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The document outlines the role of supply-side policies in accelerating the transition to zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) by influencing manufacturers to increase the production and sale of compliant vehicles. It highlights a broader analysis of ZEV policies in eight specific markets—Australia, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, the United States, and South Africa—to identify policy gaps and the link between policy design and the mobilization of financing.

Trase's co-directors criticize proposed EPP amendments to the EUDR, specifically the introduction of a "no risk" country category. They argue that the criteria for this category—such as stable net forest area—are scientifically flawed and could mask significant deforestation, create legal uncertainty regarding WTO rules, and introduce loopholes that undermine the regulation's effectiveness.

The text asserts that the green energy transition is currently acting as a vehicle for "colonialismo verde" (green colonialism), where indigenous territories are exploited without proper consent. It highlights that failing to protect indigenous rights creates strategic risks for governments and industries, citing legal challenges to wind energy in Sweden and the negative impacts of the Belo Monte hydroelectric project in Brazil. The author calls on G20 leaders to move beyond the T20 Communiqué's recommendations by reforming land-use laws, addressing power asymmetries through dedicated funding, and recognizing indigenous leadership in defining a just transition.

The World Resources Institute warns that proposed amendments to the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) risk 'defanging' the law through the creation of a 'no-risk' country category, the use of an outdated 1990 reference year for forest assessments, and ambiguous language that creates uncertainty for stakeholders and potential trade disputes.

The document asserts that the green transition is currently acting as a vehicle for "green colonialism," where Indigenous rights are sidelined for profit and development. It highlights a gap between policy ambitions and reality, citing the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act and the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam in Brazil as examples of failures to protect Indigenous communities. The author argues that upholding Indigenous rights is a pragmatic necessity, as Indigenous Peoples are increasingly using legal actions to stop or delay projects. In Sweden, 42 court cases involving Sámi herding communities are influencing wind energy developers to seek consent more proactively, while the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre has tracked 60 global legal cases against renewable energy projects brought by Indigenous communities.

The report argues that European oil and gas companies are pursuing LNG projects in Africa that expose host countries to significant financial and environmental risks. Due to delayed revenue-sharing structures and a predicted global LNG supply glut by the 2030s, African states face the prospect of stranded assets and debt traps. The document highlights a contradiction between Europe's domestic decarbonization goals and its promotion of fossil fuel infrastructure in Africa, while noting that high breakeven costs make African producers particularly vulnerable to price competition.

Global warming projections for 2100 have remained stagnant since 2021, with current policies leading to a median estimate of 2.7°C of warming. While clean energy investments now double those for fossil fuels, record-high fossil fuel subsidies and funding for prolonging projects are preventing the steep emissions decline required by the Paris Agreement. The briefing emphasizes that seven large emitters and the COP Troika countries, responsible for 63% of 2022 global emissions, must set more ambitious 2030 and 2035 targets to align with 1.5°C.

The report finds that 10 major international oil companies (IOCs) are responsible for 7% of global gas flaring on an equity-weighted basis, with a significant portion occurring at non-operated assets. In 2023, total global upstream flaring was 145 billion cubic meters (bcm), with an average intensity of 5.0 m³/bbl. The analysis highlights a gap between corporate commitments to the World Bank's Zero Routine Flaring (ZRF) initiative and actual performance, noting that non-routine flaring remains largely unabated and that no analyzed company meets the IEA's Net Zero Emissions scenario target of 0.3 m³/bbl by 2030. The report argues that IOCs have a broader influence on up to 40% of global flaring through their partnerships with national oil companies (NOCs) and recommends extending emissions targets to non-operated assets and implementing stricter regulatory and financial levers.

National renewable energy targets for 2030 currently aim for a collective doubling of capacity rather than the tripling agreed upon at COP28, despite market forecasts suggesting such a goal is achievable, particularly for solar and battery storage.

The document examines the governance gaps surrounding solar radiation modification (SRM), warning that the current dominance of Global North institutions and private entities creates a risk of unilateral deployment. It advocates for the UNFCCC to formally engage with SRM to democratize decision-making and prevent the exacerbation of global inequalities.

The report details Brazil's recent efforts to institutionalize the bioeconomy under President Lula da Silva, highlighted by the creation of the National Secretariat of Bioeconomy (SNB) and the 2024 National Bioeconomy Strategy. It analyzes the bioeconomy through three lenses: biotechnological, bioresources, and bioecological, noting that the current national strategy primarily aligns with the bioecological vision. The document maps the roles of multiple ministries—including the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA), the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC), and the Ministry of Finance (MF)—in implementing this framework. It also identifies complementary regulations such as the Fuel of the Future Law and the Productive Forests National Program, while emphasizing the upcoming National Bioeconomy Development Plan (PNDBIO) as a key opportunity for cross-sectoral coordination.

Mighty Earth argues that proposed amendments by the European People’s Party (EPP) to the EUDR would create loopholes for laundering high-risk commodities and undermine the investments of companies that have already developed traceability systems. The organization calls for the European Commission to withdraw the proposal to delay implementation and ensure the law enters into force in 2025, citing a poll where 84% of surveyed European citizens support swift enforcement.

The report assesses the renewable energy requirements for decarbonizing the EU steel industry, which currently accounts for approximately 5% of the region's CO2 emissions. It evaluates two primary scenarios based on scrap usage (0% vs 50%) and two value chain routes (EU-based vs imported iron) to determine the necessary scale of renewable electricity and hydrogen production to meet a 55% carbon emission reduction target by 2030.

The report evaluates several major global climate pledges, finding that most are currently off-track. While there are isolated successes—such as the UK closing its last coal plant and growth in electric car sales—critical goals like tripling renewable energy by 2030 and halting deforestation are not being met. The document highlights a significant gap between high-level commitments and implementation, particularly in the financial sector where net-zero plans are deemed insufficient and fossil fuel subsidies have reached record highs. It calls for a shift from loose networks to platforms of accountability as countries develop their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025.

The report identifies a 'dangerously polluted' digital information landscape where Big Tech platforms allow 'super-spreaders' to propagate debunked claims against renewable energy and electric vehicles. It highlights how disinformation operations weaponise extreme weather events, such as wildfires, to decouple them from environmental drivers and fuel opposition to climate policies. Additionally, the analysis reveals that eight fossil fuel advertisers spent at least $17.6 million on Meta for over 700 million impressions to greenwash their image and lobby for US policy changes. The document warns that degrading researcher access to data is hindering the ability to track these trends and argues that systemic architectural problems and profit motives must be addressed rather than relying solely on fact-checking.

The report finds that while some progress has been made since 2015, the EU and UK failed to meet the 2020 deadline to end overfishing. Nearly one quarter of assessed TACs for 2024 still exceed scientific advice, with particularly poor compliance for bycatch and data-limited stocks. The report highlights a lack of transparency in negotiations and calls for a genuine ecosystem-based approach to TAC-setting for 2025 and beyond.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU's net carbon sink is declining rapidly and that the current LULUCF Regulation contains loopholes, such as offsetting flexibility and reliance on forest biomass, that undermine climate goals. The organization recommends removing offsetting mechanisms, preventing double counting between national inventories and corporate claims under the Carbon Removal Certification Framework (CRCF), limiting forest harvesting for bioenergy, and strengthening synergies between LULUCF targets and the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and Nature Restoration Law.

The document examines the role of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAMs) in preventing carbon leakage and reducing emissions, with a primary focus on the EU CBAM. It argues that while the EU CBAM aims to promote global decarbonisation, it may only slightly reduce overall emissions while imposing significant economic burdens on developing nations, potentially costing them billions in income. The briefing highlights a growing, uncoordinated global trend of countries introducing their own carbon tariffs, which risks fragmenting trade and creating high compliance costs for small producers. It concludes that international cooperation, aligned with UNFCCC principles and supported by climate finance, is essential to ensure these mechanisms support global climate goals without unfairly penalising vulnerable economies.

The author contends that hosting COP29 in Azerbaijan—a country with an authoritarian regime and a growing fossil fuel industry—threatens the summit's potential for real change. The text highlights Azerbaijan's lack of net-zero targets, its expansion of gas production, and its poor human rights record, including the detention of environmental activists. It also criticizes the European Union for increasing gas imports from Azerbaijan, which the author claims bolsters the regime's power. Finally, the document calls for the UN to reform the COP host selection process by introducing mandatory climate action and human rights requirements.

The ninth FOCAC Beijing Summit signaled a recalibration of China-Africa relations, moving toward a partnership defined by African agency and a focus on quality outcomes over quantity. Despite a period of declining lending since 2016, China committed USD 50.7 billion over three years, focusing on agricultural market access, mineral processing, and infrastructure. The summit highlighted Africa's desire for value addition and industrialization, as well as China's assertive push to promote its governance model and Global South leadership through the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. This shift poses a competitive challenge to the EU and US, as African nations increasingly prioritize partnerships that offer tangible utility and respect for sovereignty.