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The policy brief contends that offensive military intervention is frequently required to stop conflicts before peacekeeping can begin, noting that international bodies often fail to act promptly. It analyzes the increasing capabilities of opposing forces in Africa—including better training, equipment, and leadership—and the logistical challenges posed by vast strategic and operational distances. The author argues that South Africa, as a regional economic power, should develop an autonomous intervention capability within the SANDF, including enhanced special forces, airlift, and reconnaissance, potentially requiring a defense budget of approximately 2% of GDP, while still cooperating with SADC and the African Union.

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  • Offensive military intervention is often a critical requirement to create the conditions necessary for subsequent peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations.
  • Opposing forces in Africa, including regular armies, guerrillas, and militias, have seen steady improvements in experience, training, leadership, and equipment, utilizing 'technicals' and modern armor like the T-72 and T-90S.
  • Successful interventions are characterized by prompt deployment and the use of force sufficient to overmatch the opposition, whereas slow or weak deployments, such as those by ECOMOG or the UN in Rwanda, tend to fail or drag on.
  • International bodies often fail to take prompt decisions, making a strong case for regional powers to launch autonomous interventions to prevent conflicts from spiraling.
  • Intervention in Africa is severely constrained by strategic, operational, and tactical distances, as well as poor transport infrastructure, necessitating specialized airlift and amphibious capabilities.
  • The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) currently lacks the capability for anything beyond the smallest intervention operations, as evidenced by the January 2013 deployment to Bangui.
  • To act as a regional security power, South Africa should expand the SANDF's special forces, reconnaissance, and rapid deployment capabilities, which would likely require increasing the defense budget to approximately 2% of GDP.

Cite the original document

APA
Heitman, H. R. (2013). Fighting for peace. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief45.pdf
Chicago
Heitman, Helmoed Römer. Fighting for peace. Institute for Security Studies, 2013. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief45.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Heitman |first1=Helmoed Römer |title=Fighting for peace |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2013 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief45.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{heitman2013fighting, author = {Heitman, Helmoed Römer}, title = {{Fighting for peace}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2013}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief45.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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