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The report finds that Just Transition is a relatively new and poorly understood concept within the Indonesian government, characterized by institutional silos and a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the Ministry of Manpower. While Indonesia is a signatory to the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration, the report notes that Just Transition is unlikely to be explicitly incorporated into the country's updated NDC, though it has been discussed for the 2050 Long Term Strategy for Low Carbon and Climate Resilience. Key gaps include the lack of a dedicated institution for the informal economy, which constitutes up to 60.5% of employment, and the disconnect between Covid-19 recovery responses and climate transition strategies. The Dala Institute recommends using informal knowledge-sharing webinars to engage stakeholders and suggests leveraging the Ministry of Manpower's 'Kartu Prakerja' pre-employment training program to mainstream Just Transition elements.

The policy brief positions carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as a public good and service, similar to wastewater treatment, because most approaches do not generate independent revenues and are avoided by commercial finance. It recommends that governments implement specific absolute volume targets for CDR within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), provide dedicated subsidies, and eliminate regulatory barriers such as underground storage permitting. To ensure long-term scalability, the brief advocates for a universal carbon price, the integration of CDR into Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, and the development of robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) methodologies to maintain environmental integrity.

The policy brief argues that while free allocation in the EU ETS protects against carbon leakage, it mutes the carbon price signal for consumers, leading to underinvestment in material efficiency. To solve this, the authors propose a 'climate contribution'—a weight-based charge on the consumption of carbon-intensive materials sold in Europe. This mechanism would pass carbon costs to users and generate revenue for climate action without the high administrative complexity or trade conflict risks associated with border-focused CBAMs. The brief compares this approach against three other CBAM scenarios, concluding that combining dynamic free allocation with a climate contribution maintains a level playing field for exports and avoids 'resource shuffling' and downstream leakage.

The document examines the progress of five EU Member States in developing policies for a climate-neutral industry. It finds that while most have set 2030 targets, these are generally conservative and focused on energy efficiency. The Netherlands and Germany are the most advanced, implementing specific incentives for advanced technologies, whereas Hungary, Poland, and Spain remain largely in the agenda-setting and policy-formulation stages. The brief emphasizes the need for a predictable legal environment and harmonized EU policies to avoid distorted competition in the basic materials sector.

The document argues that CCfDs can mitigate regulatory and price uncertainty in carbon markets while providing innovation incentives for low-carbon industrial technologies. It positions CCfDs as one element of a broader five-part policy package including climate contributions, renewable CfDs, green public procurement, and product carbon requirements. The brief examines the economic costs and social values of CCfDs, suggests national-level implementation to be practical despite state aid complexities, and discusses their potential integration with COVID-19 Recovery Funds to ensure long-term business cases for green industrial investments.

The report analyzes how the EU's ESIF, particularly the ERDF and CF, supports climate mitigation and energy efficiency in Member States like Lithuania and Slovakia. It identifies success factors such as partnership-based negotiations, alignment with national priorities, and the use of non-grant financial instruments to leverage private capital. However, it notes limitations including administrative hurdles, limited project preparation capacities, and a tendency to fund 'low-hanging fruits' over advanced R&D. The document concludes with five key lessons for international climate policy, emphasizing national ownership, simplified procurement, and the need for comprehensive technical assistance.

The document argues that the rapid government action and public support seen during the COVID-19 crisis provide a momentum that should be used to implement long-term green recovery strategies rather than short-term fixes. It emphasizes the need for a clear EU-wide dimension to investments to lower finance costs and suggests that recovery packages must prioritize social equity and local self-sufficiency to reduce vulnerability. The paper highlights the importance of defining 'green' across different sectors and suggests that cooperation on technology transfers and intellectual property, similar to WHO initiatives during the pandemic, should be applied to climate and clean energy action. It also notes the tension between EU reindustrialization and the needs of the Global South, as well as the geopolitical implications for Border Carbon Adjustment proposals.

The document argues that COVID-19 recovery should be leveraged to advance climate neutrality through international solidarity that goes beyond simple cooperation to include reparations and loss and damage. It highlights the tension between short-term survival needs in developing countries and long-term climate mitigation, suggesting that multilateral regimes for conditional debt relief and bottom-up innovation financing in energy and water sectors could bridge this gap. The paper calls for a critical reassessment of globalisation and the use of the Paris Agreement's Article 6 to implement non-market approaches, such as bulk procurement of low-carbon technologies for least developed countries.

The document explores the intersection of COVID-19 recovery and climate action, arguing that state bailout packages and stimulus measures provide a short window to drive decarbonization and align recovery with the Paris Agreement. It examines the shifting role of the state, the potential for universal basic income to support transitioning workers, and the opportunity to leverage increased public trust in science to counter populism. The paper also highlights the risk of "quick hit" high-carbon responses and the need to avoid backsliding into business-as-usual development.

