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The 2014 South African Defence Review describes the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as being in a 'critical state of decline' due to obsolescence, force imbalance, and unsustainable budgeting. The review proposes a long-term rejuvenation plan through four planning milestones extending to 2034, requiring significant budget increases. However, the author argues that the review's 'mandate-driven' approach is overly expansive given South Africa's financial constraints and actual tasks. The brief recommends refocusing the SANDF on peace operations, downsizing bloated staffing structures, and reforming the department's accountability and procurement legislation.

The document examines the evolution of democratic governance in Africa from the OAU era to the AU era, focusing on the APRM and ACDEG. It argues that while the continent has shifted from 'politics of the bullet' to 'politics of the ballot', significant challenges remain, including 'illiberal democracies' and slow implementation of governance reviews. The author advocates for stronger synergies between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), increased domestic funding for National Programmes of Action (NPoAs), and a balanced role for non-state actors to prevent 'state capture' of these initiatives.

The document outlines a framework for transitioning African governance toward the 2030 SDGs, emphasizing the need for National Councils for Sustainable Development (NCSDs) and integrated planning. It identifies current gaps, such as poor policy implementation and a dearth of data, and proposes capacity-building strategies and the establishment of Communities of Practice (CoP) to foster knowledge sharing across the continent.

The document evaluates the African Union's (AU) efforts to promote democracy through electoral perspectives, arguing that while AU declarations have positively influenced the electoral landscape, elections often remain 'democratic liabilities' rather than assets. It identifies key setbacks including the resurgence of military coups, tenure elongation (the 'third term agenda'), and the refusal of incumbents to concede power. The author critiques AU election monitoring for being undermined by poor field coverage, a short-term focus on election-day events, and a tendency to be less critical of incumbents seeking re-election. The paper concludes that AU reports lack legal force and often conflict with domestic observer findings, necessitating a shift toward long-term monitoring and stronger collaboration with local civil society.

A coalition of social movements and NGOs argues that the FAO's current forest definition is reductionist and primarily benefits industrial timber, pulp, paper, and rubber companies. The authors contend that by defining forests simply as land with a certain percentage of tree cover, the FAO erroneously classifies large-scale monoculture plantations as 'reforestation' and ignores the structural and cultural importance of forests to the 300 million people who depend on them for their livelihoods. The letter calls for a new, community-led definition process that recognizes the role of forests in food sovereignty and biological diversity.

The African Governance Architecture (AGA), established by the African Union in 2011, aims to coordinate continental governance initiatives under a 'shared values' agenda. However, the paper identifies critical gaps in its operationalization, specifically a disconnect between governance and security frameworks and an undefined role for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The authors argue that integrating the AGA with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) would transform the latter from a reactive to a pre-emptive tool by using governance assessments to flag potential conflicts. Additionally, the paper suggests the APRM should serve as the primary diagnostic tool for monitoring member states' compliance with shared values instruments, noting that past APRM reports have already identified systemic barriers to domestication, such as bureaucratic red tape and lack of enforcement capacity.

The paper examines the tension between 'positive' and 'negative' governance values in Africa. While the African Union has established comprehensive frameworks like the APRM and ACDEG to promote transparency, accountability, and human rights, the author argues that a lack of political will and moral leadership hinders their implementation. The document highlights persistent issues such as systemic corruption, political clientelism, the marginalisation of women, and electoral manipulation, while noting that a small group of countries has made significant progress toward democratic governance.

The document analyzes state fragility in Africa as a self-reinforcing syndrome driven by poor governance, conflict, inequality, and poverty. Using the International Futures system, it forecasts that while 16 of the 26 identified fragile countries may transition toward resilience by 2050, ten are at risk of remaining in a 'fragility trap'. The authors emphasize that while Africa's overall economy is projected to grow significantly, the gap in extreme poverty between fragile and resilient states is expected to widen unless inclusive growth and improved governance are achieved.

The document argues that while South Africa was successful in peacemaking and peacekeeping in Burundi, it failed to maintain a substantive post-conflict presence after 2009, resulting in missed opportunities for development and peacebuilding. It recommends that South Africa develop a long-term, coordinated strategy for post-conflict engagement, leveraging its access to government authorities and building national skills in peacebuilding to avoid the ad hoc approach seen in Burundi.

The policy brief contends that offensive military intervention is frequently required to stop conflicts before peacekeeping can begin, noting that international bodies often fail to act promptly. It analyzes the increasing capabilities of opposing forces in Africa—including better training, equipment, and leadership—and the logistical challenges posed by vast strategic and operational distances. The author argues that South Africa, as a regional economic power, should develop an autonomous intervention capability within the SANDF, including enhanced special forces, airlift, and reconnaissance, potentially requiring a defense budget of approximately 2% of GDP, while still cooperating with SADC and the African Union.

