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Ohio is experiencing an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme precipitation, flooding, heat, and drought, with natural disaster costs reaching $2 to $5 billion in the first half of 2026. These hazards are compounded by aging infrastructure, including high-hazard dams and levees, and a legacy of industrial pollution from Superfund sites. The state's energy grid is under strain from extreme heat and surging demand from over 200 data centers, while state policy continues to favor fossil fuels and obstruct renewable energy development. Key military assets, such as Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, face significant flood and wildfire risks. While Ohio lacks a comprehensive statewide climate governance framework, some progress has been made through municipal adaptation plans and significant support from federal agencies like NOAA, FEMA, and the EPA.

The authors contend that while generative AI is useful for staff work, its use in war colleges can lead to 'cognitive submission,' where officers outsource the intellectual struggle necessary to develop strategic judgment. They argue that PME is a 'boot camp for the brain' where the process of writing and debating is the primary mechanism for cognitive development. The document warns that AI can exacerbate military biases toward overconfidence and technology, potentially homogenizing thought and eroding critical thinking. To mitigate this, the authors propose 'governance by design,' using AI as a thought partner to surface counterarguments and test assumptions rather than as a tool to produce finished analysis or define problems.

The document outlines a comprehensive strategy for state, local, and tribal governments to combat information threats associated with extreme weather. It categorizes threats into environmental, geopolitical, and hate-based vectors, and advocates for a shift from reactive crisis communications to proactive 'trust architecture' built through grassroots partnerships. The guide provides a risk matrix for triaging threats based on immediacy, severity, and prevalence, and offers technical advice on 'pre-bunking' and Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) to ensure high-trust information remains visible in AI-driven search environments.

The research paper examines how AI-enabled decision-support systems in military operations erode 'command authority'—the ability to bear consequences and exercise independent judgment—even when 'decision authority' (the formal act of authorization) remains with a human. The author contends that AI systems pre-structure the decision space, effectively predetermining outcomes while leaving junior officers to absorb the operational and career risks. This 'compliance trap' is reinforced by institutional incentives that make following machine advice the safest career choice. To counter this 'command drift,' the paper proposes requiring AI systems to declare embedded risk assumptions, providing formal protections for personnel who override machine recommendations, and expanding accountability reviews to audit the advisory layer's influence.

The report argues that AI-enhanced ISR creates "precarious transparency," where sensing advances are unevenly distributed across different tasks and scenarios. While these tools improve the detection of static objects and peacetime verification, they remain fragile when applied to tracking mobile missiles or operating under wartime countermeasures. The authors conclude that these capabilities asymmetrically favor the United States, which may provoke China to expand its nuclear forces or employ counterspace capabilities more aggressively, thereby increasing the risk of instability.

The 2026 wildfire season has seen record-breaking burn areas, with roughly 579,000 square miles burned globally in the first four months. This trend is driven by a powerful El Niño, hydroclimate 'whiplash', and the expansion of fires into previously immune regions. These conditions have led to over 110 military deployments across 49 countries between January and July 2026, straining defense priorities and threatening critical infrastructure. The document analyzes different military response models—ranging from Spain's dedicated standing unit (UME) to Indonesia's integrated civilian-military approach—and recommends expanding collaborative models, investing in joint training, and building international interoperability to manage wildfires as a standing security challenge.

Poland integrates national health as a key component of its national security, managed through the Government Centre for Security (RCB) and the Ministry of Health. While the 2022 National Crisis Management Plan (KPZK) provides detailed response modules for biological incidents, the document argues that Poland lacks a dedicated national biodefense strategy. Current priorities include investing in real-time disease forecasting, diagnostic facilities, and securing pharmaceutical supply chains within the EU.

The research evaluates the impact of AI on the detectability of SSBNs, finding that AI enhancements are most effective in shallow waters (0-200 ft). This creates asymmetric strategic risks: the US enjoys a geographic advantage with direct deep-water access, while Russia and China's reliance on 'bastion' strategies is reinforced by AI's ability to secure shallow perimeters. The UK and France are identified as particularly vulnerable during the transit phase from port to deep ocean. While AI improves the 'Search' and 'Classify' phases of the detection chain, the authors conclude that fundamental physics and the cost asymmetry between seeking and hiding prevent the realization of 'transparent oceans,' though the perception of such a shift could destabilize nuclear strategic stability.

The document provides a detailed scoring framework and analysis of how AI enhances the ability to search, localize, classify, and track ballistic missile submarines. It evaluates platforms ranging from fixed acoustic arrays (IUSS) and nuclear attack submarines (Virginia SSN) to unmanned systems like the Orca XLUUV and Slocum Gliders, as well as satellite-based SAR constellations. The analysis highlights that AI's impact is most significant in shallow waters for multi-modal platforms and in deep water for acoustic-heavy systems, while physical constraints of the ocean environment continue to limit AI's effectiveness at extreme depths.

The report highlights a critical shortage of holistic, AI-ready biological data in the US, which limits the potential of AI/ML in biotechnology and biodefense. It argues that the US government should transition from merely curating data to actively creating high-quality, standardized data sets. The authors emphasize that without rigorous benchmarks and standards to address biological variability, AI-driven discoveries face significant translational risks. The document also discusses the tension between open data sharing and the need to secure data to prevent the creation of enhanced bioweapons, calling for updated Dual Use of Research Concern (DURC) guidelines. Finally, it reviews recent US policy momentum, including the Genesis Mission and various cloud laboratory legislative efforts, as essential steps toward a secure bioeconomy.

