Search Climate Insights Directory

The report details a December 2006 workshop used to test the first section of the CSC Manual, 'Assessing Conflict'. Participants identified and prioritised conflicts around Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP), specifically focusing on pastoralist encroachment and policy implementation gaps. Using tools like Conflict Trees, Conflict Mapping, and Stakeholder Analysis, the workshop identified root causes—such as land scarcity and ethnic rivalry—and proposed entry points for conflict resolution and sensitivity strategies for the CARE REPA programme.

The document details a capacity-building workshop for ICCN staff and partners to analyze and resolve conflicts in Virunga National Park. It identifies three primary conflicts: lack of revenue sharing, deforestation and encroachment, and military involvement in illegal activities. The report outlines conflict mapping tools, actor analysis, and proposed strategies such as creating collaboration frameworks, reorganizing fisheries on Lake Edward, and initiating community self-reliance projects.

The manual defines conflict-sensitive conservation (CSC) as programming that accounts for the causes, actors, and impacts of conflict to avoid exacerbating tensions and to support peace. It outlines a three-step institutional process for organizations to adopt CSC—assessing capacity, allocating human resources, and developing guiding principles—and a two-step project-level process involving conflict analysis and the design of sensitive solutions. The manual emphasizes that conservation can inadvertently fuel conflict by restricting resource access, imposing economic burdens, or distributing benefits unequally, but it can also foster peace by addressing root causes of resource scarcity and creating non-threatening spaces for dialogue.

The manual introduces 'Conflict-Sensitive Conservation' (CSC), a process designed for conservation organizations operating in or near protected areas, particularly in conflict-prone regions. It argues that while conservation can prevent conflict by managing scarce resources, poorly designed interventions—such as restricting resource access or unequal benefit distribution—can inadvertently trigger or fuel violence. The guide outlines a three-step institutional process to adopt CSC (assessing capacity, allocating human resources, and defining principles) and a two-step programmatic process (conflict analysis and the design/monitoring of solutions). It provides specific tools for analysis, including conflict trees, conflict mapping, and stakeholder profiling, and emphasizes the importance of gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding.

The report details a capacity-building workshop for the ICCN focused on managing natural resource conflicts in Kahuzi-Biega National Park. It identifies three primary conflict categories: park-population tensions, disputes over resource access, and intra/inter-institutional conflicts. Key drivers include the park's expansion without community consensus, the presence of armed groups like the FDLR, and the displacement of Batwa pygmies. The workshop utilized tools such as conflict trees and stakeholder analysis to prioritize strategies, identifying institutional capacity building for the army and ICCN, co-management, and the complete delimitation of the park as top priorities.

A declaration by various international organizations opposing the World Bank's role in the UNFCCC climate regime due to its continued financing of fossil fuels, contribution to deforestation, and undemocratic governance.

The report critiques REDD as a flawed approach that focuses on reducing rather than stopping deforestation, potentially rewarding polluters through carbon offsetting. It highlights significant risks to Indigenous Peoples' land rights, the danger of replacing natural forests with carbon-poor plantations, and methodological failures such as 'leakage'. The author argues that market-based funding is volatile and inequitable, suggesting instead that funding should be grant-based, managed by the UN, and focused on addressing the underlying drivers of deforestation.

The report argues that REDD, as currently designed, focuses on reducing rather than stopping deforestation and risks becoming a tool for corporate profit rather than climate mitigation. It highlights significant risks to indigenous land rights, the potential for 'leakage' where deforestation simply moves to other areas, and the danger of replacing natural forests with monoculture plantations. The author criticizes the use of carbon markets to fund REDD, suggesting instead public funding derived from fossil fuel taxes and the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies.

The report critiques REDD, asserting that it is designed to reduce rather than stop deforestation and may incentivize the replacement of natural forests with carbon-poor plantations. It warns that financing REDD through carbon markets could allow industrialized nations to avoid reducing fossil fuel emissions, undermine national sovereignty in developing countries, and lead to the displacement of indigenous communities. The author argues that REDD's 'opportunity cost' calculations often benefit polluters and that the mechanism is susceptible to market volatility and corporate lobbying. The document advocates for a non-market, grant-based funding system managed by the UN, focused on ecosystem justice, the recognition of indigenous land rights, and the elimination of the underlying drivers of deforestation.

