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The report identifies opportunities to reduce direct emissions from the food, agriculture, and land use (FALU) sector in Southeast Asia by 1.9 billion tons of CO2-eq per year. It highlights that FALU is responsible for 54% of the region's total greenhouse gas emissions, with deforestation and peatland degradation acting as the primary drivers. The analysis emphasizes 'hotspots' where targeted interventions—such as protecting 20% of carbon-dense forests or improving rice cultivation on 20% of farms—can yield disproportionately high emissions savings. Key solutions include legal forest protection, non-continuous flooding in rice paddies, and improved nitrogen fertilizer management. The report also discusses indirect solutions like shifting diets toward the EAT-Lancet planetary health diet and reducing food loss and waste, while detailing co-benefits such as improved air quality, water security, and enhanced farmer incomes.

The report outlines ten best practices for linear infrastructure (LI) development to mitigate impacts on nature. Key recommendations include conducting strategic environmental assessments (SEAs), incorporating mandatory safeguards in financial policies, and adhering to the mitigation hierarchy (avoid, minimize, restore, compensate). It emphasizes early integration of environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs) and the use of climate vulnerability assessments. The document also advocates for wildlife-friendly designs, including ecological corridors, and the adoption of sustainable infrastructure certifications to ensure long-term ecological integrity.

Brazil possesses a significant carbon competitiveness advantage due to its renewable-heavy electricity grid, but faces substantial risks from incoming Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAMs) and the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). While 78% of its exports go to net zero-aligned markets, structural contradictions—such as continued fossil fuel exploration and the 'Devastation Bill'—threaten its climate credibility. The economy is heavily dependent on China, and recent unilateral tariffs from the US have introduced significant geopolitical volatility.

The document argues that while 'ecological security' is not yet widely recognized in Southeast Asia, it is essential for addressing interconnected threats like the Mekong polycrisis, green transition externalities, and environmental crimes. It highlights the tension between security services and civil society, the influence of US-China competition on resource extraction and infrastructure, and the need for a holistic framework that bridges the gap between political-security and environmental specialists.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and McKinsey have proposed using 'transition credits' (carbon offsets) to attract finance for the early retirement of coal plants in Asia. Reclaim Finance argues that this approach replicates the failures of the broader offset industry, specifically regarding the inability to prove 'additionality' and the risk of inflated emission reduction estimates. The document asserts that offsets create perverse incentives that may deter governments from enacting national coal phaseout policies or providing concessional finance. It concludes that a successful transition requires increased public concessional funding and accelerated investment in sustainable power alternatives rather than a reliance on tradeable offsets.

The International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) updated the Common Ground Taxonomy (CGT) in November 2024, expanding the analysis to include 96 activities across five environmental objectives. The CGT serves as a voluntary technical tool to enhance the interoperability of sustainable finance standards between the EU and China, potentially lowering trans-boundary costs for green investments. The report details a scenario-based methodology for mapping activities using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) as a neutral code. While it identifies 76 climate mitigation activities and 20 non-climate activities with shared ground, it explicitly excludes 'Do No Significant Harm' (DNSH) criteria, minimum social safeguards, and climate change adaptation due to technical complexity and divergent regulatory approaches.

The report details how Koch, Inc. and its executives had access to scientific warnings about global warming as early as 1972 but spent decades financing a network of nonprofits and think tanks to obstruct climate action. This was achieved by contesting climate science, running public relations campaigns to shift cultural understanding, and lobbying political elites. The document tracks this effort from early API and National Petroleum Council reports through the funding of the Competitive Enterprise Institute's 'global warming project' and the activities of Americans for Prosperity, culminating in significant policy victories during the Trump administration and continued opposition to Biden-era climate legislation.

The November 2024 update reveals a three-year stagnation in global warming projections, with current policies setting the world on a path toward 2.7°C of warming by 2100. While renewable energy and electric vehicle deployment have seen record growth, these gains are offset by all-time high fossil fuel subsidies and increased funding for fossil fuel projects. The report warns that without a substantial increase in the ambition of 2030 and 2035 targets, the 1.5°C limit will likely be breached in the early 2030s, leading to a multidecadal overshoot.

The AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol (AfCFTA DTP), adopted in February 2024, establishes a comprehensive framework to integrate digital trade across Africa. The protocol covers 52 articles across 11 parts, addressing market access, data governance, digital inclusion, and trade facilitation. While it aims to unlock significant economic potential—with Africa's digital economy potentially reaching USD 712 billion by 2050—its success depends on the completion of eight ongoing annex negotiations and the ability of state parties to overcome infrastructure gaps and regulatory fragmentation. Key features include a focus on digital inclusion for MSMEs and the establishment of trust frameworks for cybersecurity and data protection, though some critics argue its data flow provisions may favor foreign big tech companies over local technology transfer.

The document details the operational and structural differences between Article 6.2 (bilateral/multilateral agreements), Article 6.4 (a UN-overseen global carbon market), and Article 6.8 (non-market approaches). It highlights the role of 'corresponding adjustments' in preventing double-counting and the specific financial contributions required under Article 6.4, such as the Share of Proceeds for the Adaptation Fund and the Overall Mitigation of Global Emissions. The author emphasizes that establishing high standards for credit quality and transparency is essential for the success of these markets at COP29.

ASEAN's electricity demand grew by 3.6% in 2023, a rise entirely met by fossil fuels, leading to a 6.6% increase in power sector emissions. While solar and wind costs are falling, the region remains heavily dependent on coal and gas, and hydropower has become less reliable due to climate-induced droughts. The report argues that scaling renewable capacity by 3-5x by 2035, implementing direct power purchase agreements, and expanding the ASEAN Power Grid are essential to meet rising demand and climate goals. It also highlights the potential for a regional compliance carbon market and the importance of a just transition to secure social acceptance.

