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The document examines the financial crisis facing India's electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs), which were already struggling with high costs and poor billing before the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic caused a catastrophic drop in power demand, further reducing revenues while fixed costs for coal and older renewable energy remained. While the central government provided a stimulus package of INR 90,000 crore and expanded borrowing limits, the document argues these measures do not address root causes. It recommends improving metering and billing, better targeting of subsidies, adjusting fixed-cost billing components, and renegotiating power purchase agreements to better allocate risk across the supply chain.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) advocates for integrating NDC priorities into national stimulus packages to ensure a low-emission recovery. It highlights the GCF's role in providing financial instruments and readiness support to help developing countries, particularly LDCs and SIDS, implement climate-resilient infrastructure and energy efficiency without increasing debt burdens.

India faces significant climate vulnerability, with nearly 3% of its GDP at risk annually. To meet its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) goals, India requires $2.5 trillion in investments between 2016 and 2030, yet it is currently mobilizing less than 25% of this requirement. A primary barrier to scaling these investments is the lack of an agreed-upon definition of 'green finance,' leading to confusion and inconsistent reporting across the financial sector. The document proposes a combination of international practices, a principles-based approach (aligning with national goals and net carbon reduction), and a sectoral taxonomy to create a formal definition. Such a framework would enable better tracking of capital flows, mitigate greenwashing, and allow financial institutions to better assess climate-related physical and transition risks. The authors recommend forming a stakeholder task force to develop a comprehensive green finance roadmap that includes a common taxonomy, mandatory climate risk disclosures, and regulatory incentives to divert capital from carbon-intensive sectors.

The report examines the financial and environmental impact of the UK's carbon tax exemption for biomass power plants, specifically focusing on Drax, Lynemouth, and MGT Teesside. It argues that biomass is not inherently carbon neutral and that the current tax break diverts funds from other low-carbon renewables. The author estimates that the government could forgo up to £6.4 billion in carbon taxes by 2027 based on high-end emission scenarios. The report recommends removing the tax break, tightening sustainability criteria, and requiring full life cycle assessments for Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) projects.

The Alliance for Rural Electrification (ARE) warns that the COVID-19 pandemic threatens the survival of the decentralised renewable energy (DRE) sector, with many companies facing liquidity crises and only 3-6 months of survival capacity. To mitigate this, the report proposes the creation of a 'Global DRE Relief Fund' providing grants and low-interest loans (up to 3%), the implementation of a 'Rural Electrification Stimulus Plan' to close the investment gap for SDG7, and the official recognition of DRE as an 'essential service' to allow staff movement during lockdowns. It also calls for the reform of fossil fuel subsidies to fund these transitions and the provision of technical assistance for crisis management and risk analysis.

The document argues that off-grid solar (OGS) is a critical tool for achieving universal energy access and climate mitigation, particularly by replacing kerosene lamps and reducing black carbon emissions. Despite this, multilateral climate finance institutions have invested only a small fraction of the total capital deployed in the sector. The briefing identifies barriers such as the complexity of projects that combine mitigation, adaptation, and development, as well as a focus on large-scale projects. It recommends strategies including increased concessional financing for early-stage businesses, expanded use of blended finance to attract commercial equity, and the development of a uniform methodology to quantify the climate benefits of OGS, specifically regarding black carbon.

The document identifies significant barriers to financing sustainable cooling, including the diversity of needs across human comfort, agriculture, and health sectors, and a lack of global tracking for cooling-specific investments. It argues that while private capital is abundant, it is often too risk-averse for the innovative or low-income contexts where cooling is most needed. The brief highlights the role of the Kigali Cooling Efficiency Program (K-CEP) and suggests leveraging blended finance, national cooling action plans, and bulk procurement to scale solutions. It specifically emphasizes the need to coordinate funding for refrigerant replacement (via the Montreal Protocol) with energy efficiency improvements to maximize climate benefits.

The document details Hawaii's approach to climate resilience through the Hawaii Green Infrastructure Authority (HGIA), highlighting its use of non-traditional underwriting to democratize clean energy for low-income residents and renters. It discusses specific projects, such as the Kahauiki Village microgrid and the Kahuku Point coastal restoration, as models for combining mitigation and adaptation. The briefing also argues for the National Climate Bank Act to scale these models federally, noting that while mitigation is easier to finance due to cash flows, adaptation requires more innovative financial structures to address unpriced positive externalities.

