive a disproportionately small share of finance; for example, Sub-Saharan Africa received less than 1.5% of global investments between 2000 and 2020. The report emphasizes that private capital prioritizes low-risk, commercially viable projects, leaving a critical gap in less mature technologies and high-risk regions. It argues for a fundamental shift in public financing, moving beyond simple de-risking to provide more grants, concessional loans, and innovative instruments like local currency lending and green bonds to ensure a just and inclusive transition.

The policy brief examines the shortcomings of South Africa's current climate finance landscape, specifically the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) and the initial implementation of Climate Budget Tagging (CBT). It argues that current efforts suffer from horizontal and vertical incoherence, limited transparency regarding debt and private financing, and a top-down approach that marginalizes social justice and adaptation needs. To remedy this, the author proposes a comprehensive Climate-Responsive Budgeting (CRB) framework that integrates positive and negative expenditure tagging, revenue tracking, gender-responsive budgeting, and regular Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIR).

The document outlines the methodology for a briefing on public money for fossil fuels, detailing how the authors tracked subsidies, state-owned enterprise (SOE) investments, and international public finance. It specifies the use of IMF and IEA data for 2022 subsidies and explains the 50% government ownership rule for SOE analysis. The note also highlights significant data gaps, particularly regarding subnational support and transparency in Chinese SOE reporting, suggesting that total government support for fossil fuels is likely underestimated.

The WTO Dialogue on Plastics Pollution, launched in November 2020 and co-sponsored by 75 members, seeks to align international trade policies with global efforts to reduce plastic pollution. The Dialogue operates through three workstreams: crosscutting issues (transparency and capacity building), promoting trade in sustainable technologies and substitutes, and fostering circularity and reduction. Key priorities include improving the Harmonized System (HS) for better trade data, integrating plastic pollution into the Aid for Trade initiative, and coordinating with other international frameworks like the Basel Convention and the UNEA's legally binding instrument on plastic pollution.

The We Mean Business Coalition calls for the urgent delivery of the $100 billion annual climate finance commitment to developing countries and the implementation of market signals to steer private capital toward net zero. The coalition emphasizes the need for reforming fossil fuel subsidies, implementing carbon pricing, and mandating transparent, comparable sustainability reporting standards aligned with the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) to prevent greenwashing and facilitate sustainable investment.

The document examines the intersection of global trade flows and climate change, highlighting how trade can both exacerbate emissions through 'embodied' carbon and facilitate the diffusion of green technologies. It details a variety of policy levers—including border carbon adjustments, the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and the liberalization of environmental goods—that can align trade with climate goals. The brief analyzes the role of the WTO, noting that while existing rules generally allow for good-faith environmental policies, tensions arise over local content requirements and discriminatory measures. It highlights member-led initiatives like the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) and the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform group as critical paths for future cooperation, emphasizing the need for a 'just transition' for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs).

The document evaluates the IMF's updated surveillance practices by analyzing recent reports for Indonesia and South Africa. While it notes a 'sea change' in the IMF's willingness to integrate climate issues—such as endorsing carbon taxes and green financing—it argues that the organization continues to prioritize steep fiscal consolidation and austerity. This focus on budget deficit ceilings is seen as a threat to the funding required for climate adaptation and mitigation. The authors highlight significant 'blind spots,' including the failure to fully account for the long-term fiscal risks of stranded fossil fuel assets and the potential for carbon-intensive exports to decline as trade partners decarbonize. The report concludes that while there is 'cautious optimism' due to more sophisticated analytical work, the IMF's advice remains insufficient for achieving a socially-just green transition.

The report argues that current climate finance is woefully inadequate to meet Paris Agreement goals, with developing countries alone requiring $4.3 trillion for 2030 commitments. It outlines a three-stage framework—planning, implementation, and monitoring—and details a variety of fiscal and policy instruments to align public spending, increase public funding, and mobilize private capital.