The report warns that climate change is increasing the probability of simultaneous crop failures in major global breadbaskets, which could trigger food price spikes, social unrest, and geopolitical instability. Using France, Germany, and India as examples, it projects significant increases in crop failure risks by 2040 and highlights how extreme heat undermines both agricultural yields and the labor and infrastructure necessary for food security. For Europe, these failures could be exploited by Russia through hybrid warfare and disinformation, while destabilizing import-dependent NATO and EU partners. The authors recommend that NATO and the EU integrate food security into resilience frameworks, protect agricultural aid, coordinate trade responses to avoid export bans, and increase investment in climate-smart agricultural R&D.

The briefing warns that Pacific SIDS are facing a convergence of geopolitical and climatic crises. The war in Iran is driving up fuel and food prices due to shipping disruptions and import dependence, leading to states of emergency in Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. This economic strain is expected to be compounded by a strong El Niño in the second half of 2026, which threatens tuna stocks, freshwater access, and agricultural productivity. The document recommends immediate anticipatory action, such as pre-positioning supplies and expanding early warning systems, alongside long-term investments in regenerative agriculture and regional fisheries management.

Latvia employs a "Comprehensive State Defence" model that integrates biosecurity into a whole-of-society resilience framework, led by the Ministry of Health. While the country possesses solid institutional foundations—including a BSL-3 national reference laboratory and a new Crisis Management Centre established in July 2025—it lacks a standalone national biosecurity strategy and does not explicitly identify biological weapons as a distinct threat in its security documentation. Latvia is heavily integrated into EU and NATO mechanisms, regularly conducting CBRN exercises such as RADEX 2025 and participating in ECDC preparedness assessments. Key areas for improvement include modernizing disease surveillance IT infrastructure, formalizing access to BSL-4 capabilities, and articulating a clearer posture against deliberate biological threats.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) analyzes the FY27 US Presidential Budget Request, noting that while biodefense is stated as a priority, general programmatic cuts and agency reorganizations have restricted key programs and reduced budgetary transparency. While the Department of Defense saw a record topline increase to $1.45 trillion, biodefense funding did not increase proportionally. Significant cuts were observed in the Department of State's Global Health Programs and the Department of Agriculture's crop and livestock protection. Conversely, the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) saw a massive increase in its "Pandemic Preparedness and Biodefense" program to $327 million to support pharmaceutical supply chain resilience. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) improved transparency by detailing the transfer of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) functions to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

The document analyzes the geopolitical context of a 2026 summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, noting China's perceived advantage due to US unpredictability and legal rulings on tariffs. It highlights the tension surrounding nuclear weapons, following the expiration of New START and US allegations of Chinese nuclear testing, while suggesting that paths for meaningful engagement on strategic stability still exist.

Mallory Stewart testifies that the U.S. must lead the development of international guardrails and rules of responsible behavior in outer space to avoid unintentional escalation and prevent China and Russia from defining future space security policy. Stewart emphasizes the need for the State Department to lead a unified space diplomacy policy, improve interagency coordination, and restart bilateral and multilateral space security dialogues to strengthen alliances and protect U.S. national security and commercial interests.

The Council on Strategic Risks describes a workshop in California that explored how extreme weather events, such as wildfires and droughts, can be leveraged by opportunistic actors to spread mis- and disinformation. The report identifies key uncertainties regarding generative AI, institutional capacity, and public trust, and presents three divergent future scenarios for the state: a 'muddling through' crisis, a geopolitical collapse triggered by conflict in the Pacific, and a positive social transformation in water management. It concludes that information manipulation is a persistent risk to disaster response and national security, necessitating cross-sector partnerships for resilience.

France maintains a sophisticated biodefense and health security system integrated into broader national resilience strategies, despite lacking a single dedicated national biosecurity strategy. The framework is characterized by a multi-tiered response structure (ORSAN), specialized military and civilian health services, and a strong emphasis on 'One Health' and societal resilience. France is a key actor in international biosecurity, contributing to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), hosting INTERPOL's Bioterrorism Prevention Unit, and leading efforts in WMD accountability.

The document argues that AI has entered its '1911 Moment,' shifting from experimental curiosity to real-world military and diplomatic application. It defines the spectrum of AI capabilities from Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) to theoretical Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) and details current deployments of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and AI-driven decision support in conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere. The authors contrast the 'normal technology' view of AI with the 'exceptional technology' view, noting that the choice between these frameworks dictates whether policy should focus on governing deployment or controlling the models themselves. Finally, it highlights the use of 'compute diplomacy' and AI chip export controls as modern instruments of economic statecraft.

The Council on Strategic Risks proposes that the US government invest $10 billion annually over 10 years in biodefense, noting that the FY26 request of $4.02 billion is insufficient given threats from Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran. The author suggests that 2% of the proposed $500 billion defense spending increase could fund critical enhancements in wastewater surveillance, medical countermeasure discovery via supercomputing, biomanufacturing, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).