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The document analyzes the Jawa-7 project in Indonesia and the Hwange Expansion Project in Zimbabwe. It finds that while Indonesia's more robust regulatory framework and the use of ultra-supercritical technology limited some environmental impacts, Zimbabwe's lack of transparency and reliance on sub-critical technology led to severe pollution and community displacement. Both cases highlight a tension between national desires to exploit domestic coal reserves and international climate commitments, as well as persistent governance issues and a lack of transparency associated with Chinese-led infrastructure lending.

The document analyzes the ESG impacts of the Lamu Port in Kenya and the Kuantan Port in Malaysia, both developed under China's Belt and Road Initiative. It finds that both projects caused significant environmental damage, including the loss of mangroves in Kenya and pollution from bauxite mining in Malaysia. Socio-economic issues include unpaid compensation for displaced communities in Kenya and public health concerns in Malaysia. The briefing argues that these projects often prioritize political elite interests over pragmatic alternatives, leading to governance failures and questionable economic rationales.

The COVID-19 pandemic increased food insecurity across Africa, with upper-middle income countries like South Africa experiencing higher vulnerability due to their reliance on formal employment and global supply chains. While agricultural production grew in 2020, protectionist measures such as export bans in Malawi hindered the redistribution of food. The document highlights the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) as a critical mechanism to reduce dependence on global imports, lower trade barriers, and improve food resilience through increased intra-continental trade and the legalisation of informal cross-border trade.

The Ugandan government responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to mitigate the economic contraction caused by aggressive containment measures. While these policies helped maintain financial sector stability and provided temporary liquidity to businesses, the economy experienced a significant slowdown, with real GDP growth dropping from 6.8% in FY 2018/19 to 2.9% in FY 2019/20. The industrial and services sectors were hardest hit, contributing to a projected 34.5% increase in the number of people living below the poverty line. Fiscal strain led to a rise in public debt from $12.55 billion to $15.27 billion in FY 2019/20, while the external sector saw a contraction in foreign direct investment and tourism receipts.

The document examines the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Stung Tatay project in Cambodia, analyzing how ESG standards were applied. It finds that while Chinese firms led construction, the implementation of ESG standards was dominated by local actors, leading to outcomes that reflected the institutional capacities and transparency levels of the host governments. Both projects resulted in significant habitat destruction for endangered species and loss of local livelihoods, though Ghana exhibited higher levels of transparency and stakeholder engagement than Cambodia.

The document outlines key lessons for SADC member states to improve their NDCs, emphasizing the need for inclusive stakeholder engagement, alignment with long-term development goals, and the use of quantifiable targets and evidence-based analysis. It highlights examples from South Africa, Rwanda, and Costa Rica to demonstrate how detailed implementation roadmaps and participatory scenario planning can enhance climate commitments.

The statement criticizes the imposition of travel bans on Southern African countries, asserting that such measures are ineffective at stopping mutations and cause significant economic damage. It highlights the disparity in vaccination rates between Africa and advanced economies, calling for the decentralization of vaccine manufacturing, the implementation of a WTO intellectual property rights waiver, and a shift from unilateralism to collective global action to ensure equitable vaccine distribution.

The document examines the intersection of pandemic recovery and climate finance, highlighting that most global recovery funds are not contributing to greening economies. It emphasizes the failure of developed nations to meet the $100 billion annual climate finance pledge and advocates for a new goal of $1.3 trillion per year by 2030 to support African countries. The briefing identifies significant barriers to accessing finance, including complex procedures and a lack of climate data, and suggests using Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to hold governments accountable for the climate impact of their recovery spending.

The document examines the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework's Two-Pillar Solution to tax challenges from the digitalisation of the economy. It highlights that developing countries, particularly in Africa, suffer disproportionate revenue losses from tax avoidance—up to 5%–8% of GDP in some cases—compared to developed nations. The author argues that the current framework lacks adequate representation of African nations (only 23 of 55 AU members participated) and contains provisions, such as a 15% minimum corporate tax rate and high turnover thresholds for profit reallocation, that may marginalise poorer economies. The brief recommends shifting negotiations to a neutral body like the UN and increasing technical and financial support for developing countries to implement new standards.

The document examines how ESG standards are applied in Chinese-led hydropower projects in the Global South, contrasting the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Stung Tatay project in Cambodia. It finds that while Chinese contractors lead construction, the implementation of ESG standards is primarily the responsibility of local actors and recipient governments. In Cambodia, a lack of transparency and weak governance eroded public trust and left the actual impact of the Stung Tatay project unclear. In Ghana, the Bui Dam project benefited from higher transparency and stakeholder engagement, though it still suffered from failures in environmental mitigation and unfulfilled socioeconomic promises. Both cases demonstrate that institutional weaknesses in recipient governments can lead to poor ESG outcomes, creating reputational risks for Chinese contractors.

The document analyzes the resurgent roles of China and Russia in Africa since 2000. China's influence is primarily economic, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative and long-term infrastructure investments, while Russia's approach is more opportunistic, focusing on mining, arms exports, and the deployment of private military contractors in fragile states. While the two powers coordinate on challenging Western norms and supporting non-interference in the UN Security Council, they maintain a 'competitive partnership' characterized by limited strategic coordination in security and economics, and occasional competition for commercial contracts in countries like Zimbabwe.

The report analyzes the 2019 HRC voting records of 13 African member states, finding a significant lack of unity within the African Group. While South Africa, Rwanda, and Burkina Faso emerged as the strongest supporters of international human rights, Egypt, Eritrea, and Cameroon were the most opposed. The analysis highlights a recurring contradiction where many African states strongly support resolutions condemning Israel while opposing or abstaining from resolutions targeting other rights-abusing regimes. Overall, the report suggests a general unwillingness among African states to defend international human rights, with a noted decline in support since 2017.

Russia is attempting to leverage historical Soviet-era ties and new institutional frameworks, such as the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum, to increase its presence in Zambia and Tanzania. While there is significant high-level political engagement and cooperation in nuclear energy and military sales, the report finds that Russia's economic footprint remains limited compared to China and other global powers. Key efforts include the promotion of nuclear research centers in Zambia and the use of 'debt-for-development' schemes, though the latter have seen little success in these two countries. The report also notes the use of the COVID-19 pandemic for geopolitical gain through vaccine diplomacy and targeted tourism to Zanzibar.

The document provides a multi-expert critique of COP26, noting that while the summit completed the Paris Agreement rule book and secured net zero commitments for 90% of the world, it failed to secure a 'grand bargain' for coal with India or a loss and damage fund. It highlights the $8.5 billion just transition deal for South Africa as a potential model but warns that developed nations have failed to meet the $100 billion annual finance goal. Experts argue that the summit ignored the critical role of oceans in carbon absorption and failed to address the resource-intensive economic systems driving global warming.

The document examines China's role as a primary funder and contractor of ICT networks in the Global South, specifically through the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. It compares the implementation of a submarine fibre optic cable in Cambodia and the National ICT Broadband Backbone in Tanzania. The analysis finds that while these projects generally had limited environmental impacts and provided essential connectivity, they suffered from a lack of transparency and mixed results in socioeconomic mitigation, such as limited high-level technology transfer and underutilisation of infrastructure.

The document outlines the financial gap for climate action in Africa, noting that NDCs will require approximately $3 trillion by 2030. It identifies significant barriers to private investment, including political, project, and economic risks, as well as a lack of 'bankable' projects. To address these, the brief recommends the development of NDC implementation plans, the use of credit enhancement mechanisms via blended finance, and the provision of technical grant-based funding to help borrowers reach the bankability stage. It specifically emphasizes the need for catalytic public finance to unlock private investment in adaptation and nature-based solutions.

The document argues that Africa faces an existential crisis due to climate change, yet adaptation finance remains critically low compared to mitigation. It identifies barriers such as the perception of adaptation as a public good, lack of bankable proposals, and inadequate climate data. To address these, the brief recommends demonstrating the business case for adaptation to attract private capital, strengthening government technical capacity, introducing adaptation levies, and lobbying for a distinct international goal for adaptation finance.

The document presents recommendations from African stakeholders to improve the quantum and quality of climate finance. Key priorities include establishing a global goal for adaptation finance, streamlining access to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and creating national regulatory environments to unlock private investment. It emphasizes the need for grant-based finance to avoid exacerbating debt crises and calls for a broader definition of return on investment for adaptation projects.

The South African Youth Climate Action Plan (SA YCAP) is a comprehensive framework developed by young people aged 13-30 to advocate for an intersectional and just transition to a decarbonised economy. It calls for the integration of youth in policymaking, the implementation of a national climate education plan, and a shift from fossil fuel dependency to decentralised renewable energy. The plan emphasizes the need for good governance to combat corruption in climate finance and proposes specific nature-based solutions and sustainable agricultural practices to protect South Africa's biodiversity and food security.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of nuclear governance across the Southern African Development Community (SADC), categorising member states by their nuclear capacity and identifying gaps in regulatory synchronisation. It highlights the critical need for harmonised policies to manage the transport of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) and radioactive sources across borders. The author proposes leveraging the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the African Association of Competent Authorities (AACA) to create a more integrated regional safety and security architecture.