Search Climate Insights Directory

The report details how climate change drives biodiversity loss through mechanisms like ocean acidification and species range shifts, while biodiversity loss weakens the planet's carbon sinks. It critically assesses 'false solutions'—including monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsetting, and geoengineering—arguing that these policies often cause further ecological damage and land grabbing. The document calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, energy sufficiency, and the protection of Indigenous Peoples' land rights to address the polycrisis holistically.

The manual outlines a pedagogical framework to move beyond simple renewable energy substitution toward a systemic change based on energy sufficiency and sovereignty. It critiques 'energy extractivism'—the exploitation of resources in the Global South for external consumption—and 'green extractivism,' where climate mitigation narratives justify local land and resource loss. The guide promotes circular design to combat planned obsolescence and provides examples of community energy models in Gambia, Brazil, Denmark, and the UK, while detailing Scotland's policy strategy for local renewable ownership.

The document analyzes how climate change accelerates biodiversity loss and how the loss of ecosystems further destabilizes the climate. It critiques 'false solutions' such as monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsets, and geoengineering, arguing they often cause more harm than good. The report calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, community-led energy transitions, and the protection of Indigenous rights.

In 2024, global coal power saw a contradiction: while new completions reached a 20-year low of 44 GW and the EU increased retirements fourfold, China and India saw record-breaking activity. China's new coal starts reached a ten-year high of 94 GW, driven by approval surges in 2022-2023 and supportive policies like capacity electricity tariffs and long-term power purchase agreements. Conversely, OECD nations have significantly reduced planned projects, though their retirement pace remains too slow to meet Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8 GW despite the lowest number of new commissions in 20 years, driven primarily by record construction activity in China and India. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK eliminated coal entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to expand capacity. The report highlights a stark divide between OECD countries, where projects have plummeted, and Asia, where China and India account for 92% of new projects.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

The document analyzes sovereign debt in the Global South as a tool of neocolonial control that perpetuates structural dependencies in food, energy, and manufacturing. It critiques existing G20 restructuring mechanisms for treating debt as a liquidity issue rather than a structural one. Drawing on the failure of the 1980s Cartagena Initiative, the authors advocate for a Global South Debtors’ Coalition to leverage collective bargaining power. This coalition would pursue 'The Bargain of the Century,' proposing that Global South nations use their strategic mineral wealth and market size to secure technology transfers from major powers like China, the US, and the EU. The paper specifically urges South Africa to use its G20 Presidency to advance this framework, linking debt justice to food sovereignty, renewable energy independence, and regional industrial policies.

This guide explains how model contracts—both generic and nationally tailored—can help governments ensure responsible investment in agriculture. It details how these templates can integrate international standards, prevent problematic omissions, flag risky clauses like stabilization provisions, and promote transparency and legal harmonization.

The report provides a comprehensive framework for negotiating international agreements on fossil fuel subsidies (FFS), detailing six key building blocks: objectives, scope, disciplines, carve-outs/exceptions, special and differential treatment (SDT), and enforcement. It analyzes various legal approaches, including those based on the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and highlights the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) as a primary precedent for specific FFS disciplines.

The report argues that low-income countries face a systemic balance of payments crisis rather than a simple liquidity or solvency problem, driven by a rise in expensive, short-maturity non-guaranteed private debt and reversed capital flows. It proposes the Debt for Resilience (D4R) initiative, which would provide a standardized 50% reduction in the net present value (NPV) of official bilateral and multilateral debt for IDA-eligible countries. Participation would be contingent on an active IMF program and the development of nationally determined growth plans supported by the United Nations and World Bank to avoid austerity. The report also evaluates existing proposals like the Bridge Initiative and the Debt Relief for a Green and Inclusive Recovery (DRGR), arguing they rely on a flawed binary between liquidity and solvency and fail to account for the heterogeneity of countries' credit compositions.

The report argues that while phasing out oil and gas is essential to meet the 1.5C Paris Agreement goals, the threat of investor-state arbitration often creates a 'regulatory chill' that discourages ambitious climate action. It identifies that legal risks increase as a project progresses through its life cycle, with the highest risks associated with targeting the production phase. To mitigate these risks, the authors propose five principles: stopping the issuance of new licenses, managing investor expectations through long-term frameworks and early notice, grounding policies in legislation and scientific evidence, leveraging existing environmental regulations, and ensuring consistent application across all investors. The report specifically suggests that governments should prioritize a managed phase-out with clear end dates and consider an internationally legally binding instrument to harmonize production deadlines and exclude arbitration rights for fossil fuel investors.

The report analyzes the role of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), International Investment Agreements (IIAs), and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in the critical minerals supply chain. It highlights a fundamental tension: exporting countries seek to maximize domestic value addition and industrialization, while importing countries prioritize stable, affordable access to raw materials. Through case studies of Chile, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the report demonstrates that while newer agreements are beginning to incorporate ESG standards and protect policy space for producers, old-generation IIAs still pose significant risks via Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. The authors recommend that exporting countries reform outdated treaties to secure industrial policy space and that importing countries support value addition in producer nations to enhance overall supply chain resilience.