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The document finds that the extreme heat and wildfires of summer 2026 significantly increased the salience of climate change as a top public concern in most surveyed European countries, particularly those most affected. This shift led to a modest increase in support for government policy actions, such as carbon taxes and fuel duty increases, although personal lifestyle changes remained stagnant. The research highlights a strong public link between the weather events and climate change, rendering climate denial politically toxic, while noting that the primary political debate has shifted toward the pace and cost of the energy transition rather than the necessity of action.

The report finds that while global attitudes toward climate change remain largely stable, there is a distinct increase in concern and perceived impact within Europe, where salience rose in France, Italy, and Spain, and more people reported noticing heatwaves and droughts.

The document outlines a comprehensive approach to deliberative democracy applied to the climate crisis. It details a five-phase process—preparation, learning, reflection, recommendation drafting, and decision-making—supported by independent governance structures. The guide emphasizes inclusivity, accessibility, and the use of both digital and physical tools to ensure a representative sample of citizens can produce legitimate policy recommendations for governments and social actors.

The report identifies three primary ecosystems driving climate mis- and disinformation: the 'attention economy' of online influencers, state-affiliated networks (specifically Russia), and the fossil fuel lobby. It details how the #ClimateScam hashtag has gained prominence on X, how ad tech companies monetise websites hosting climate denial, how Russian state media instrumentalises climate topics for geopolitical influence, and how fossil fuel companies use Facebook advertising for greenwashing. The document argues that these efforts undermine the public mandate for Net Zero and calls for structural changes to digital platform incentives and greater transparency in ad tech.

The document details the environmental and health impacts of Alberta's coal-fired power plants, noting that in 2014, 68% of the province's electricity was generated from coal. It highlights that these plants are significant sources of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, fine particulate matter, mercury, and greenhouse gases, with 2011 emissions totaling 43 megatonnes of GHG. The authors propose a transition plan to reach 0% coal reliance by 2030, increasing renewable energy to 40% and reducing electricity demand through energy efficiency by 20%. The strategy discourages increased reliance on stand-alone natural gas due to production-related GHG emissions and suggests mechanisms for phase-out such as legislated closures, lifespan caps, or carbon pricing.

The document examines the challenges of accounting for fossil CO2 used in non-permanent products (like plastics and fuels) in the EU ETS. It compares a 'final emitter pays' (downstream) approach, which avoids double pricing but risks emissions leakage, against a 'capture installation pays' (upstream) approach, which is the current system but risks double pricing if MWI is included. The authors recommend including MWI in the ETS by 2028 and suggest specific safeguards for either accounting path to maintain environmental integrity.

The analysis finds a significant funding gap for European carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects that cannot recover costs through carbon pricing alone. By 2023, 55% of excess costs are uncovered, and a total shortfall of €10 billion is projected by 2030. While some countries like Norway, the UK, and the Netherlands have established specific incentive schemes, the report argues that additional targeted funding is required, particularly for high-cost sectors, to kickstart deployment and develop infrastructure.

The document argues that for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to maintain industrial competitiveness and meet climate targets, it must rapidly deploy carbon capture and storage (CCS). A critical barrier is the current reliance on exporting CO2 to the North Sea, which increases costs; the report finds that developing domestic storage could reduce deployment costs by 23% to 48%. To bridge the funding gap between high deployment costs and the EU ETS price, the brief recommends a 'Coordinator' role for governments to align value chains, leverage EU funds like the Innovation Fund and Connecting Europe Facility, and implement de-risking tools such as carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs). Case studies of the Porthos (Netherlands) and Northern Lights (Norway) projects illustrate how layered public-private financing, including state-owned enterprise (SOE) participation and capital grants, can lead to final investment decisions.

The analysis identifies a significant gap between announced CO2 capture ambitions and the development of geological storage capacity in Europe, particularly in the short term. While Europe possesses a theoretical storage potential of approximately 507 Gt, the time required to develop storage sites (5 to 15 years) lags behind the faster implementation of capture projects. By 2025, a shortage of around 15 Mt/year is expected, and by 2030, the gap widens to approximately 40 Mt/year, with available capacity meeting only half of the 82 Mt/year demand. The report notes that many capture projects are concentrated in industrial clusters, but several countries—including Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, and Sweden—have no announced storage projects despite capture ambitions, necessitating cross-border storage solutions.

The document argues that large-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) is essential for the EU to reach climate neutrality by 2050, with estimates suggesting a need to capture between 490 and 600 million tonnes of CO2 annually by that date. It highlights that current deployment is significantly below the required trajectory due to inadequate policies and a lack of storage sites outside the North Sea. The brief advocates for the development of shared CO2 transport and storage 'hubs' and cross-border networks to reduce costs for industrial emitters, particularly in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. It specifically urges EU Member States to use the 2023-2024 NECP revision process to detail funding commitments, deployment targets, and storage capacity to align with the Net Zero Industry Act's target of 50 million tonnes of annual injection capacity by 2030.

The report argues that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as lower latitudes, with black carbon and methane having a disproportionate impact. It proposes that the U.S., during its 2015-2017 Arctic Council Chairmanship, should champion best practices in the oil and gas sector, advocate for a heavy fuel oil ban in shipping, promote clean energy for residential heating, and implement strategies to curb open burning.

The document outlines Poland's position as the EU's third-largest greenhouse gas emitter and advocates for the deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) to decarbonize energy-intensive industries. It highlights Poland's significant geological storage potential, exceeding 15 Gt of CO2, and discusses specific projects like GO4ECOPLANET and ECO2CEE. The text emphasizes that developing domestic storage and transport infrastructure is critical to reducing costs and avoiding high EU ETS emission fees.

Poland is the EU's third-largest emitter, with industrial point source fossil emissions totaling 40.6 MtCO2/year. The document argues that CCS is essential for the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries—particularly cement, steel, and fertilizer—and for providing firm power in a decarbonised energy grid. Poland possesses a significant CO2 storage potential of over 15 Gt, primarily in saline aquifers (14.3 Gt) and hydrocarbon fields (1 Gt), which could store 369 years of its annual industrial point source fossil emissions. Current projects like GO4ECOPLANET aim to decarbonise cement production at the Kujawy plant, with CO2 transported to the North Sea via the ECO2CEE project. The document highlights that developing domestic onshore storage and pipeline infrastructure could reduce transport and storage costs from €93-€100/t to between €23-€49/t. To accelerate deployment, the author recommends developing national storage resources, supporting projects to Final Investment Decision (FID) through mechanisms like carbon contracts for difference, and establishing cross-border partnerships with other EU Member States and Baltic countries.

Portugal has a theoretical CO2 storage capacity of 7.09 GtCO2, which could support the decarbonisation of its energy-intensive industries, particularly cement and pulp and paper. While no active CCS projects exist, the STRATEGY CCUS project has identified the Lusitanian Basin as a key area for cluster development. To accelerate adoption, the document recommends creating a national carbon management strategy, clarifying offshore maritime space permits, and establishing cross-border storage partnerships with EU member states like Spain.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) advocates for the inclusion of diverse CO2 transport and storage projects in the EU's PCI and PMI lists to enable the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate sectors. CATF emphasizes the need to expand infrastructure beyond the North Sea to Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, and to develop flexible transport networks using pipelines, shipping, barges, and trains. The document highlights that by 2050, 300 to 640 million tonnes of CO2 must be captured and stored annually in the EU, with at least 30% of industrial emissions requiring transport to non-North Sea storage.

The report finds that while announced storage capacity in the EU and EFTA (including Norway) may exceed 2030 capture demand, the EU alone is not on track to meet its 50 Mtpa target by 2030. Significant uncertainty remains as most projects are in early exploration stages, and actual investment lags behind announced ambitions.

The document argues that the availability of CO2 storage sites is the primary bottleneck for industrial decarbonisation in Europe. While it supports the NZIA's proposed target of 50 million tonnes of annual injection capacity by 2030, it suggests this is a 'bare minimum' and recommends five key improvements: setting more ambitious long-term storage targets, creating an EU-level aggregation platform to match CO2 sources with sinks, requiring Member States to map storage potential and plan cross-border transport networks, ensuring oil and gas producers' storage obligations align with industrial needs, and accelerating permitting and exploration licences for storage projects.

The Clean Air Task Force calls on the European Commission to prioritise a Communication on the Strategic Vision on CCUS, arguing that a robust policy framework is essential for deploying critical infrastructure by 2030. The letter proposes that an EU CCS strategy should prioritise hard-to-electrify industrial processes, establish clear definitions for CCS, CCU, and CDR, and develop a publicly regulated, open-access CO2 infrastructure network while maintaining the 'polluter pays' principle via the EU ETS.

The document argues for the urgent development of domestic geological CO2 storage in France to avoid long transport routes and high costs. It recommends implementing Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) to incentivize industrial adoption, accelerating the timeline for projects like Pycasso, and adopting a regulated infrastructure model similar to the UK's to ensure open access for diverse industrial emitters. While acknowledging CO2 utilization (CCU), it prioritizes permanent geological storage for maximum climate impact.

The Climate Knowledge Brokers (CKB) Group, supported by a Coordination Hub at REEEP, operates as a community of practice for approximately 400 brokers across 60 countries. Between 2014 and 2017, the group focused on professionalizing the role of climate knowledge brokering through the 2015 Climate Knowledge Brokers Manifesto, peer-learning workshops, and the development of digital tools like Climate Tagger and Climate Search. The group emphasizes collaboration over competition to ensure decision-makers have access to tailored, high-quality climate information.