Case study 02

The document argues that while SADC has significant potential for sugarcane-based ethanol production to reduce petroleum import dependency, regulatory uncertainty—specifically the lack of blending mandates and pricing formulas—is the primary barrier to investment. It suggests that a regional market could leverage South Africa's demand and the production capacity of other member states, potentially creating millions of jobs and providing significant electricity co-generation.

• The primary obstacle to a regional fuel ethanol market in SADC is regulatory uncertainty or the total absence of regulation, as corporate boards require certainty on blending mandates and pricing formulas before approving investments.
• Sugarcane is identified as the most viable feedstock for ethanol in the region because the industry is well-established, it has an existing policy framework via Annex VII of the SADC Protocol on Trade, and its production in rural areas drives local industrial development.
• Addressing regulatory constraints could lead to significant regional benefits, including meeting up to 60% of new petrol requirements over 20 years using 2–4% of cropland, generating 6,000–9,000 MW of electricity, and creating 1.5–1.8 million direct and 4 million indirect jobs.
• The document identifies five critical political economy challenges: the 'food vs fuel' debate, resistance from established petroleum interests, land ownership and displacement of small-scale farmers, the tension between national and regional energy security, and the need for trade policies to protect against subsidized non-SADC imports.
• The 'food vs fuel' conflict is considered weak for sugarcane because it is not a staple food, requires specific agronomic conditions that limit its spread, and is a monopsonistic product, allowing governments to control expansion by regulating the number of sugar mills.
• Current regulatory status varies across SADC: Malawi allows up to 100% conversion; Mozambique, Swaziland, and Tanzania have national strategies or agencies; South Africa has a strategy and a 2–10% blend rate but lacks an agreed pricing framework; and Zimbabwe has a 5% blend rate.

APA

Braude, W. (n.d.). Case study 02. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/141125_EDIP_GIZreport_pg31-37_CS2rev.pdf

Chicago

Braude, Wolfe. Case study 02. South African Institute of International Affairs, n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/141125_EDIP_GIZreport_pg31-37_CS2rev.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Braude |first1=Wolfe |title=Case study 02 |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/141125_EDIP_GIZreport_pg31-37_CS2rev.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{braudendcase, author = {Braude, Wolfe}, title = {{Case study 02}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/141125_EDIP_GIZreport_pg31-37_CS2rev.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }