Search Climate Insights Directory

The paper examines the security implications of geoengineering, distinguishing between long-term risks of unilateral deployment and near-term risks involving geopolitical competition and misinformation. It highlights how a lack of trust between the Global North and South, combined with strategic competition between powers like the US, China, and Russia, could lead to states attributing natural disasters to perceived geoengineering attempts. Drawing on historical examples like Project Popeye and the 1978 ENMOD treaty, the author argues against a total ban on geoengineering, suggesting instead that the US lead the development of transparent, civilian-led guardrails and robust science diplomacy to mitigate these risks while continuing the transition from fossil fuels.

The authors call for a transformation of the international financial architecture during the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings to better support climate adaptation and resilience in fragile contexts. They argue that failing to improve access to finance for climate-vulnerable nations threatens global security by exacerbating risks such as irregular migration and political instability.

The report identifies that climate change creates systemic stressors for the UK Home Office, ranging from direct threats to public health and infrastructure to indirect risks like societal polarization and organized crime. It argues that the Home Office must move from a reactive to a proactive posture by establishing a high-level climate security policy initiative. The proposed Action Plan is built on four pillars: exercising sustained leadership, understanding and anticipating risks through better data and literacy, collaborating with domestic and international partners, and implementing specific preventative measures to protect citizens and maintain social cohesion.

The document examines India as a critical case study for the climate-insecurity-migration nexus, highlighting the tension between economic development and climate action. It identifies the need for stronger domestic architecture, regional policy platforms, improved institutional coordination, and adequate climate finance to address these challenges across South and Southeast Asia.

DASD Caroline Baxter describes the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) efforts to integrate climate literacy into professional military education (PME). She argues that climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" affecting installations, mission demand, and budgets. The DoD's approach focuses on making climate information mission-relevant, integrating it into existing curricula to avoid task saturation, and emphasizing readiness and lethality over political terminology. Key initiatives include the Climate Literacy Sub-Working Group, a new outcomes-based PME instruction, and a dedicated online portal for authoritative climate information.

The briefing identifies a critical national security risk stemming from the US pharmaceutical supply chain's dependence on China, which is the sole source for approximately 20% of API for vital medicines and 45% of KSM. It highlights that domestic generic manufacturing is severely underutilized, with plants operating at only half capacity, leaving the healthcare system and military vulnerable to shortages. The author proposes a phased strategy: immediately filling the Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient Reserve (SAPIR) with an 18-month supply of essential ingredients, providing grants and loans to transition manufacturing to US plants, and closing the 'Acetris loophole' to ensure 'manufactured in the U.S.' requires substantial transformation. The long-term goal is to achieve a domestic manufacturing capacity utilization of over 75% and reduce the number of drug shortages to below 50 within ten years.

The workshop highlighted that Japan's continued reliance on fossil fuel imports creates acute security vulnerabilities and trade-offs, particularly when intersecting with climate hazards and geopolitical tensions. Participants identified that public opinion can be a driver for the renewable energy transition if technology is perceived as viable, and suggested that Japan should pursue an energy resilience alliance with like-minded countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. The report emphasizes the need for deeper inter-governmental dialogue across Japanese ministries to integrate climate security into national defense planning and to mitigate supply chain risks associated with renewable technology, specifically reliance on China.

The document examines the intersection of food insecurity, climate change, and conflict, noting that while food security is beginning to be mainstreamed into multilateral processes, there is a critical lack of climate finance for green transitions in food systems. It highlights how food insecurity can increase security risks and be exploited by terrorist organizations for recruitment, urging a shift away from donor-driven approaches and policy silos to treat food security as a predictive tool for stability.

The authors identify a category of 'risks of response' where climate policies trigger security dynamics, exemplified by widespread farmer protests across Europe. These protests, driven by grievances over fuel subsidies and environmental regulations, have escalated into violence and provided opportunities for far-right parties to foment instability. The text warns that this 'green backlash' could slow the transition and increase global security risks if not managed with better risk assessments and ameliorating measures.

The document details Kazakhstan's efforts to eliminate its inherited Soviet nuclear and biological weapons legacies and its current leadership roles in the NPT and the proposed International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS). It recommends that Kazakhstan push for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, the creation of a nuclear weapons database, and the formalization of the IABS to address gaps in the Biological Weapons Convention.

