DELIVERY OF JUSTICE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The report identifies significant vulnerabilities in the South African criminal justice system, where the President and various Ministers hold unfettered discretion over the appointment and removal of heads of key institutions. The Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) argues that this lack of oversight facilitates political interference and 'state capture'. The document proposes a legislative overhaul to implement a Judicial Service Commission-style model for appointments and the creation of independent disciplinary committees to ensure both security of tenure and public accountability.

• For five of the eight identified criminal justice institutions, the President has the discretion to appoint candidates with little to no oversight, specifically including the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the head of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU).
• There is a critical lack of prescribed eligibility criteria for leadership positions across the criminal justice system; the Public Protector is the only exception with extensive criteria, while others use vague terms like "fit and proper". The National Commissioner of SAPS has no eligibility criteria at all.
• Removal procedures for institutional heads are largely controlled by the President or relevant Ministers, which threatens security of tenure. Notably, the Head of the SIU can be removed by the President "at any time" based on undefined "sound reasons".
• The HSF recommends a systemic shift toward a Judicial Service Commission (JSC)-like model for all criminal justice head appointments to remove the decision-making power from a single political office holder.
• Panelists highlighted a dangerous blurring of political and professional roles, where political figures interfere in professional executions of policy, such as the Minister of Justice inquiring about specific investigations handled by the NDPP.

APA

Public Affairs Research Institute (2019). DELIVERY OF JUSTICE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY. https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/report-on-delivery-of-justice-independence-and-accountability.pdf

Chicago

Public Affairs Research Institute. DELIVERY OF JUSTICE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY. 2019. https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/report-on-delivery-of-justice-independence-and-accountability.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Public Affairs Research Institute |title=DELIVERY OF JUSTICE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY |date=7 August 2019 |url=https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/report-on-delivery-of-justice-independence-and-accountability.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{publicaffairsresearchinstitute2019delivery, author = {{Public Affairs Research Institute}}, title = {{DELIVERY OF JUSTICE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY}}, institution = {Public Affairs Research Institute}, year = {2019}, month = aug, url = {https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/report-on-delivery-of-justice-independence-and-accountability.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }