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The document identifies a critical gap in South Africa's 'just transition' framework, which the author describes as 'reactive' because it primarily addresses future losses in the coal sector. The paper proposes a 'proactive' approach termed 'just distribution,' focusing on the electricity distribution landscape. It argues that the current system—characterized by complex governance shared between Eskom and local municipalities—undermines poverty reduction goals. The author introduces a preliminary 'energy-society model' to map how drivers like local government fiscal models and governance gaps lead to adverse socioeconomic outcomes, such as energy poverty and the forced use of polluting substitutes, which are often more significant than the expected impacts of the low-carbon transition itself.

The research paper defines a 'transition effective state' as one capable of identifying and solving community-priority problems through co-production—a collaborative process where affected citizens are active partners in policy design. Evaluating South Africa's Just Energy Transition (JET), the authors find that current state capabilities are low because the government relies on 'tick-box' public participation and 'isomorphic mimicry' of international best practices rather than locally-driven solutions. Fieldwork in Mpumalanga reveals critical policy gaps, including the invisibility of the informal coal value-chain, the loss of community services provided by Eskom and mines, and water scarcity. The paper concludes that rigid budgeting and entrenched administrative habits hinder progress, recommending the development of detailed co-production guidelines and pilot projects focusing on water and community asset management.

The report examines 'state capture' in South Africa, defined as a systematic project to redirect state resources for private gain by weakening democratic institutions. It focuses on the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (Zondo Commission), detailing its findings on the targeting of state-owned enterprises like Transnet and Eskom, and the role of the Gupta family. The document also analyzes other South African commissions (e.g., Nugent, Mokgoro, Mpati) and provides a comparative analysis with Kenya's Bosire Commission to illustrate the limitations of commissions in achieving individual accountability. Finally, it discusses necessary reforms in public procurement, whistle-blower protection, and the professionalization of the public service to prevent future capture.

The study finds that new coal-fired power plants are not necessary to meet South Africa's electricity demand at the lowest cost and that committing to the Thabametsi and Khanyisa IPPs would substantially increase both system costs and greenhouse gas emissions. Using the South African Times Model (SATIM), the authors demonstrate that a least-cost build plan relies on wind, solar PV, and gas, while the coal IPPs would create a generation surplus and potentially accelerate Eskom's financial crisis. The report highlights that the emissions from these plants would almost entirely offset the savings from the National Energy Efficiency Strategy or the expected reductions from the carbon tax.

The IRP 2019 identifies an immediate risk of power shortages in South Africa due to the declining energy availability factor (EAF) of Eskom's fleet and the decommissioning of old coal plants. To mitigate this, the plan recommends a medium-term power purchase programme, the life extension of the Koeberg nuclear plant to 2044, and the continued operation of plants despite minimum emission standard non-compliance. Long-term, the plan envisions a diversified energy mix shifting from coal toward renewables, gas, and nuclear, while emphasizing a 'just transition' to protect jobs and local economies. It specifically proposes 2,500 MW of new nuclear capacity and the integration of the Grand Inga Hydropower Project from the DRC.

The Life After Coal Campaign (LAC) opposes the establishment of a panel of experts intended to provide guidance on managing sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from existing power plants in South Africa. The LAC argues that such a panel is unnecessary, would duplicate previous work done to set Minimum Emission Standards (MES), and would delay essential actions such as retrofitting plants with abatement technology or decommissioning non-compliant facilities. The campaign expresses concern that the panel could be used to weaken legal emission requirements or grant rolling postponements to operators like Eskom and Sasol. Additionally, the LAC notes a lack of transparency regarding the panel's terms of reference and criticizes the Minister of Environmental Affairs for previously weakening SO2 limits in the amended List of Activities published on 31 October 2018 without proper consultation.

This consolidated report, compiled by Siemens for Eskom, evaluates the requirements and costs for extending the operational life of the Hendrina Power Station. The study examines three scenarios: continuing operations until 2025, extending operations until 2035, and implementing capacity increases through system improvements. Based on physical inspections and desktop studies, the report finds the plant's units 1-10 to be in generally poor condition, with significant output losses due to operating limitations and forced outages.

