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The research examines the determinants of external state support for rebel groups using a new dataset of 403 organizations. It argues that support is not merely a function of the civil war's general characteristics but depends on the specific attributes of the rebel group and the international relations of the target state. The findings indicate that moderately strong groups with transnational constituencies are most likely to receive aid, particularly when the target state is involved in an international rivalry or receives its own external support. Conversely, very strong or very weak groups, and those in democratic states, are less likely to be supported.

The paper maps the disparate research and practice of 'business-peace' interactions into five core assertions: economic engagement creating a peace dividend, local development building peace capacities, importing international norms for accountability, constraining conflict drivers, and direct corporate diplomacy. While proponents argue these activities foster stability and development, critics warn of neo-colonial exploitation, 'peacewashing', and the risk of exacerbating local inequalities. The author concludes that business contributions are often limited by the willingness of local regimes and the priority of profit over courageous ethical choices in fragile contexts.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of global conflict trends from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 54 state-based conflicts in 2019. It highlights the significant role of the Islamic State (IS) in driving recent conflict increases and the prevalence of internationalized civil conflicts. While battle-related deaths have generally decreased over the last 20 years, specific hotspots in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia remain deadly. The paper also analyzes the decline in peace agreements since 2015 and the persistence of non-state conflicts, particularly violent drug cartel activity in Latin America and communal violence in Africa.

The paper analyzes conflict dynamics in Africa from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 25 state-based conflicts in 2019, many of which are low-intensity or involve the Islamic State. While Africa faces rising non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, it also leads other regions in the number of definitive ceasefires and peace agreements. The study further details the growth of UN peacekeeping operations in the region from 1994 to 2018, highlighting a significant increase in troop deployment peaking in 2010.

The document examines the contested nature of 'power sharing,' noting that it is often implemented as a tool for conflict resolution but yields contradictory results in research. It identifies four primary types of power sharing: political, military, territorial, and economic. The author argues that findings vary based on whether researchers view power sharing as a means to achieve stable democracy (consociationalism) or as a tool for postconflict conflict management. While some studies suggest inclusive institutions prolong peace by addressing rebel security concerns, others argue they reward violence, strengthen ethnic divisions, and hinder democratic accountability by marginalizing opposition.

The report 'Five Years Lost' details 12 major fossil fuel expansion projects globally, estimating they would collectively emit at least 175 gigatons of CO2, consuming up to 75% of the remaining carbon budget for a 66% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C. It identifies a systemic failure in the finance industry, noting that between January 2016 and August 2020, financial institutions provided $1.6 trillion in loans and underwriting and $1.1 trillion in investments to 133 companies driving these projects. The document highlights the role of public finance, specifically Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) like the World Bank Group, in de-risking these projects. Case studies cover diverse regions including the Permian Basin (USA), Vaca Muerta (Argentina), and the Barents Sea (Norway), emphasizing the associated human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and the 'myth' of natural gas as a bridge fuel.

The Alliance for Rural Electrification (ARE) provides capacity building through two primary channels: Investment Academies, which help small and medium enterprises secure finance through modules on business planning and pitching, and the CORE Initiative, which offers technical training on DRE systems like mini-grids and solar thermal energy. These programs have trained 3,050 practitioners and 210 trainers across 15 countries, targeting the development of bankable projects and the transfer of engineering skills to enhance energy access and security in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America.

ENGIE Energy Access identifies a critical funding gap and strategic misalignment in the effort to achieve universal energy access in Sub-Saharan Africa. The report argues that current grant funding is too limited, fragmented, and often diverted from core household electrification toward higher-tier or niche goals. It proposes four strategic shifts: refocusing on basic household access (Tier 1–2), tailoring financial instruments to specific market segments, increasing the share of grants in the capital mix to approximately 50%, and transitioning to coordinated programmatic platforms with standardised administration.

The document establishes a business case for gender equality in the decentralised renewable energy (DRE) sector, asserting that women-led businesses are often as profitable as or more profitable than those led by men. It provides a framework of recommendations for DRE companies, civil society organisations (CSOs), and investors to improve gender equality at the community, organisational, and investor levels. The report includes 17 case studies from various global regions demonstrating the impact of gender-sensitive interventions, such as solar kiosks in Togo, feminist microgrid development in Haiti, and technical training for women in Brazil.

The SADC region exhibits significant economic disparities, with South Africa dominating both regional GDP (55.5%) and intra-regional exports (68.1%). While the region saw an average annual GDP growth of 4.7% from 2003-2013, competitiveness is hindered by poor infrastructure, corruption, and limited access to finance. The services sector is the primary driver of regional growth, though reliance on agriculture remains high in countries like Mozambique, Madagascar, and Malawi. Intra-regional trade has stagnated relative to other African regional economic communities, further hampered by severe transport inefficiencies and customs delays.

