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The report finds that section 139 interventions in South African municipalities are largely ineffective, often initiated only after 'total collapse' rather than as a preventative measure. It highlights a systemic misapplication of the law, where discretionary section 139(1) interventions are used for financial crises that legally require mandatory section 139(5) recovery plans. The authors argue that the use of administrators to assume all executive functions is legally baseless and often worsens municipal health due to incompetence or corruption. The report recommends a standardized implementation framework with clear trigger thresholds and strengthened oversight from the NCOP and National Treasury's Municipal Financial Recovery Service.

The research examines the systemic nature of corruption and rent-seeking in South African metropolitan municipalities. It contrasts two distinct governance models: Cape Town's 'growth machine,' which leverages land rights and property development for established interests, and Nelson Mandela Bay's 'clientelist' regime, which relies on procurement and personnel rents to sustain patronage networks. The author argues that while growth machines may produce better overall development outcomes, neither model effectively serves the urban poor.

The report identifies significant vulnerabilities in the South African criminal justice system, where the President and various Ministers hold unfettered discretion over the appointment and removal of heads of key institutions. The Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) argues that this lack of oversight facilitates political interference and 'state capture'. The document proposes a legislative overhaul to implement a Judicial Service Commission-style model for appointments and the creation of independent disciplinary committees to ensure both security of tenure and public accountability.

The author comments on PARI's position papers regarding state reform in South Africa, arguing that public procurement should be used as a tool for industrial policy and economic transformation. The text distinguishes between 'developmental' procurement, which fosters high-productivity industries and innovation, and 'non-developmental' procurement, which often results in the outsourcing of state services to dependent firms. The author suggests that while South Africa has used procurement to support black business growth, there is an urgent need to transition toward 'Procurement for Innovation' (PPfI) to drive structural transformation and reduce the influence of state-dependent coalitions associated with 'state capture'.

The briefing highlights the role of 'private actors in the service industry', such as bankers, lawyers, and accountants, in designing the structures that facilitate state capture and corruption, noting that these actors are frequently not held accountable.

The Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) is releasing three position papers in August 2019 aimed at structural state reform in South Africa. The proposals focus on depoliticising public service recruitment, reforming state procurement to support development while strengthening contract management, and increasing the independence of senior appointments within criminal justice institutions to combat state capture and corruption.

A coalition of civil society organisations condemns the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) for using violent language and intimidation against the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation and journalists. The groups urge the EFF and other political parties to adhere to the Bill of Rights and Constitution, calling for a focus on addressing economic crimes, such as the VBS bank looting and state capture, rather than engaging in divisive race baiting.

A coalition of progressive civil society organisations calls on the South African Parliament to ensure that individuals implicated in state capture are not appointed to office and to protect the Zondo Commission from political interference. The letter also urges the government to implement the Political Party Funding Act, debate electoral reform based on the 2003 Van Slabbert Commission recommendations, and declare a climate emergency to address ongoing droughts and environmental threats.

The authors examine South Africa's transition toward a 'contract state' and the subsequent failures of its public procurement regulatory regime. They highlight that while the state has moved toward a centrally steered but decentralised form, limited central steering capacity has resulted in a fragmented system prone to corruption. The paper discusses a 2013 reform initiative by the Minister of Finance intended to establish a centre-led, strategic, and developmental procurement methodology to address these systemic deficits.

The report argues that Kenya suffers from 'state capture,' where a political elite has repurposed state institutions—specifically the Presidency and the Treasury—for private profiteering and to fund electioneering. It contends that conventional anti-corruption efforts, including high-profile arrests and commissions of inquiry, are tactical 'stagecraft' that fail to address the deep roots of the problem. The document details three major cases of state capture: the Goldenberg, Anglo Leasing, and Eurobond scandals. It further analyzes how the electoral management body, the police, and the judiciary have been compromised to maintain this system. The report concludes that while democracy has been hollowed out, it still offers potential for rupture through economic crises or the emergence of powerful anti-corruption coalitions, and suggests that civil society should focus on archiving evidence for future prosecutions and pursuing international indictments.

