A no-regret option: South Africa’s nuclear future

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The document examines South Africa's history of nuclear energy planning, from the 2008 Nuclear-1 plan to the current 2,500MW nuclear build programme. It identifies critical failures in governance, including the impact of state capture during the Zuma presidency and the resulting financial instability of Eskom. The brief highlights challenges such as aging infrastructure at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant and the SAFARI-1 research reactor, a decline in technical expertise, and budget constraints exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It recommends updating the 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy, improving parliamentary oversight of spending, and ensuring transparency and public consultation to make future nuclear expansion financially viable and safe.

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  • South Africa's domestic nuclear governance is described as poor, fragmented, and outdated, which may hinder the realization of future nuclear plans.
  • The nuclear expansion plans during Jacob Zuma's presidency were viewed as a cover for large-scale state capture, with estimated costs for the new build ranging from ZAR 600 billion to ZAR 1 trillion.
  • The Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) has lost its 20% share of the global radioisotope and radiopharmaceutical market due to poor governance and corruption.
  • South Africa faces a shortage of technical skills and a dwindling pool of experts, with existing training programmes being fragmented and lacking success assessments.
  • Critical nuclear infrastructure, specifically the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant and the SAFARI-1 research reactor, has reached the end of its life cycle and requires significant investment for safe operation.
  • The 2013 IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) expressed concerns regarding nuclear safety and security, suggesting the need for a comprehensive nuclear law covering liability, safety, and security.
  • The government is pursuing a revived nuclear build programme for 2,500MW capacity, as indicated by a June 2020 Request for Information (RFI) and subsequent NERSA consultation papers.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2021). A no-regret option: South Africa’s nuclear future. https://saiia.org.za/research/a-no-regret-option-south-africas-nuclear-future/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. A no-regret option: South Africa’s nuclear future. 2021. https://saiia.org.za/research/a-no-regret-option-south-africas-nuclear-future/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=A no-regret option: South Africa’s nuclear future |date=1 March 2021 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/a-no-regret-option-south-africas-nuclear-future/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2021noregret, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{A no-regret option: South Africa’s nuclear future}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2021}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/a-no-regret-option-south-africas-nuclear-future/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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