The document outlines how carbon pricing instruments (CPIs) can create varied socio-economic impacts across different households and regions, noting that risks are higher in developed countries or areas with high existing poverty where low-income groups rely on fossil fuels. It argues that these negative impacts can be offset through policy design and the strategic use of carbon revenues, while emphasizing that such mitigations must not compromise the primary objective of reducing emissions.

The report identifies significant barriers to implementing just transition strategies in developing countries, including a lack of conceptual consensus, the misconception that the concept only applies to developed nations, and weak institutional capacity. It proposes a structured template for NDCs that includes labour market planning, stakeholder engagement, and the creation of inter-departmental coordinating committees. Through case studies of Latin American countries and a policy roundtable, the document emphasizes that no 'one size fits all' approach exists, particularly due to the prevalence of informal economies and varying levels of social protection in low- and middle-income economies.

The document analyzes the energy transition in North Africa, noting that electricity generation must nearly double by 2030 to meet growing demand. While the region is expanding renewable energy capacity and implementing efficiency regulations, natural gas is projected to remain the dominant power source by 2030 unless international financial support and technology transfer accelerate. The author highlights a tension between the region's low historical emissions and its high vulnerability to climate change, warning that insufficient climate finance from developed countries risks the region's ability to meet its Paris Agreement commitments.

The report examines six specific policy cases from the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and Austria to provide a roadmap for decarbonising the non-ETS transport and buildings sectors in CEE countries. It uses a participatory transferability assessment involving experts from Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to identify regional barriers and opportunities for 'leap-frogging' to best practices.

The document argues that because fossil fuel combustion drives both climate change and air pollution, well-designed carbon pricing—such as taxes, emission trading systems, and the removal of subsidies—can reduce both greenhouse gases and local pollutants. It emphasizes that the short-term health benefits of improved air quality often outweigh the costs of climate policy, which can help build broader political support. The author advocates for a holistic policy approach across all sectors and governance levels, involving multidisciplinary research to avoid unintended consequences, such as chemical reactions caused by partial pollutant reduction.

The briefing examines the shared origins of air pollution and climate change, primarily fossil fuel combustion, and advocates for integrated policy frameworks. It details the significant health and economic burdens of air pollution, particularly in urban areas and for vulnerable groups. The text demonstrates that the health co-benefits of climate mitigation, such as carbon pricing, often outweigh the policy costs. It provides examples of coordinated efforts in Chile, California, the EU, Madrid, and London, while warning that uncoordinated policies—such as incentivizing diesel vehicles for lower CO2 or installing SO2 filters that reduce plant efficiency—can create counterproductive outcomes.

The statement advocates for a non-market platform connecting the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) to collectively account for carbon stocks in the Southern Ocean. It highlights that Antarctic blue carbon sites, which are expanding as ice melts, could store up to 160 million tonnes of carbon annually and act as a major natural negative feedback on climate change. By utilizing the ATS's existing framework where sovereignty claims are suspended, the authors suggest a way to bypass diplomatic obstacles to conservation and avoid conflicts over individual Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

The production of basic materials accounts for approximately 25% of global CO2 emissions and 16% of EU GHG emissions. While industry commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 is growing, current innovation funds and carbon pricing are insufficient to make climate-friendly technologies commercially viable. The Climate Friendly Material Platform proposes a policy package including a 'Climate Contribution' as an alternative to Border Tax Adjustments, Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCFDS), Contracts for Difference for Renewables, Green Public Procurement (GPP), and Product Carbon Requirements to stimulate investment and prevent the relocation of production to regions with less stringent climate policies.

The report argues that current carbon pricing and innovation funds are insufficient to transform the basic materials sector. It proposes a five-part policy package: a Climate Contribution to ensure full carbon cost internalisation, project-based Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfDs) to hedge investment risks, Contracts for Difference (CfDs) for renewables to lower electricity costs, Green Public Procurement (GPP) to create lead markets, and long-term Product Carbon Requirements to phase out carbon-intensive materials.

The research identifies 66 carbon pricing policies globally, categorising adopting polities into five clusters: early adopters, North-American states and provinces, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The authors conclude that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to promoting carbon pricing, as different economic, political, and policy variables drive adoption across different clusters. However, they identify general facilitators, including economic crises, UNFCCC commitments, regional learning, and a preference for emissions trading in carbon-intensive economies.

The report analyzes climate policy performance in the transport and buildings sectors across CEE countries, highlighting specific successful initiatives. In transport, it identifies Romania's 'Rabla' car scrappage scheme, Hungary's Jedlik Ányos Action Plan for electric vehicles, Poland's electric bus rollout, Slovakia's railway modernization, and the Czech Republic's integrated public transport laws as regional benchmarks. In the buildings sector, it highlights Romania's EIB-financed thermal insulation, Slovakia's long-term retrofit support, Poland's solar collector promotion, and the Czech Republic's heat pump subsidies. The document argues that these 'first mover' experiences can be transferred across the region to accelerate the low-emission transition.