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The document highlights the urgency of loss and damage finance following devastating floods in Bangladesh and Northern India. It argues that existing mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund and humanitarian aid, are insufficient due to stringent requirements, slow disbursement, and overstretched resources. The author calls on G7 nations to provide bilateral grants, support existing pilot facilities, or fund national disaster funds to provide immediate relief while working toward a formal loss and damage finance facility at COP27.

The document argues that progress on loss and damage (L&D) finance has been stalled by disagreements over liability and compensation. It proposes a near-term 'solidarity-based' approach to unlock funding without requiring strict legal liability, while advocating for the eventual creation of a formal L&D mechanism within the UNFCCC. The authors emphasize that L&D finance must be additional to mitigation and adaptation funding and should be distributed based on a needs-based approach prioritizing the most vulnerable populations.

The report finds that while there is some progress in governance—such as the African Union's permanent seat in the G20 and a third chair for Africa on the IMF Executive Board—most substantive financial reforms are lagging. It highlights a critical gap in climate finance, noting that Africa receives only 20% of global adaptation flows despite needing US$277 billion annually. The document argues that the current GFA is 'ill-equipped' to handle Africa's debt crises and high borrowing costs, with the cost of capital in Africa being 5% or higher than in other regions. Key areas of 'no progress' include the overhaul of the G20 Common Framework for debt treatment and the reform of the IMF quota system. The report recommends prioritizing the reduction of borrowing costs, enhancing transparency in 'new and additional' climate finance, and establishing an African Credit Rating Agency to counter subjective international assessments.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) issued climate-related recommendations or questions to 35 out of 43 States considered in 2023. The Committee primarily focused on the differentiated impact of climate change on women, emphasizing the need for gender-responsive strategies in adaptation and disaster risk reduction, as well as the increased vulnerability of rural, Indigenous, migrant, and refugee women. While less frequent than adaptation, the Committee also addressed mitigation policies, fossil fuel extraction—specifically criticizing Norway's expansion of oil and gas permits in the Arctic—and the necessity of women's participation in the UNFCCC loss and damage fund.

The document argues that the Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) must move beyond procedural participation to a human-rights-based framework that empowers the most affected communities. It recommends establishing robust modalities for Active Observers, creating a community access window for small grants, and implementing an independent grievance redress mechanism. The brief emphasizes that relying on World Bank standards for environmental and social safeguards or information disclosure is insufficient for the LDF's specific mission of climate justice.

Four youth delegates from ClimaTalk share their experiences at SB60 in Bonn, detailing the technical challenges of tracking policies such as the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) and the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). They highlight a dynamic increase in youth participation and the presence of a youth-centered climate camp, while noting barriers to accessibility including financial constraints on remote participation, visa issues for delegates from less developed countries, and a lack of translation services.

The document provides an overview of the UN's COP process, detailing the outcomes of COP29 and the objectives for COP30 in Belém, Brazil. It highlights the tension between urgent climate action—such as the 'Baku to Belem Roadmap' to raise $1.3 trillion in climate finance and the submission of updated National Determined Contributions (NDCs)—and the influence of fossil fuel lobbyists and petrostates. The guide specifically critiques the role of industry lobbyists at recent summits and notes the contradiction of Brazil's presidency given its plans to expand oil and gas production by 20% by 2030.

Global Witness critiques COP29 as a 'playground for fossil fuel lobbyists,' noting that the summit failed to mention a transition away from oil and gas and provided insufficient climate finance for developing nations. The organization highlights systemic flaws, including the hosting of summits in petrostates and the repression of civil society in Azerbaijan, while calling for structural reforms to prioritize vulnerable communities over polluting industries.

Global Witness argues that the UK government should leverage the high profits of the oil and gas industry to fund climate loss and damage both globally and domestically. The briefing highlights that the oil industry made an average of £5 billion in annual profits from UK production over the last 30 years, while the UN Loss and Damage Fund remains severely underfunded, with initial pledges totaling only £504 million as of March 2024. The document proposes a 'Climate Damages Tax' (CDT) that would charge companies for every tonne of carbon from extracted fuels, potentially raising £20 billion in the UK over 10 years. This revenue would be split between the international fund and a 'domestic dividend' to support a worker-led North Sea transition, which is estimated to require an additional £1.9 billion per year until 2030.

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) developed the Climate Change and Economic Vulnerability Index (CEVI) and the Climate Change and Economic Resilience Index (CERI) to address the misalignment of climate finance. Using data from 160 countries, the indices reveal that low-income economies, particularly in Africa, face the highest vulnerability and lowest resilience. An analysis of 2021 OECD adaptation finance flows shows that funds are often misallocated, with more resilient and less vulnerable countries sometimes receiving higher per-person funding than those in the most critical need. The paper recommends that international financial institutions mainstream these indices to ensure needs-based allocation of climate support.

The World Resources Institute (WRI) has developed the Climate Finance Calculator to help users determine indicative minimum climate finance contributions for countries based on their historical emissions and economic status. The tool is intended to inform UNFCCC negotiations, including the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the loss and damage fund. This comes amid a widening global finance gap; Climate Policy Initiative data indicates annual climate finance needs will rise from $8.1 trillion to $9 trillion by 2030, and exceed $10 trillion annually between 2031 and 2050, significantly surpassing the $1.3 trillion annual flows recorded between 2021 and 2022.

The document provides a comparative analysis of climate policy tools in the US and China. It details the US's reliance on subnational carbon pricing and evolving SEC disclosure rules, and China's implementation of the world's largest emissions trading system (ETS) and its 'common but differentiated responsibilities' approach to international finance. It concludes by suggesting cooperation on sustainable procurement, emission accounting standards, and subnational carbon market exchanges.

The briefing examines the climate policy landscapes of the U.S. and China, noting that while the U.S. lacks a national carbon price, it has significant subnational activity. China has established the world's largest emissions trading scheme (ETS) but maintains that it is not obligated to provide international climate finance as a developing nation. Both countries are advancing corporate climate disclosure rules, though they differ on the requirement for Scope 3 emissions. The paper suggests cooperation on sustainable procurement, data standards for emission accounting, and subnational carbon market exchanges.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of the climate and energy landscapes in China and the United States. For China, it highlights a 4.7% increase in CO2 emissions in 2023, the growth of non-fossil fuel power capacity to 53.9% of the total, and the implementation of the 'Carbon Peak' pilot program and the restart of the CCER market. For the United States, it notes a projected 1.9% decrease in emissions for 2023, the impact of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and the focus on decarbonizing the power sector by 2035. The briefing also details the 'Sunnylands Statement' as a framework for bilateral cooperation on methane and energy transition, while noting tensions regarding trade policies and the potential impact of the 2024 US election.

The document outlines how governments monitor climate finance to ensure alignment with climate goals. It highlights that as of 2022, approximately 50 countries—mostly developing nations—have processes to assess climate spending. A key tool discussed is climate budget tagging, used by about 23 countries as of 2023 to identify climate-relevant budget allocations. The guide details specific tagging approaches used in countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Nepal, Peru, and the Philippines, and defines the essential components of an effective tagging program, including transparent methodology, appropriate tools, institutional commitment, and strategic frameworks.