China-driven hydropower: Lessons from Ghana and Cambodia

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The document examines how ESG standards are applied in Chinese-led hydropower projects in the Global South, contrasting the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Stung Tatay project in Cambodia. It finds that while Chinese contractors lead construction, the implementation of ESG standards is primarily the responsibility of local actors and recipient governments. In Cambodia, a lack of transparency and weak governance eroded public trust and left the actual impact of the Stung Tatay project unclear. In Ghana, the Bui Dam project benefited from higher transparency and stakeholder engagement, though it still suffered from failures in environmental mitigation and unfulfilled socioeconomic promises. Both cases demonstrate that institutional weaknesses in recipient governments can lead to poor ESG outcomes, creating reputational risks for Chinese contractors.

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  • China's domestic hydropower regulation is split between large-scale projects, which require coordination between central and local governments and multiple ministries, and 'rural' or 'small hydropower' projects (below 50,000 KW) which have a simpler management system. By the end of 2019, rural hydropower stations accounted for 22.9% of China's installed hydropower capacity.
  • The Stung Tatay hydropower project in Cambodia, a 246 MW dam funded by a $540 million China Exim Bank loan, was marked by a significant lack of transparency. The official Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was not public, and there were conflicting estimates regarding the flooded area, with one source claiming 2,949 hectares and another (JICA) projecting 4,600 hectares.
  • The Stung Tatay project caused environmental damage to the Cardamom Forest, affecting endangered species such as Siamese crocodiles and elephants. Additionally, there is no evidence that promised socioeconomic programs—including healthcare, agricultural support, and small business loans—were ever implemented.
  • In Ghana, the Bui Dam project (400 MW) saw the Ghanaian government and the Bui Power Authority (BPA) take primary responsibility for the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), rather than the Chinese contractor, Sinohydro. However, environmental mitigation failed significantly, with approximately 21% of the forest area inundated and the displacement or death of a hippo population estimated at 305.
  • The resettlement process for the Bui Dam displaced 1,216 residents from 219 households. While the process was more transparent than in Cambodia and based on World Bank and IFC standards, it failed to deliver promised skills training and the development of 'Bui City,' leaving displaced communities in the temporary Jama Resettlement Township.
  • A comparison of the two projects indicates that ESG implementation is heavily dependent on the recipient government's capacity. While Ghana demonstrated higher transparency and better stakeholder engagement through initiatives like the Ghana Dams Dialogue, both projects suffered from a lack of government capacity to fully implement mitigation measures, which increases the reputational risk for Chinese contractors.

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APA
MURG, B., VAN STADEN, C., & DUANYONG, W. (2021). China-driven hydropower: Lessons from Ghana and Cambodia. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/PB-254-AGDP-FCDO-Murg-van-Staden-Duanyong-FINAL-WEB.pdf
Chicago
MURG, BRADLEY, COBUS VAN STADEN, and WANG DUANYONG. China-driven hydropower: Lessons from Ghana and Cambodia. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2021. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/PB-254-AGDP-FCDO-Murg-van-Staden-Duanyong-FINAL-WEB.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=MURG |first1=BRADLEY |last2=VAN STADEN |first2=COBUS |last3=DUANYONG |first3=WANG |title=China-driven hydropower: Lessons from Ghana and Cambodia |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=December 2021 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/PB-254-AGDP-FCDO-Murg-van-Staden-Duanyong-FINAL-WEB.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{murg2021chinadriven, author = {MURG, BRADLEY and VAN STADEN, COBUS and DUANYONG, WANG}, title = {{China-driven hydropower: Lessons from Ghana and Cambodia}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2021}, month = dec, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/PB-254-AGDP-FCDO-Murg-van-Staden-Duanyong-FINAL-WEB.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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