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In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades at 44 GW, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in plant closures and the UK shut its last coal plant, Indonesia faces a contradictory trend: overall proposed capacity is down 90% since 2015, but 'captive' coal plants for industrial use are surging. Indonesia's transition is further complicated by conflicting government statements on a 2040 phase-out, the withdrawal of the US from the JETP leadership, and record coal production reaching 831 million tons in 2024.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global coal fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. The report highlights a stark divergence: while the UK became coal-free and EU27 retirements quadrupled, China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW) and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Together, China and India accounted for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity in 2024. In the OECD, proposals have plummeted from 142 in 2015 to five today, though annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to meet 1.5°C pathways. The report also notes the rise of 'captive' coal plants in Indonesia and the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea as strategies to prolong coal use.

In 2024, China approved 66.7 GW of new coal power and saw 94.5 GW begin construction, the highest level since 2015, despite adding a record 356 GW of wind and solar capacity. This 'energy addition' strategy is driven by long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) that guarantee coal generation and the influence of coal mining companies, who financed over 75% of new approvals. These factors lead to the curtailment of renewables and a shift away from using coal plants as flexible regulating capacity. The report concludes that China's coal expansion contrasts sharply with global trends, as China accounted for 93% of global coal construction starts in 2024.

The document details the legal actions taken by a coalition of civil society organizations, including Trend Asia, WALHI, and Greenpeace Indonesia, against the Indonesian government's National Electricity General Plan (RUKN) and the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL). It argues that these plans ignore the escalating climate crisis—exemplified by Cyclone Senyar—and instead lock the country into fossil fuel dependency through the extension of coal-fired power plants (PLTU) and the use of biomass co-firing, which the authors claim drives deforestation. The coalition alleges that these policies violate multiple national laws and international commitments, such as the Paris Agreement, by failing to provide a clear coal phase-out roadmap and ignoring cheaper renewable energy alternatives.

The document argues that Asia can achieve a more rapid coal phase-out by stopping the construction of new plants, which would allow 90% of the existing fleet to exceed their 20-year investment recovery period by 2040. It critiques co-firing with ammonia or biomass as expensive and marginally effective, while highlighting successful financing models from IEEFA and the Griffith Asia Institute that make early retirement financially viable through renewables bundling and refinancing. The briefing emphasizes that a just transition requires concessional and multilateral financing from developed nations to support coal-dependent communities.

Japan is the only G7 country without a clear coal phaseout deadline, with coal accounting for nearly one-third of its electricity generation as of 2023. The Japanese government is promoting 'next-generation' technologies, specifically carbon capture and storage (CCS) and ammonia co-firing, which the report characterizes as 'false solutions' due to their high cost and limited effectiveness. These policies are supported by market mechanisms like the Capacity Market and the Long-Term Decarbonization Power Source Auction, which incentivize the continued operation of coal plants. Furthermore, Japan's three megabanks—Mizuho, MUFG, and SMBC—provided US$23.5 billion in coal financing between 2021 and 2023, often utilizing loopholes that exclude only new clients. The report also highlights the Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) initiative, noting that 35% of its 158 agreements involve fossil fuels, potentially locking Southeast Asian nations into outdated energy systems.

The UK became the first G7 country to phase out coal power on September 30, 2024, with the closure of the Ratcliffe-on-Soar plant. However, the author contends that this domestic achievement is contradicted by the actions of UK financial institutions, which provided US$6.5 billion to the global coal industry between 2021 and 2023. The document calls for stronger financial regulations to end coal expansion funding and redirect capital toward renewable energy and early decommissioning.

The document highlights Indonesia's climate crisis, noting record temperatures in Larantuka and the country's position as a top ten global greenhouse gas emitter due to coal dependency. It criticizes the government's continued construction of coal-fired power plants (PLTU), the use of biomass co-firing that threatens forests and indigenous peoples, and the environmental damage caused by nickel mining for electric vehicle batteries. The guide advocates for community-based renewable energy and provides a framework for individual and collective action, including reducing transport emissions, mindful consumption, and demanding political accountability.

The report examines the socio-ecological impacts of energy plantation forests (HTE) in Java, specifically in Sukabumi, Grobogan, and Bojonegoro. It argues that Perhutani uses the narrative of 'critical land' and 'energy transition' to reclaim land from local farmers, effectively continuing a history of agrarian extraction. The study finds that the introduction of biomass crops like gamal and kaliandra restricts community access to food and fuel, transforms these species into 'flex trees' for industrial profit, and employs local labor under precarious, low-wage conditions. The document concludes that these projects often fail economically while exacerbating land conflicts and environmental degradation, recommending a shift toward genuine forestry land reform.

The paper argues that biomass energy projects, framed as climate change mitigation, serve as a mechanism for 'energy grabbing' and the reconcentration of land control by Perhutani. Through case studies in Sukabumi, Grobogan, and Bojonegoro, it demonstrates how the classification of land as 'unproductive' or 'critical' is used to dispossess local farmers and transform them into low-paid laborers. The study finds that the promotion of gamal and kaliandra as 'flex trees' restricts community access to essential resources like firewood and fodder, while triggering localized resistance and criminalization of farmers.

RMI conducted a pre-feasibility analysis on a high-capacity coal plant in Indonesia, finding that replacing the plant with solar and storage is the preferred solution for maximizing CO2 abatement and investor cash flow, provided sufficient land is available. The analysis highlights the necessity of blended financing to maintain affordable electricity costs during early retirement and notes that biomass co-firing is generally less profitable than other repurposing options. The study emphasizes that land characteristics and regulatory frameworks are critical determinants of a site's repurposing potential.

RMI conducted a pre-feasibility analysis on a coal power plant in Indonesia's Java-Bali region, evaluating four transition scenarios: baseline operation, early retirement without repurposing, early retirement with clean energy repurposing, and biomass co-firing. The analysis found that early retirement is financially feasible, especially with blended financing, and that clean repurposing via solar PV and battery storage offers the highest value and emissions reductions, provided land constraints are overcome. Conversely, biomass co-firing was found to be generally unprofitable due to high retrofit costs.

The report argues that labelled transition finance is currently stalled by 'transition-washing'—where finance is provided to entities without a credible plan to reach net zero. It identifies root causes such as a lack of scientifically robust, geography-specific emissions pathways and the prevalence of non-binding voluntary standards. Using sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) and Japanese transition-labelled bonds as case studies, the author highlights issues like unambitious targets, immaterial penalties, and reliance on non-credible technologies like ammonia co-firing. To address this, the report recommends six guardrails: preparing national Paris-aligned pathways, establishing robust classification standards, building external verification capacity, implementing mandatory regulatory thresholds for protected labels, empowering regulators to penalise transition-washing, and enacting systemic reforms such as mandating transition plans for large firms.

The report argues that Indonesia's biomass co-firing program primarily benefits large conglomerates and politically connected elites rather than promoting a just energy transition. It highlights how companies affiliated with groups like Sinarmas, Korindo, and Medco dominate energy plantation forest (HTE) concessions, often through opaque ownership structures or 'shadow companies'. The document details instances of deforestation, land conflicts with indigenous peoples (notably in Papua and NTB), and the persistence of 'carbon debts' resulting from the conversion of natural forests to HTE. Furthermore, it notes that some biomass suppliers are also coal traders, and that the actual biomass used in PLTUs often consists of unregulated sawdust rather than the planned wood pellets, undermining the program's environmental claims.

The document highlights a recent increase in global coal capacity and a slowdown in the adoption of coal-restrictive policies by private financial institutions, calling for urgent regulatory action and the implementation of the Coal Transition Accelerator.

The report finds that while many countries are reducing planned coal capacity, global operational capacity reached a record high in 2023, driven largely by China. It highlights a divergence between China's increasing construction and the decline in other regions. In South Korea, the report argues that current plans are insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals and that continued reliance on coal, including ammonia co-firing, poses significant financial risks to the state utility and the national economy.

The report finds that while most countries are reducing coal proposals, global operating capacity grew by 48.4 GW in 2023, primarily driven by China. It highlights a stark divergence between China's construction surge and a record low in new starts elsewhere, while noting that only 15% of global operating coal capacity has a Paris-aligned retirement commitment.

The report warns that 'unabated' coal phase-down strategies—including co-firing, retrofitting with CCS, and using carbon credits—risk extending the life of fossil fuel infrastructure and providing incomplete emission reductions. It urges public development banks to avoid these 'false solutions' to ensure public funds support rapid coal retirement rather than prolonging coal usage.

The Electrical Utilities Criteria establish requirements for the certification of electrical utilities and their debt instruments, focusing on a transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. The framework employs an entity-level approach to assess the decarbonisation of the entire electricity value chain, including generation, transmission, and distribution. Certification requires entities to meet a global emission intensity pathway and adhere to specific fossil fuel phase-out benchmarks, which vary between advanced and emerging economies. The criteria prohibit new investments in fossil fuel power generation and mandate a total phase-out of fossil fuel generation by 2040 at the latest. To support grid security, the criteria allow the replacement of coal with fossil gas under strict conditions, provided the entity maintains its emission intensity pathway and has a phase-out plan. Eligible mitigation measures for Use-of-Proceeds (UoP) bonds include retrofitting plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS), carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS), or cofiring with low-carbon synthetic fuels and biomass. Certification is available in two tiers: 'align' for those meeting the pathway at the time of certification, and 'transition' for those meeting it by the end of 2030.

Trend Asia criticizes the 2024 vice-presidential candidates for offering technical 'gimmicks' rather than substantive solutions for grassroots issues. The organization argues that the candidates' visions for energy transition and sustainable development remain rooted in extractivism, ignore the legal and social vulnerabilities of local communities, and rely on 'false solutions' like CCUS and geothermal energy while failing to address the structural causes of the climate crisis and the harms of the coal industry.