Rents and Repurposing in Two South African Cities

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The research examines the systemic nature of corruption and rent-seeking in South African metropolitan municipalities. It contrasts two distinct governance models: Cape Town's 'growth machine,' which leverages land rights and property development for established interests, and Nelson Mandela Bay's 'clientelist' regime, which relies on procurement and personnel rents to sustain patronage networks. The author argues that while growth machines may produce better overall development outcomes, neither model effectively serves the urban poor.

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  • The author identifies a 'growth machine' model in Cape Town, characterized by a hierarchical administration and strong vertical accountability, where power is centralized in the Mayor's office to facilitate land rights allocation to established property interests.
  • In contrast to Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay is described as a 'clientelist' regime where an atomized organization is replaced by informal networks that distribute procurement and personnel rents to sustain a decentralized patronage-based model.
  • Municipal rents are generated through various mechanisms, including land use zoning, building plan approvals, procurement contracts, staff appointments, and reductions in service charges or property valuations.
  • Regulatory decisions regarding land enablement are particularly potent sources of rent because they increase property values without transferring municipal funds, making them harder for auditors to track.
  • Despite the differences in governance structures, both the growth-machine and clientelist regimes fail to specifically benefit the urban poor, often marginalizing them institutionally or pushing them to the urban periphery.
  • The paper notes a broader decay of institutional controls in South African local government, citing that approximately two-thirds of municipalities have material findings regarding unfair or uncompetitive supply chain management processes.

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APA
Olver, C. (2019). Rents and Repurposing in Two South African Cities. Public Affairs Research Institute. https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/20190918_CrispianOlver_WorkingPaper_RentsAndRepurposing.pdf
Chicago
Olver, Crispian. Rents and Repurposing in Two South African Cities. Public Affairs Research Institute, 2019. https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/20190918_CrispianOlver_WorkingPaper_RentsAndRepurposing.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Olver |first1=Crispian |title=Rents and Repurposing in Two South African Cities |publisher=Public Affairs Research Institute |date=September 2019 |url=https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/20190918_CrispianOlver_WorkingPaper_RentsAndRepurposing.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{olver2019rents, author = {Olver, Crispian}, title = {{Rents and Repurposing in Two South African Cities}}, institution = {Public Affairs Research Institute}, year = {2019}, month = sep, url = {https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/20190918_CrispianOlver_WorkingPaper_RentsAndRepurposing.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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