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The document provides an overview of three types of carbon markets: compliance-based, voluntary, and multilateral-based (Article 6 of the Paris Agreement). It highlights the growth of government-led markets, which generated $104 billion in 2023, while noting the severe integrity crisis and subsequent investment decline in voluntary carbon markets. The author discusses how countries manage competitiveness through tools like free allowances and output-based pricing, and details the emerging landscape of Article 6 bilateral agreements. For developing countries, the report identifies a tension between the need for climate finance and the risks of 'greenwashing' and fiscal instability.

The document details a conference focused on the marginalization of Africa within the global economic system, specifically regarding the legacy of structural adjustment and the current lack of representative governance in international financial institutions. It identifies critical barriers to African development, including inflated risk premiums that cost the continent over $74 billion annually and the failure of the Global North to deliver over $1 trillion in promised climate financing. The report proposes a tiered reform agenda: short-term priorities include debt cancellation and increased access to Special Drawing Rights; medium-term goals focus on improving credit ratings through better data and combating illicit financial flows; and long-term goals aim for greater representation in the IMF and World Bank. Additionally, it explores the potential for Africa to leverage its natural capital and critical minerals for the energy transition, while cautioning against new dependencies on China as the world shifts toward a multipolar order.

In a speech delivered on 4 July 2024, WTO Deputy Director-General Jean-Marie Paugam outlines the evolving relationship between the WTO and environmental protection. He notes a paradigm shift where climate change is now actively disrupting trade, citing examples like the Panama Canal drought. While the WTO has made progress through the 2022 Ministerial Declaration and the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement, Paugam warns that uncoordinated national actions—such as the nearly 70 carbon tax schemes in development and varying green steel standards—risk fragmenting world trade. He advocates for a "reglobalization" approach that combines green industrialization with trade cooperation, suggesting the WTO may need to adopt new rule-making models, including plurilateral commitments or non-binding frameworks similar to the Paris Agreement, to remain relevant.

The document evaluates the suitability of NGFS, IEA, and NITI Aayog scenarios for the Indian context, highlighting that global models often underestimate India's specific macroeconomic risks. It details transmission channels from macro-variables to micro-level financial risks and analyzes case studies from the ECB, Bank of England, Bank Negara Malaysia, and the Central Bank of Colombia. The authors propose a phased roadmap for the Reserve Bank of India, moving from preliminary top-down exercises to the development of in-house macroeconomic models and comprehensive bottom-up stress tests over a long-term horizon.

The report highlights that China's steel industry requires at least 1.6 trillion yuan (approximately 220 billion USD) in fixed asset investment to achieve decarbonisation by 2050. While technical feasibility for zero-carbon steel exists, high costs remain a barrier. The document argues that transition finance, carbon pricing mechanisms like the EU's CBAM, and green public procurement are essential to drive investment toward deep decarbonisation technologies, such as low-carbon hydrogen, and to avoid 'carbon lock-in' as 78% of existing coal-based blast furnace capacity requires reinvestment by 2030.

The report highlights that China's steel sector requires at least CNY1.6tn (USD220bn) in fixed-asset investment for decarbonisation by 2050. While the labelled bond and loan markets have the capacity to provide this capital, current issuance from the steel sector is minimal, representing only 0.1% of the Chinese labelled bond market. The document recommends aligning provincial transition finance guidelines with national and international standards, encouraging the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-reduction targets in sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs), and implementing green public procurement to stimulate demand for low-carbon steel.

The report examines border carbon adjustments (BCAs) as a tool to prevent carbon leakage, synthesizing views from stakeholders in five countries. It analyzes the risks of carbon leakage—specifically in Canada's heavy industry—and evaluates the design of the EU and UK CBAMs. Key discussions include the challenges of product-level emissions measurement, the need for revenue to support decarbonization in developing nations, and the potential for domestic carbon pricing as a strategic response to foreign BCAs.

The report examines how the EU's CBAM and potential future BCAs from other nations affect Vietnam's export-oriented economy, focusing on the iron, steel, aluminum, cement, and fertilizer sectors. It highlights the administrative and financial burdens on Vietnamese enterprises, particularly SMEs, and argues for the development of a domestic carbon pricing mechanism to retain revenues and improve competitiveness. The document also emphasizes the need for technical assistance and the application of the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle to ensure fairness for developing nations.

The document argues that the steel sector is no longer 'hard-to-abate' due to advancements in green hydrogen and electric arc furnaces. It challenges the distinction between metallurgical and thermal coal, warns against reliance on CCUS, and highlights the risk of stranded assets. The briefing urges financial institutions to adopt strict sectoral policies to end financing for new blast furnaces and metallurgical coal projects while increasing investment in sustainable alternatives.

The document argues that while the WTO has historically neglected the environment, there is a current paradigm shift toward recognizing trade's role in addressing climate change and biodiversity loss. It assesses the outcomes of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference (MC13), highlighting failures in fisheries subsidies and the absence of explicit climate commitments in the Ministerial Declaration, while noting progress in plurilateral initiatives like the Dialogue on Plastic Pollution. Experts propose reforming subsidy rules for fossil fuels and agriculture, leveraging 'Aid for Trade' for just transitions, and adopting the legal principle of 'Common Concern of Humankind' to guide trade law. The report emphasizes the need for regulatory alignment on circular economy principles and the ability of the WTO to coordinate trade-related climate measures, such as Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms, to avoid global trade fragmentation.