The report finds that while global climate finance almost doubled between 2011 and 2020, reaching a cumulative USD 4.8 trillion, current growth rates are insufficient to meet climate goals. Preliminary 2021 estimates show an all-time high of USD 850–940 billion, driven largely by electric vehicle demand. However, a significant gap remains in adaptation finance, and continued fossil fuel subsidies in 51 major countries exceeded total global climate finance investment for the 2011-2020 period. The report argues that annual flows must reach USD 4.3 trillion by 2030 to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.

The document contends that Canada's oil and gas industry, bolstered by windfall profits, should fund its own decarbonization rather than relying on public subsidies. It highlights that current government supports, such as those for carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS), often fail to yield meaningful emissions reductions and may even enable increased production. The author argues that public funds would be more effectively spent on proven low-carbon technologies like renewable energy and grid electrification to meet Canada's 2030 climate targets and ensure long-term energy security.

One year after COP26, progress on climate pledges is described as "mixed at best," with some advancements in renewable energy and net-zero targets countered by a resurgence in fossil fuel reliance due to the Russia-Ukraine war. While 24 countries updated their emissions targets and renewable capacity reached new heights, global fossil fuel subsidies nearly doubled in 2021. Financial commitments remain unmet, with developed nations still $17 billion short of the $100 billion annual goal for 2020. Efforts to curb methane and deforestation have seen expanded participation, but accountability for city-level net-zero pledges remains low due to a lack of reported emissions data.

The NewClimate Institute criticizes the German government for contradictions between its climate ambitions and its foreign policy actions, specifically citing the support for gas exploration in Senegal and insufficient climate finance. It urges the implementation of a cross-departmental foreign policy strategy in 2023 to ensure consistency across all ministries, including those led by the FDP, and recommends independent monitoring of progress.

The Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment (CAPE) urges the Government of Canada to adopt a 'planetary health' framework in its federal budget, arguing that climate change is the most significant global health threat of the 21st century. Key recommendations include reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 140% below 2005 levels by 2030, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies by 2023, and redirecting public finance from Export Development Canada (EDC) away from fossil fuels. CAPE also advocates for a 'wellbeing economy' that defines success beyond GDP, increased funding for the National Adaptation Strategy, and an additional $200 million for the Chemicals Management Plan to protect vulnerable populations from toxic pollution.

The document analyzes the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) of 2021 and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022, detailing how they provide billions in funding and tax credits for carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS), direct air capture (DAC), and hydrogen production. It specifically highlights the 45Q tax credit increases and the Clean Hydrogen Tax Credit, while criticizing provisions that link renewable energy permitting on federal lands to continued oil and gas leasing.

The document argues that while the costs of climate action are high, the costs of inaction are higher, noting that physical climate risk has already increased the cost of capital for V20 countries by USD62bn over 10 years. It proposes a three-pillar policy framework: providing clarity on green investments via taxonomies, tilting investment toward green opportunities through de-risking and carbon pricing, and building green investment pipelines. Key mechanisms suggested include the use of junior capital by development finance institutions to mobilize private investment, the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and the implementation of carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs). The summary concludes with a list of 101 specific policy ideas across sectors including energy, transport, and agriculture to be detailed in a full report.

The document contends that the Canadian oil and gas industry has sufficient windfall profits to fund its own decarbonization and that public subsidies for the sector, particularly for carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS), create significant opportunity costs. It highlights that previous government supports have sometimes increased overall emissions by enabling higher production. The authors advocate for shifting public investment toward proven low-carbon technologies like wind, solar, and energy efficiency to meet Canada's 2030 climate targets.

The paper examines how multilateral development banks (MDBs) use policy-based operations (PBOs)—unearmarked budget support provided in exchange for policy reforms—and finds that current risk screening is insufficient to prevent these operations from undermining climate goals. Through an analysis of 126 PBOs and six case studies, the authors argue that policy actions can create path dependence in fossil-fuel-reliant activities and delay urgent climate spending. The document recommends that MDBs integrate long-term climate risks into macro-fiscal assessments, include at least one climate results indicator in every PBO, and provide more concessional finance, such as grants, to support ambitious climate action in vulnerable countries.