The document argues that while SADC has significant potential for sugarcane-based ethanol production to reduce petroleum import dependency, regulatory uncertainty—specifically the lack of blending mandates and pricing formulas—is the primary barrier to investment. It suggests that a regional market could leverage South Africa's demand and the production capacity of other member states, potentially creating millions of jobs and providing significant electricity co-generation.

The document examines the lack of progress in implementing the SADC univisa, despite the 1998 Protocol on the Development of Tourism. It identifies a conflict between economic goals—where tourism contributes 5.8% to SADC's GDP—and security concerns held by home affairs and security agencies. While a pilot group of countries (including South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) has worked on harmonisation, political will remains low. The study suggests using the Kavango Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA pilot as a model to overcome bureaucratic resistance.

The Beit Bridge border post, a critical transit link for Southern and Eastern Africa, suffers from severe delays averaging three days, with some extending to two weeks. These delays are driven by inadequate physical infrastructure, such as a single commercial vehicle lane, frequent power outages in Zimbabwe, and non-harmonised IT systems between the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA). The document highlights a systemic culture of bribery and corruption among immigration and police officials, as well as high crime rates that effectively limit operations to daylight hours. Economic consequences include increased transport costs of approximately $400 per truck per day and higher consumer prices for goods like fuel and sugar.

The SADC Non-Tariff Barrier (NTB) Monitoring Mechanism allows private sector actors to report trade barriers via an online database, but the resolution of these barriers is often ineffective. NTBs affect products accounting for $3.3 billion, or 20%, of regional trade, with transport-related barriers being the most persistent. Resolution is hampered by inefficient National Monitoring Committees, a lack of technical expertise, and a political preference for cooperative rather than litigious dispute settlement. The document argues that resolution depends on political will, as some states maintain barriers to protect local industry or revenue. Proposed solutions include strengthening business membership organisations, capacitating national focal points, and creating forums for facilitated dialogue between the private sector and government.

This 2012 case study examines the operational challenges faced by Aluminium Africa Limited (ALAF), a Tanzania-based aluminium and steel manufacturer. ALAF reports significant barriers to regional trade within the SADC area, including inadequate energy infrastructure (marked by power rationing and cost increases), inefficient border controls and port services in Tanzania, and regulatory uncertainty. The company also highlights difficulties in accessing skilled labour and foreign currency in markets like Malawi. While ALAF has invested in backup power and lobbied via the Confederation of Tanzania Industries, it notes a lack of tangible government action to resolve these systemic constraints.

The report analyzes South African foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mozambique, noting that while South Africa was the primary investor (49% of FDI from 1997-2002), businesses face significant hurdles. Key obstacles include systemic corruption, inefficient bureaucracy, a weak judiciary, and high import taxes. While large-scale projects like Mozal and Sasol succeeded through high-level government support, smaller firms are more exposed to 'small corruption' and bureaucratic delays. The document highlights a stark geographic imbalance in investment, with the majority concentrated in Maputo, and calls for structural reforms in land rights, infrastructure, and the financial sector to foster sustainable growth.

The report details Austria's limited historical and economic ties with Africa, noting that while North Africa maintains stronger diplomatic relations, trade and development assistance are focused on specific priority countries in East and Southern Africa. It highlights South Africa as Austria's primary African trading partner and discusses Austria's commitments to EU-Africa strategies during its 2006 EU Council presidency.

The document details Germany's shift from a marginal interest in Africa during the Cold War to a more active partnership approach starting in 1998. It highlights the transition from a 'watering can' aid model to targeted support for a limited number of countries, emphasizing poverty reduction and sustainable development. Economic ties are characterized by a concentration of foreign direct investment in Libya, Egypt, and South Africa, while political engagement includes support for the G8 Africa Action Plan and NEPAD. The report specifically examines the 'strategic partnership' with South Africa, noting significant bilateral trade and investment in the automotive and chemical sectors. It also outlines Germany's security contributions through UN-mandated operations and its internal economic challenges, such as high unemployment, which influence its international agenda.

The report argues that mine action in Southern Africa should transition from being treated as a technical 'special initiative' to a core development activity. It recommends that national governments take greater political ownership, establish clear communication frameworks with donors, and utilize local technical expertise. The author emphasizes the need for socio-economic impact assessments to prioritize resources and suggests that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) play a more prominent political role in international forums to secure continued support for the region.

This case study examines the Walvis Bay Corridor Group (WBCG), a hybrid public-private partnership established in 2000 to facilitate trade and infrastructure development in Namibia and neighboring SADC countries. The WBCG coordinates a network of roads and rail—including the Trans-Kalahari, Trans-Caprivi, Trans-Cunene, and Trans-Oranje corridors—to connect the Port of Walvis Bay and the Port of Lüderitz to landlocked markets.