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The 2022 SEforALL Forum, held in Kigali, Rwanda, mobilized USD 347 million in new financial commitments to support clean energy transitions and energy access in developing countries. Key outcomes included the Kigali Communique, which outlines seven transformative actions for a just energy transition in Africa, and the launch of several new partnerships and initiatives targeting renewable energy, energy efficiency, and clean cooking. The event emphasized the integration of youth in energy leadership and provided a platform for ministerial roundtables and B2B investment matchmaking.

The report examines the role of informal waste reclaimers in African cities, highlighting their significant contribution to recycling and waste diversion despite facing severe health risks, social marginalization, and low pay. It argues that the current linear 'take-make-waste' model is unsustainable and that an 'inclusive circular economy' must integrate these vulnerable workers into formal policy and value chains. The document provides a comparative analysis of the informal waste sector in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda, detailing specific policy gaps and opportunities for reclaimer integration and formalization.

The AfCFTA has the potential to generate USD 3.4 trillion in GDP and lift over 100 million people out of poverty by 2040, with primary gains expected in manufacturing and services. However, significant disparities in factor markets—including labour skills, technology adoption, and financial capacity—exist across the continent, with Eastern and Southern Africa generally possessing higher capacities than Central and Western Africa. The document highlights risks associated with heavy reliance on non-African financing, such as the EU-funded Africa Trade Observatory, and urges member states to leverage domestic capital markets and sovereign wealth funds. It further emphasizes that political stability and the empowerment of regional bodies are essential to protect private sector investment in cross-border infrastructure, which the World Bank estimates requires USD 47.6 billion annually.

The document examines the 'militarisation of politics' in Africa, using the conflict in Ethiopia between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as a primary example. It defines militarisation as the tendency to settle political disputes militarily and notes that this trend is often a legacy of colonial rule. The author highlights a history of military coups and civil wars across the continent, noting that by 2017, Africa had experienced 200 successful and failed coups. While the African Union (AU) has frameworks like the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to prevent unconstitutional changes of government, the document argues that inconsistent implementation—such as the AU's failure to suspend Chad after the seizure of power by the Transnational Military Council—undermines these efforts. Additionally, the text notes a 17% increase in African military spending over the last decade, totaling $41.2 billion in 2019. In the Horn of Africa, the conflict involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan risks regional destabilisation and the undoing of previous peace agreements.

The policy brief examines the severe fiscal constraints facing African countries during COVID-19 recovery, noting that while advanced economies mobilised about 6% of GDP, African countries mobilised barely 1%. It highlights the inadequacy of current debt relief mechanisms like the DSSI and the Common Framework, and the high cost of borrowing from international capital markets due to unfair credit ratings. The author proposes five policy priorities: establishing national donor coordination frameworks, reallocating public investment to de-risk private projects, extending the DSSI for two years with partial debt cancellation, creating a transparent multilateral framework for debt resolution involving commercial creditors, and exploring the establishment of independent, publicly owned credit rating agencies.

The document outlines the environmental and social risks associated with mine waste—such as reactive mineralization affecting air and water—and highlights the leadership of Ghana and British Columbia in implementing legal frameworks and risk response strategies. It emphasizes that both jurisdictions, despite different mining histories, can provide lessons on effective waste management to avoid catastrophic impacts on ecosystems and communities.

Ghana's first Adaptation Communication (AdCom), led by the Environmental Protection Agency, evaluates the country's progress in adaptation planning. While the document notes significant progress in institutional structures, governance, and capacity building across various sectors, it characterizes overall gains as modest and a foundation for more ambitious future actions.

The document examines the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Stung Tatay project in Cambodia, analyzing how ESG standards were applied. It finds that while Chinese firms led construction, the implementation of ESG standards was dominated by local actors, leading to outcomes that reflected the institutional capacities and transparency levels of the host governments. Both projects resulted in significant habitat destruction for endangered species and loss of local livelihoods, though Ghana exhibited higher levels of transparency and stakeholder engagement than Cambodia.

The report examines the synergy between the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the African Union's Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP) to foster green intra-continental trade and investment. While the AfCFTA is intended to transform Africa's production and trade landscape, the document notes that environmental and climate considerations have not been prominent in its development. The report specifically analyzes how the combined implementation of these frameworks can support recovery in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa.