The author argues that education administrations in the Transkei and Ciskei bantustans exhibited weak infrastructural power, characterized by poor control over system expansion, uneven supervision of teachers, and an inability to regulate social relations for routine education provision. While professional teacher associations attempted to limit protest, they could not ensure compliance among a stressed teaching workforce. This weakness persisted into the post-apartheid period in the Eastern Cape, suggesting a continuity of weak state authority in the education sector.

The document highlights a gap between theoretical strategic planning and its practical implementation in the public sector, noting that plans are often disconnected from budgets and lack clear mechanisms for prioritisation and alignment. It argues that while theoretical frameworks for performance management and monitoring and evaluation exist, there is a lack of critical, systematic evidence on what works in practice, particularly in Southern Africa.

This 2013 case study by Tracy Ledger examines the origins of South Africa's energy crisis, focusing on the role of the state utility Eskom and the systemic failures that led to widespread power cuts and load shedding starting in 2007.

The report examines the gap between strategic planning and implementation in the public sector, with a focus on South Africa. It argues that successful prioritisation and alignment are not merely technical achievements but are dependent on the socio-political environment, including the concentration of state power and the stability of the political-administrative interface. Through case studies of Chile, Malaysia, and Uganda, the document highlights the importance of iterative planning, strong central coordination, and the integration of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) into budgetary decisions. It specifically critiques the South African context, noting that its constitutional structure of three independent spheres of government and the prevalence of factional politics hinder top-down alignment. The report suggests that South Africa could benefit from 'lab'-style planning, nested monitoring hierarchies, and genuine participatory governance to bridge the planning-implementation gap.

The author argues that African administrations, specifically in Cameroon, should move beyond a 'tax for service' paradigm to understand the sociological drivers of tax resistance and the concept of the 'just tax' to increase tax morale.

The People's Tribunal on Economic Crime recommends urgent investigations and prosecutions into three areas of economic crime in South Africa: apartheid-era UN sanctions violations, the 1999 Arms Deal, and state capture. The Tribunal argues that sanctions-busting during apartheid aided crimes against humanity and created a culture of corruption that enabled the 1999 Arms Deal and subsequent state capture. Key recommendations include establishing a special prosecutorial team within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to investigate entities like Kredietbank and the French government, and creating a specialised commission and tribunal for crimes against humanity.

The guide outlines the legal obligations and procedures for reporting wrongdoing within the South African public service. It distinguishes between general reports and 'protected disclosures' under the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000, which offers legal safeguards against 'occupational detriment' such as dismissal or harassment. The document mandates that departments establish formal reporting policies including confidential channels, recording systems, and investigation procedures. It specifically highlights the duty of officials in positions of authority to report corruption involving R100,000 or more to the police.

The report examines the 'political-administrative interface' in South Africa, arguing that while political deployment was a post-apartheid imperative for transformation, it has evolved into a system of clientelism and patronage. Through interviews with public servants in local, provincial, and national government, the authors illustrate how political interference—often driven by factionalism within the ANC—leads to institutional instability, the appointment of incompetent officials, and severe psychological trauma for employees. The document concludes by recommending a shift toward professionalisation, including strengthening the oversight powers of the Public Service Commission and limiting the HR authority of political executives to senior-most positions.

This report by the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) South Africa examines the role of taxation in state-society relations within sub-Saharan Africa, specifically focusing on South Africa, Mozambique, and Cameroon. The authors argue that the effectiveness of a tax system depends not only on institutional design but also on the socio-political dynamics and societal perceptions that influence tax morale and voluntary compliance.

The document describes how the ANC government under Jacob Zuma shifted toward tyranny by disregarding the constitution and rule of law, driven by a perception that these frameworks hindered radical economic transformation. This environment enabled widespread state corruption, which in turn triggered a resurgence of civil society coalitions aimed at forcing the government to adhere to legal rules.