The research paper examines the intersection of G7 initiatives, such as the Energy for Growth in Africa Initiative and the Mattei Plan, with South Africa's role as a representative for African climate priorities. It highlights the tension between Western-led green transitions and African concerns over 'green protectionism' (specifically the EU's CBAM), the need for adaptation financing based on the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle, and the geopolitical competition for critical minerals. The author argues that the G7 must provide concrete deliverables and respect African agency to effectively bridge its goals with South Africa's upcoming G20 presidency.

The report finds that Türkiye's domestic coal power plants are incapable of providing baseload electricity, characterized by an average availability rate of 52% and significant annual production losses of 22 TWh due to malfunctions. Despite this poor performance, coal-fired generation reached a record 118 TWh in 2023, contributing 20% of the country's total carbon emissions. The analysis highlights that domestic lignite plants are particularly inefficient, with energy efficiency 15% below the EU average, and some wind farms now achieve higher capacity factors than these coal plants. The document argues that Türkiye lacks a coal phase-out strategy, with some licenses extending to 2069, and recommends transitioning to cheaper renewable energy to meet its 2053 net zero target and mitigate potential EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) costs.

The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a regulatory tool designed to prevent 'carbon leakage' by applying a carbon price to specific imported goods, matching the price paid by EU producers under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The mechanism covers cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity, and hydrogen. It involves a transitional monitoring period starting in October 2023, followed by a definitive phase-in in 2026. Importers must purchase and surrender non-tradeable certificates based on the embedded emissions of their goods. The document highlights the necessity of phasing out free ETS allowances to ensure the CBAM's effectiveness and discusses the potential for reinvesting CBAM revenues into climate mitigation in developing economies.

The report analyzes the UK's proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as a tool to prevent carbon leakage. It highlights key divergences from the EU CBAM, specifically the inclusion of glass and ceramics and the exclusion of electricity, as well as the absence of a transitional period. The document emphasizes the potential administrative and economic burdens on developing countries and LDCs and recommends aligning the UK system with the EU CBAM to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for trading partners.

The report assesses how border carbon adjustment (BCA) schemes, such as the EU's CBAM, may negatively affect Trinidad and Tobago by increasing production costs and reducing export competitiveness due to the country's lower GHG reduction goals and limited access to finance. While BCAs could incentivize a transition from fossil fuels, stakeholders emphasize that this requires substantial investment and international assistance. The report recommends a phased implementation approach and special treatment for developing countries to balance climate action with equity, adhering to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

The report examines how border carbon adjustment (BCA) schemes affect Brazil, noting that while the EU's CBAM has limited impact due to the small share of covered exports, other jurisdictions like the United States could pose greater risks. Stakeholders highlight challenges including compliance costs, administrative burdens, and the need for production transformation investments. The document emphasizes that a lack of awareness regarding these measures is a primary obstacle and calls for international collaboration to ensure fair BCA design.

The report analyzes how border carbon adjustments (BCAs), such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), affect Trinidad and Tobago's hydrocarbon-dependent economy. It identifies significant risks to the competitiveness of key exports like ammonia and fertilizers, while highlighting opportunities for the country to accelerate its transition to a green hydrogen economy and implement domestic carbon pricing.

The United Kingdom plans to introduce a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2027 to prevent carbon leakage as free allowances under its Emissions Trading System (ETS) are phased out. While similar to the EU CBAM, the UK version will cover ceramics and glass but exclude electricity, and it will lack a transition period. The report highlights risks including potential trade diversion, administrative burdens for exporters, and diplomatic tensions with developing nations who view such measures as 'environmental colonialism'. It suggests that the UK would benefit from mirroring the EU's reporting systems and exploring the linkage of their respective ETSs to reduce bureaucratic friction and economic risk.

India's heavy industries emit 920 million tonnes of CO2 annually, with steel and cement contributing 18% of total national emissions. The report argues that green electrification is a critical lever for decarbonisation, starting with the transition of current electricity demand to renewable energy sources (RES) by 2030 and moving toward deep electrification and power-to-fuel technologies by 2050. By 2030, meeting the projected 253 TWh industrial electricity demand with RES would require 120 GW of capacity and could avoid 180 Mt of CO2. In the long term, a 'Potential Electrification Case' suggests that electricity's share of industrial energy consumption could triple to 34.5% by 2050, requiring 699 GW of RES capacity and potentially reducing CO2 emissions by 37% (737 Mt) compared to business-as-usual.

The report highlights that the EU is a net importer of CO2 emissions, with consumption-based emissions (CBEs) significantly exceeding territorial emissions. While the EU has focused on territorial targets, the authors argue that addressing CBEs is essential for global climate goals. Through case studies of Sweden, Denmark, and France, the report identifies a lack of standardized monitoring and binding targets as primary barriers. It recommends that the EU establish binding CBE targets, standardize carbon accounting, and expand policies like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the EcoDesign Regulation to drive sustainable consumption and production globally.