The briefing analyzes violent clashes between the Konianké and Guerzé communities in Guinea's Forest Region, which resulted in at least 100 deaths in July 2013. It attributes the conflict to disputes over land and citizenship, exacerbated by historical political manipulation, religious differences, and the proliferation of weapons from neighboring conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. The author argues that these tensions could influence Guinea's national electoral politics and recommends independent judicial processes and local peacebuilding initiatives to mitigate future violence.

The report examines the threats of religious extremism and terrorism in Niger, analyzing the factors contributing to its vulnerability and resilience. It details the government's three-pillar response—military, socioeconomic, and legal—while highlighting the challenges of regional cooperation in the Sahel-Saharan region.

The document assesses the G-20's food security commitments from an African perspective, focusing on food-price volatility, agricultural productivity, and nutrition. While it finds broad alignment in rhetoric and focus areas, it argues that the G-20 fails to implement critical regulatory reforms in financial markets and trade that would meaningfully benefit Africa.

The report examines the 'land question' in Ghana, identifying a weak institutional base and the political manipulation of land as primary drivers of insecurity. It details how these issues lead to violent disputes, the rise of 'land guards', and economic instability. The document also addresses the impact of large-scale land grabbing by foreign corporations and the systemic marginalization of women and the poor in land access. It concludes that these problems are mirrored across other ECOWAS member states and calls for regional policy leadership and greater accountability for traditional chiefs.

The research paper argues that South Africa's military involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR) is driven by a desire to contest Western influence and secure resource interests. It highlights the CAR's wealth in diamonds, uranium, and potential oil, which has attracted Chinese investment and caused friction with France. The author notes that South Africa's efforts to resist 'western interference' have been undermined by a lack of regional diplomatic support and insufficient intelligence infrastructure, leading to a 'humiliating experience' in the face of more established international rivals.

The document analyzes Senegal's foreign policy since 2000, noting a transition from 'classic' diplomacy to a 'technicized' approach where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost its monopoly to specialized ministries and non-state actors. It highlights the 'hyper-power' of the presidency, the marginalization of the legislative and judicial branches, and a strategic shift toward emerging economic partners like China and Dubai. The paper concludes that while President Abdoulaye Wade's tenure was marked by high personalization and pan-Africanist ambitions, the 2012 election of Macky Sall signaled a return to more traditional diplomatic relations, particularly with France and neighboring states.

The document analyzes Senegalese foreign policy under President Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012) and the transition to President Macky Sall. It highlights a shift from 'classical' diplomacy led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs toward a more technical, economy-centered approach involving non-state actors and specialized ministries. The paper emphasizes the 'hyper-power' of the presidency over the legislature and judiciary in external affairs. Key trends include a realignment toward emerging economic powers like China and Dubai, a revival of Pan-Africanist goals through the African Union and Nepad, and a high degree of personalization in diplomacy under Wade. Following the 2012 election, the author notes a return to traditional diplomacy, characterized by restored ties with France and improved relations with neighbors like Gambia and Mauritania.

The document examines the evolving relationship between France and Senegal, highlighting a shift from exclusive ties to a more diversified partnership under President Abdoulaye Wade. While France remains the primary economic partner and donor, the paper details periods of diplomatic tension, the reduction of French military presence, and a renewed cordiality following the 2012 elections of Macky Sall and François Hollande.

The document examines CFL exchange programmes in Ghana and Kenya, finding that while they achieved immediate technical goals—such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and peak electricity demand—they often overlooked opportunities to build indigenous technological capabilities. In Ghana, a 2007 GEF-funded programme distributed 6 million CFLs, reducing peak demand by 128 MW and saving approximately USD 33 million annually. In Kenya, the 'Badilisha Bulb' programme distributed 1.25 million CFLs, reducing CO2 emissions by 55,000 tonnes per annum. The author argues that for long-term low-carbon development, policymakers should move beyond the simple distribution of finished goods toward building local manufacturing capabilities and implementing robust performance standards to prevent the market from being flooded with low-quality imports.

The report identifies a 'syndrome of fragility' in Africa driven by the interaction of poor governance, conflict, inequality, and poverty. Using the International Futures (IFs) system, it forecasts that while 16 of the 26 identified 'more fragile' states could transition toward resilience by 2050, ten countries—including the DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan—are at risk of remaining in a fragility trap. The analysis warns that climate change and democratic deficits could exacerbate these risks, and recommends long-term national development plans, extractive sector reform, and direct cash transfers to the poor to pivot toward a more optimistic future.