The document explores transition finance as a tool for emerging and developing economies, particularly in Asia, to decarbonise high-emitting sectors that struggle to meet strict green finance criteria. It analyses the taxonomies of Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and ASEAN, while highlighting risks of 'transition-washing' and the need for science-based targets and independent verification to ensure alignment with 1.5°C pathways.

Demand aggregation consolidates fragmented demand from multiple buyers into a single, larger signal to help suppliers overcome the high costs and risks associated with building low-emissions infrastructure. This process helps bridge the "green premium"—the price difference between conventional and low-emissions alternatives—by providing financiers with predictable, long-term cash flows through collective procurement and advance purchasing agreements. The document highlights the use of "book and claim" mechanisms to allow indirect procurement of environmental attributes when direct physical procurement is not possible. RMI and its partners are implementing this strategy through four specific initiatives: the Sustainable Aviation Buyers Alliance (SABA), the Zero Emissions Maritime Buyers Alliance (ZEMBA), the Sustainable Steel Buyers Platform (SSBP), and a phased approach for low-emissions cement and concrete.

The report highlights that China's steel industry requires at least 1.6 trillion yuan (approximately 220 billion USD) in fixed asset investment to achieve decarbonisation by 2050. While technical feasibility for zero-carbon steel exists, high costs remain a barrier. The document argues that transition finance, carbon pricing mechanisms like the EU's CBAM, and green public procurement are essential to drive investment toward deep decarbonisation technologies, such as low-carbon hydrogen, and to avoid 'carbon lock-in' as 78% of existing coal-based blast furnace capacity requires reinvestment by 2030.

The report argues that India requires cumulative investments of US$10.1 trillion by 2070 to reach net-zero, yet current tracked mitigation finance is only about 25 percent of the required amount. It distinguishes between 'green finance' for near-zero emission technologies and 'transition finance' for hard-to-abate sectors that lack immediate green alternatives. The document identifies critical gaps in the supply of finance, noting a lack of standardised taxonomy and an underdeveloped corporate bond market. On the demand side, it analyses the decarbonisation needs of the steel, cement, transport, power, and agriculture sectors, highlighting the high capital costs and technical risks of transformative technologies like Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and Storage (CCUS). The report proposes a five-pillar roadmap covering scope and definition, transparency, cooperation, supply chain support, and financial innovation, while recommending the establishment of a Prime Ministers Net Zero Council (PMNZC) to coordinate inter-ministerial efforts.

The Structured Finance for Nature (SFN) instrument uses a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) in Singapore to aggregate a diversified portfolio of natural assets, combining equity, mezzanine finance, and green bonds. It aims to overcome barriers such as high upfront costs and small project sizes to protect and restore one million hectares of forest and wetlands. The pilot project in Agusan del Sur, Philippines, focuses on protecting 91,000 hectares of forest, with future expansions planned for Cambodia, Bhutan, and Indonesia. The model emphasizes high-integrity carbon credits, a 20% minimum benefit-sharing allocation for local and Indigenous communities, and real-time monitoring via a proprietary dashboard.

The report examines the Rempang Eco City project, a National Strategic Project (PSN) in Indonesia's Riau Islands, which is promoted as a green industrial zone for solar panel glass manufacturing. It argues that the project, linked to the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) framework, has resulted in forced evictions, human rights violations, and the marginalization of indigenous Malay, Orang Laut, and Orang Darat communities. The analysis reveals a lack of transparency in the PSN designation process and suggests that the project is driven by a network of global and local elites, specifically citing the involvement of Xinyi Group and the use of shell companies in the British Virgin Islands to obscure beneficial ownership. The report concludes that the transition to green energy is being used as a cover for land grabbing and corruption, calling for the recognition of customary land rights and a re-evaluation of JETP's social justice criteria.

The report examines the Rempang Eco City project, a National Strategic Project (PSN) in Indonesia's Riau Islands, which is promoted as a green industrial zone for solar panel glass production. It argues that the project contradicts the principles of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) by causing forced evictions, human rights abuses, and social conflict among indigenous Malay, Orang Laut, and Orang Darat communities. The analysis reveals that the project's primary investor, Xinyi Group, plans to use a 2 GW coal-fired power plant, undermining its 'green' label. Furthermore, the report alleges systemic corruption and a lack of transparency, identifying PT Makmur Elok Graha (PT MEG) as the concession holder and tracing its ownership through shell companies in the British Virgin Islands to hide the beneficial ownership of figures like Tomy Winata. The document concludes that the project prioritizes elite profit and foreign investment over the rights and basic needs of local residents, who continue to face electricity shortages while the region is developed for energy exports to Singapore.

Singapore is implementing a phased approach to mandatory climate-related disclosures (CRD) for listed and large non-listed companies to align financial decisions with its 2050 net-zero target. This includes transitioning from TCFD-based requirements to ISSB standards, with specific timelines for Scope 3 GHG emissions reporting and environmental risk management guidelines for financial institutions issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

Malaysia possesses significant untapped solar resources that could reduce its reliance on volatile fossil fuel prices and improve energy security. While the National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR) targets 70% renewable capacity by 2050, the report suggests that more ambitious targets, such as those proposed by IRENA, could further benefit the country. In Peninsular Malaysia, solar generation costs dropped 64% between 2016 and 2021, becoming 53% cheaper than fossil fuel options by 2023. To manage the 'twin peaks' of daily demand (4 pm and 8 pm), the report advocates for a combination of solar for daytime peaks and hydropower and battery energy storage systems (BESS) for evening peaks. Key barriers include the need for grid interconnections between Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak, as well as the requirement for clearer policies on wheeling charges and BESS bankability.