The Life After Coal Campaign, comprising the Centre for Environmental Rights, groundWork, and Earthlife Africa, submitted a letter to the IPP Office of the Department of Energy on 8 June 2018. The letter highlights findings from a University of Cape Town Energy Research Centre (ERC) report which concludes that the proposed Thabametsi (557MW) and Khanyisa (300MW) coal-fired power stations are not required to meet South Africa's medium-term electricity demand and would increase system costs by R19.68 billion compared to a least-cost energy system. The campaign argues that these projects would increase greenhouse gas emissions by 205.7Mt CO2eq over 30 years, undermining the Paris Agreement and the government's emission mitigation plans. Furthermore, the letter asserts that these plants would exacerbate Eskom's financial crisis by reducing the output of existing, cheaper coal plants and increasing pressure on the utility. The campaign concludes that the projects fail the 'value for money' requirement of the 2011 Electricity Regulations and requests clarification on the deadlines for commercial and financial close.

The study finds that new coal-fired power plants are not necessary to meet South Africa's electricity demand at the lowest cost and that their inclusion would substantially increase both system costs and greenhouse gas emissions. Using the South African Times Model (SATIM), the authors demonstrate that a least-cost build plan relies on wind, solar PV, and gas, while the coal IPPs would create a generation surplus and potentially accelerate Eskom's financial crisis. The report highlights that the emissions from these plants would almost entirely offset the savings from the National Energy Efficiency Strategy or the carbon tax, complicating South Africa's ability to meet its Paris Agreement commitments.

The IEJ criticizes the South African National Treasury's reliance on austerity and private-sector-led growth, arguing that the real burden of national debt is its cost rather than its size. The report proposes a shift toward a developmental budget that prioritizes public investment in infrastructure, green energy, and social services. To fund these priorities without increasing VAT, the IEJ suggests implementing a net wealth tax, reducing tax breaks for high earners, addressing illicit financial flows, and utilizing the Gold and Foreign Exchange Contingency Reserve Account (GFECRA). The document also calls for increasing the Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant to the Food Poverty Line and restructuring Eskom's debt to facilitate a just energy transition.

The report argues that the REIPPPP's centralised, top-down approach reproduces structural disempowerment for rural municipalities. Using eMthanjeni Local Municipality as a case study, it finds that local governments are excluded from early planning and procurement, leading to deteriorating infrastructure and minimal revenue gains. While the programme promises 'green jobs' and community development, the report highlights a skills deficit, the prevalence of short-term construction labour over long-term operational employment, and the failure of community trusts to provide immediate relief due to long loan repayment periods. Furthermore, it notes that land lease benefits primarily accrue to white minority landowners, while the municipality struggles with significant debt to Eskom despite hosting renewable energy infrastructure.

The report explores four international business models—municipal ownership in Germany, state-owned enterprise (SOE) transition in Denmark, public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Morocco, and cooperatives in the United Kingdom—to identify pathways for increasing renewable energy deployment in South Africa. It argues that while the current private-sector-led model (REIPPPP) has increased capacity, it is insufficient to meet the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target or offset the decommissioning of 24,100 MW of coal plants. The authors suggest that a combination of centralized and decentralized public ownership models can address political opposition from trade unions and parties while scaling up green energy. Key recommendations include reforming Eskom into a 'green utility,' conducting a policy gap analysis, and investigating the financial feasibility of non-private ownership models.

South Africa's energy subsidies reached at least ZAR 198 billion (USD 10.8 billion) in FY 2025, with 55% consisting of direct fossil fuel subsidies. The report highlights that electricity subsidies, largely driven by bailouts for the state-owned utility Eskom, support a coal-dominated system where 83% of generation came from fossil fuels in 2024. Key inefficiencies identified include a carbon tax with an effective rate as low as ZAR 7/tCO2 in FY 2022 due to high exemptions, and a Free Basic Electricity (FBE) policy where an estimated 80% of funding is not reaching eligible households. The author recommends a stakeholder-led action plan to align subsidies with just transition frameworks, revise the carbon tax to reflect the social cost of carbon, and shift blanket liquid fuel subsidies toward targeted transport support for low-income households.

The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER), representing groundWork, Earthlife Africa Johannesburg, the Highveld Environmental Justice Network, and the Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance, opposes the Department of Environmental Affairs' (DEA) proposal to create an expert panel to address sulphur dioxide (SO2) abatement. The CER contends that Eskom and Sasol, the country's largest polluters, are using the proposal to avoid compliance with minimum emission standards (MES) and to secure 'rolling postponements'. The document argues that the necessary solution—retrofitting plants with flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) technology or decommissioning non-compliant plants—has already been established through a five-year multi-stakeholder process. Furthermore, it highlights that South African SO2 standards are significantly weaker than those in other developing and developed nations, and that the DEA has no legislative authority to weaken the MES based on industry claims of economic infeasibility.