The report maps 103 multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) to demonstrate how transnational corporations and mega-philanthropies are displacing traditional state-led multilateralism. It identifies a pattern where the World Economic Forum (WEF) and large foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation drive a 'stakeholder capitalism' agenda, often using the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as legitimacy. The analysis reveals a significant democratic deficit, with affected communities and Global South governments largely excluded from decision-making, while the UN system often acts as a strategic partner that legitimises these corporate-led mechanisms.

The report assesses the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) in Ghana, finding that while the office has a strong legal mandate, it has struggled with inadequate funding, staffing deficits, and political interference. Interviewed anti-corruption agencies generally agree that the OSP has not yet significantly reduced corruption or the public perception of it, though there is trust in the capacity of the second Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng. The document recommends amending the OSP Act to grant full prosecutorial independence from the Attorney General and increasing actual budget disbursements.

The report provides a comprehensive poverty profile of the Obuasi Municipality and Obuasi East District, highlighting a 'resource curse' where the presence of gold mining has not translated into widespread local prosperity. Key findings indicate high unemployment due to the loss of agricultural lands to mines, insufficient household incomes, and significant gender disparities in education and economic vulnerability. Environmental degradation, including water pollution and structural damage to homes from mining blasts, is prevalent. While AngloGold Ashanti has implemented some positive social interventions, such as malaria control and youth training, residents report limited direct employment and a lack of inclusive governance by local District Assemblies.

The document examines how ESG standards are applied in Chinese-led hydropower projects in the Global South, contrasting the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Stung Tatay project in Cambodia. It finds that while Chinese contractors lead construction, the implementation of ESG standards is primarily the responsibility of local actors and recipient governments. In Cambodia, a lack of transparency and weak governance eroded public trust and left the actual impact of the Stung Tatay project unclear. In Ghana, the Bui Dam project benefited from higher transparency and stakeholder engagement, though it still suffered from failures in environmental mitigation and unfulfilled socioeconomic promises. Both cases demonstrate that institutional weaknesses in recipient governments can lead to poor ESG outcomes, creating reputational risks for Chinese contractors.

The document analyzes the resurgent roles of China and Russia in Africa since 2000. China's influence is primarily economic, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative and long-term infrastructure investments, while Russia's approach is more opportunistic, focusing on mining, arms exports, and the deployment of private military contractors in fragile states. While the two powers coordinate on challenging Western norms and supporting non-interference in the UN Security Council, they maintain a 'competitive partnership' characterized by limited strategic coordination in security and economics, and occasional competition for commercial contracts in countries like Zimbabwe.

The document explains how beneficial ownership transparency (BOT) helps uncover the individuals who ultimately control assets, preventing criminals and corrupt officials from using shell companies to hide profits from illegal wildlife trade, forestry, and fisheries. It highlights the role of public registries in tracing 'dirty money' and provides guidance for NRM practitioners to conduct due diligence and identify signs of obscured ownership to safeguard conservation projects.

The document examines how Sub-Saharan Africa can utilize the energy transition to foster industrialization. It proposes strategies including the creation of green industrial policies, the development of domestic manufacturing capabilities for clean technologies through research and skills transfer, and the strategic use of natural gas and critical minerals to bridge energy access gaps and move up the global value chain.

The High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, including leaders from 16 nations, advocates for a transition to a sustainable ocean economy to close the emissions gap. The Panel identifies six key action areas—nature-based solutions, renewable energy, industry decarbonisation, sustainable food, carbon capture and storage, and research—noting that these actions could provide up to 21% of the annual emissions cuts required to limit global warming to 1.5°C by 2050. Member nations commit to developing Sustainable Ocean Plans to manage 100% of their national waters sustainably within five years.

A keynote speech delivered by Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi of the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) at the Youth Connekt Africa Summit, advocating for increased regional labor mobility to address youth unemployment and skills gaps in Africa.

The report examines the role of indigenous knowledge in bridging climate data gaps in Africa, highlighting how traditional observation methods and community-based forecasting can enhance the accuracy of early warning systems when integrated with scientific meteorology. It identifies the decline of this knowledge due to modernization and the preference for top-down scientific models, while providing examples of successful 'co-production' of climate information in countries like Kenya.

The document traces the path from the 1972 Stockholm Conference to the 2017 entry into force of the Minamata Convention on Mercury. It highlights the role of activism and scientific evidence in driving global action and details the treaty's mechanisms for phasing out mercury-added products and regulating artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM). The brief also explains that the discrete nature of mercury's industrial sources and a stronger scientific consensus on its global threat allowed it to move toward a binding treaty, whereas lead and cadmium remain managed through voluntary partnerships and regional agreements.