The document examines sub-national pooled financing mechanisms (SPFMs) as a tool for South African municipalities to access cost-effective private capital for infrastructure. While SPFMs have successfully mobilized billions in developed and emerging economies, they have not yet been implemented in Africa. In South Africa, the author identifies a mature bond market and appetite for municipal finance, but notes significant barriers including deteriorating municipal financial health, a lack of technical capacity, and limiting regulations from the National Treasury. The brief argues that the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) holds a near-monopoly on municipal lending and should lead de-risking efforts to catalyze a vibrant local government debt market.

The report finds that while renewable energy investment reached USD 322 billion in 2018, it must almost triple to USD 800 billion by 2050 to meet climate goals. Investment is heavily concentrated in China, the US, and Western Europe, with a dominance of solar PV and onshore wind. The private sector provides 86% of capital, primarily through project developers. Off-grid renewables, though growing, represent less than 1% of total energy access finance, with Sub-Saharan Africa as the primary destination.

The 2020 Goal 8 Assessment highlights a significant gap between the climate mitigation potential of forests and the financial investment they receive, noting that public finance for forests is dwarfed by investments in renewable energy and domestic 'grey' financing for agriculture.

Argentina ranks second among G20 non-OECD countries due to relatively low support for fossil fuel use and good transparency, though it provides significant annual funding for oil and gas production, primarily through state-owned enterprise investments.

Canada provides significant public finance for fossil fuels, ranking worst among G20 OECD members on a per GDP basis. While some exploration measures have been phased out, total support increased by 12% relative to 2014–2016, driven largely by infrastructure development for oil and gas, including liquefied natural gas. The document highlights substantial unquantified support for projects like the Trans Mountain Pipeline and recent COVID-19 relief measures for fossil fuel producers.

Saudi Arabia is ranked lowest among G20 non-OECD member countries due to high levels of fossil fuel support, totaling an annual average of $77 billion between 2017 and 2019. This support is primarily driven by state-owned enterprise (SOE) investments, with Saudi Aramco providing approximately $33 billion annually for oil and gas and the Saudi Electric Company investing $8.2 billion annually in fossil fuel-based power. While the government introduced energy subsidy reforms in 2016 and 2018 under Vision 2030, domestic fuel prices remain significantly below international benchmarks. Transparency remains low regarding direct budgetary transfers and tax expenditures, leading to likely underestimations of total support.

Turkey ranks last among G20 OECD member countries in fossil fuel funding, providing an average of USD 6.8 billion in total government support between 2017 and 2019. While state-owned enterprise investment in oil and gas production decreased by 33% compared to the 2014–2016 average, support for fossil fuel consumption increased by 11% through tax expenditures. The document highlights significant transparency gaps, noting that Turkey has not performed the G20 fossil fuel subsidy peer review and lacks data on public financing from government-owned banks.

The Republic of Korea is the fourth-highest provider of public finance for fossil fuels among G20 countries, with an average annual government support of $12.4 billion between 2017 and 2019. While the government has committed to no new public finance for domestic coal projects and aims for carbon neutrality by 2050 under a Green New Deal platform, it has increased public finance for fossil fuels by 9% relative to 2014–2016 levels and provided $2.49 billion in emergency bailout loans to coal plant manufacturer Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The report finds that investment in electricity access and clean cooking remains significantly below the levels required to achieve universal energy access by 2030. While USD 36 billion was committed to electricity access in high-impact countries, only USD 12.6 billion benefited residential customers, far short of the USD 51 billion annual need. Clean cooking investment is even more critical, with only USD 32 million tracked against an annual requirement of USD 4.4 billion. The report highlights a severe lack of investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and warns that continued financing of fossil fuel power plants is incompatible with the Paris Agreement and the SDGs.

The report argues that high perceived investor risks in South East Europe lead to inflated financing costs for renewables, making them less competitive than conventional power plants. It proposes specific de-risking measures—most notably the EU budget guarantee mechanism—that could reduce project costs by up to 20%, potentially bringing onshore wind costs down to 46 EUR/MWh in Greece and 54 EUR/MWh in Serbia.

The document examines how insurance can support climate adaptation by providing financial resilience and risk-identification expertise. It distinguishes between indemnity and parametric products, discusses government interventions to bridge the 'protection gap', and argues that insurance must be integrated into a broader fiscal framework and physical resilience strategy to avoid moral hazard and ensure long-term sustainability.

In 2018, MDBs reached a record $43 billion in climate finance commitments, with an increased share allocated to adaptation and vulnerable countries. However, some banks experienced absolute declines in funding, and private sector mobilization remains lower than public co-financing. The analysis urges MDBs to meet 2020 targets, set ambitious post-2020 goals, and align their entire portfolios with the Paris Agreement.