The report describes a 'silent coup' in South Africa where a power elite centered around President Jacob Zuma and the Gupta family established a symbiotic relationship between the constitutional state and a 'shadow state'. This network repurposed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government departments to redirect public rents into private hands. The authors argue that the rhetoric of 'radical economic transformation' (RET) was used as a smokescreen for this systemic looting. Key mechanisms of capture included the manipulation of SOE boards, the ballooning of the public service to ensure political loyalty, and the subversion of security and intelligence agencies to protect the network and neutralize opposition. The report highlights specific cases of corruption at Transnet, Eskom, and Denel, and warns that the proposed Russian nuclear deal is a primary vehicle for massive future rent extraction.

The Western Cape presents a total investable renewable energy opportunity of R37.4 billion across approximately 2.35 GW of new capacity by 2030. While severe grid constraints on the Eskom network have limited new connections, the 2025 NERSA approval of a 4% congestion curtailment mechanism is expected to unlock 1,180 MW of wind capacity, attracting R20.1 billion in investment. An additional R14 billion is tied to 926 MW of wind and solar projects currently in the budget quote (BQ) phase. Behind-the-meter (BTM) solar PV and battery energy storage systems (BESS) for businesses represent a resilient R3.3 billion market, driven by rising electricity tariffs and corporate decarbonisation pressures, although projects over 1 MW face high compliance costs. Long-term growth is expected following transmission upgrades on the Cape Corridor scheduled for 2028–2031.

The report examines the role of state-owned power companies (SPCs) in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), noting they control approximately 50% of global power station capacity. Through four case studies, it explores specific transition elements: Eskom (South Africa) on just energy transition (JET), NTPC (India) on renewable energy deployment, EVN (Viet Nam) on grid integration, and PLN (Indonesia) on early coal retirement. Key findings highlight that while SPCs can lead low-carbon action due to declining technology costs, they are often hindered by high debt, fossil fuel subsidies, and a lack of comprehensive legal frameworks. The report recommends that governments mandate specific emission targets for SPCs, shift public finance from fossil fuels to clean energy, and that SPCs establish dedicated JET offices and improve data transparency to build stakeholder trust.

The document advocates for the transition from incandescent and mercury vapour lighting to compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), LEDs, and efficient fluorescent tubes in South African urban areas. It highlights that lighting accounts for approximately 12% of electricity use in the residential and commercial sectors, and replacing traditional bulbs with CFLs can reduce this by up to 75%. Using Cape Town as a model, the guide estimates that achieving penetration targets could save 8 million MWh of electricity and 7.5 million tonnes of CO2 by 2024. It identifies barriers such as high initial costs for low-income households and municipal reluctance to reduce electricity sales, while suggesting implementation strategies through procurement policy changes and Eskom's demand side management (DSM) subsidies. Case studies from Ekurhuleni and international examples from Australia, the USA, and India illustrate the economic and environmental viability of these interventions.

The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER), writing on behalf of the Life After Coal Campaign, has called on Standard Bank to cease financing the Thabametsi and Khanyisa coal-fired power stations. The CER argues that these projects are not 'procured' due to missing atmospheric emission, water use, and generation licences, and are subject to High Court reviews. The document asserts that the 2018 draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) incorrectly includes these projects despite a 'least cost' option consisting only of solar, wind, and gas. The CER claims the projects would cost South Africa nearly R20 billion more than necessary, increase electricity prices for consumers, and exacerbate severe health issues in the Waterberg-Bojanala and Highveld Priority Areas. Furthermore, the CER highlights that these plants would have greenhouse gas emission intensities 'almost 60% higher than Eskom’s Medupi and Kusile power stations', undermining South Africa's Paris Agreement commitments.

The document examines South Africa's history of nuclear energy planning, from the 2008 Nuclear-1 plan to the current 2,500MW nuclear build programme. It identifies critical failures in governance, including the impact of state capture during the Zuma presidency and the resulting financial instability of Eskom. The brief highlights challenges such as aging infrastructure at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant and the SAFARI-1 research reactor, a decline in technical expertise, and budget constraints exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It recommends updating the 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy, improving parliamentary oversight of spending, and ensuring transparency and public consultation to make future nuclear expansion financially viable and safe.