The report examines the intersection of climate change, food security, and geopolitics, highlighting how food systems are being weaponized by actors like Russia and how China's food security challenges influence its global strategy. It argues that food insecurity acts as a threat multiplier for political instability and conflict, particularly in Africa. The document advocates for a 'nexus approach' that integrates defense, diplomacy, and development to build local agricultural resilience, focusing on smallholder farmers and women to mitigate long-term climate risks and reduce global vulnerabilities.

The document examines how climate change and sea level rise threaten coastal communities and military infrastructure, potentially leading to social instability and reduced military readiness. It advocates for the use of nature-based solutions—such as mangroves, coral reefs, and salt marshes—as cost-effective alternatives or supplements to artificial infrastructure to dissipate wave energy and reduce flooding. The author highlights specific military applications, including US Department of Defense projects in Florida and UK efforts in overseas territories, and suggests that supporting these ecological defenses in partner nations can bolster strategic alliances and global security.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) reports on the 2023 status of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), noting a breakthrough in consensus at the previous year's Review Conference despite a difficult geopolitical climate. The document advocates for the establishment of a multi-layered verification mechanism, the creation of an International Agency for Biological Safety, and the development of independent scientific assessment tools. It highlights successful BWC universalization efforts in Africa led by the ISU and UNODA, while warning that baseless non-compliance allegations undermine the treaty's goodwill.

The briefing highlights the unprecedented inclusion of peace on the COP28 agenda, the role of climate finance as a security tool and geopolitical flashpoint, the environmental and security impacts of the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, and the security implications of the first Global Stocktake's findings on temperature rise.

On July 7, 2023, the United States destroyed the last of its declared chemical weapons stockpile, marking the elimination of 100 percent of the world's declared chemical weapons. The process was overseen by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and faced delays due to technical challenges and local opposition to incineration methods at sites like the Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot. Despite this milestone, the report highlights ongoing noncompliance by Burma, Iran, Russia, and Syria, and the use of Novichok nerve agents. It argues that the U.S. must retain its scientific and technical countering-WMD expertise to assist in treaty verification and respond to future contingencies, especially as other nonproliferation frameworks, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, face increasing fragility.

The document highlights a critical gap in climate finance, noting that while developing countries may need between $6 trillion and $9 trillion per year to meet their Nationally Determined Contributions, current funding is insufficient and traditional sources are nearly depleted. It identifies 'cracks' in the transatlantic alliance, citing US domestic political opposition to climate pledges, UK economic downturns, and EU internal divisions. The author recommends that leaders use COP28 and the Global Stocktake to reform multilateral development banks, link climate action to global security and food systems, and resolve disputes between the US and Europe to maintain global leadership in the green transition.

The Council on Strategic Risks proposes several avenues for U.S.-China cooperation to reduce nuclear risks, including preventing the spread of tactical nuclear weapons, discussing nuclear-only intermediate-range force measures, halting the nuclear arming of cruise missiles, and improving crisis communications.

The document assesses the outcomes of the UK's AI Safety Summit and emphasizes the urgent need for global coordination to address the 'Bio-AI risk nexus'. It argues that while AI can accelerate bioengineering R&D, it also poses catastrophic risks, such as AI-enabled aerosolised pathogenic release. The author suggests that risk mitigation must move beyond focusing on large language models to analyze how AI influences specific steps of the biological weapons lifecycle, while maintaining traditional public health and pandemic preparedness safeguards.

The report argues that pandemic prevention must shift from a human-centric biosecurity model to a holistic 'One Health' approach that integrates ecological security. It identifies critical gaps, such as funding silos between human and animal health research and a lack of sociological context in interventions. The document details U.S. agency efforts—including those by the USGS, FWS, and USAID—and proposes a project lifecycle for spillover prevention that emphasizes multidisciplinary teams, community engagement, and standardized data practices. It specifically highlights how deforestation, illicit wildlife trade, and industrial animal husbandry increase spillover risks, and recommends treating conservation as a national security imperative.

The document argues that while climate change drives extreme weather in Pakistan, such as the 2022 floods, the resulting devastation and security risks are multiplied by systemic governance failures, socioeconomic inequality, and political instability. It highlights a pattern where comprehensive strategic documents are produced following disasters, but implementation is hindered by a lack of localized governance and a political focus on short-term power over long-term resilience.