The document highlights how two decades of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have created a humanitarian crisis and severely threatened Virunga National Park. It argues that the illegal trade in park resources, specifically charcoal, funds violence and leads to deforestation, while the displacement of populations increases pressure on the ecosystem. The author contends that environmental governance must be integrated into any peace agreements to prevent natural resources from continuing to finance conflict and to support future economic recovery.

The report finds that REDD is a low-cost climate mitigation strategy, with $20 billion in annual funding potentially reducing 2020 deforestation emissions by 50%. However, it argues that political and institutional constraints—specifically the capacity and interest of major emitters like Brazil and Indonesia—will likely delay the implementation of a comprehensive global system until 2020 or later.

The document examines the transition of French-African relations from the Gaullist 'Françafrique' model—characterized by personalized ties with authoritarian leaders—toward a more transparent, multilateral approach. It highlights the failures of the 'Baule doctrine' to enforce democratization and the shift in military strategy toward reinforcing African peacekeeping capacities (RECAMP). Economically, it notes a trend of disengagement, with France moving from a primary donor to an intermediary for international financial institutions and introducing conditionality via the 'Abidjan doctrine'. Under Nicolas Sarkozy, the document identifies a contradictory mix of provocative rhetoric and new promises of transparency in defense agreements and co-development funds, while noting that traditional practices of supporting authoritarian regimes persist.

The report examines the 'Global Connectivity System' and the policy tensions surrounding the Internet's evolution. It highlights risks to sustainable development stemming from the potential loss of net neutrality, restrictive intellectual property rights, and the shift toward 'tethered' closed devices. It also analyzes infrastructure challenges, such as the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 and the lack of universal broadband in Africa. Governance concerns focus on the internationalization of ICANN and the sustainability of the IETF's volunteer-led model. Finally, it addresses the Internet's ecological footprint, specifically the high energy demands of data centers and the environmental costs of e-waste and mineral extraction in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The report analyzes the systemic nature of corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2003 to 2006, arguing that the 'kleptocratic' legacy of the Mobutu era persisted through the transition. It details how power-sharing agreements under the Sun City Accord prioritized political clientelism over merit, leading to widespread pillaging of public finances, state-owned enterprises, and the mining and forestry sectors. Despite the introduction of new anti-corruption laws and the creation of monitoring bodies like the CELC and OCEP, the report finds these efforts largely failed due to a lack of political will, institutional dysfunction, and the complicity of international partners who prioritized electoral stability over good governance.

The document examines the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin, focusing on the tensions between upstream states, particularly Ethiopia, and downstream states, Egypt and Sudan. It argues that colonial-era agreements and Egypt's pursuit of 'prior appropriation' rights have created an inequitable distribution of water, hindering development in upper riparian states. The author suggests that cooperation through frameworks like the Nile Basin Initiative and the adoption of the Helsinki Rules for equitable sharing are necessary to avoid future conflict and ensure food and energy security.

The study finds that conflicts with religious cleavages are significantly more intense than non-religious ones. The effect on duration is ambiguous: religious conflicts are more likely to terminate in their early stages but are harder to end once they have lasted at least two and a half years.

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), inaugurated in 2004, currently operates as a consultative and advisory body without legislative, supervisory, or budgetary powers. The document argues that the PAP's institutional weakness stems from the decision by African leaders in 1999 to accelerate its establishment, bypassing the gradual six-stage integration process outlined in the 1991 Abuja Treaty. This premature launch left the PAP without necessary foundations, resulting in a 'disconnection between reality and the expectation' of its contribution to the African Union (AU). Key challenges include poor interaction with other AU organs, a lack of control over its own budget, and a membership system based on nomination from national legislatures rather than direct election by citizens. While the PAP has conducted observer missions to regions such as Darfur, Mauritania, the DRC, and the Central African Republic, many of its resolutions are ignored by the AU executive. The author suggests that the PAP must exploit existing protocol provisions to enhance its visibility and engagement with AU organs to become a relevant institution.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) failed to spark a national conversation in South Africa due to the government's determination to dominate the process and a systemic failure to engage the media. The author argues that the review process was centralised within the office of Public Service and Administration Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, which marginalised civil society and led to a Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) that reflected government views rather than a broad public consensus. While the Sunday Times provided consistent coverage, it faced hostility from the government when reporting on the findings of the Eminent Persons Panel, which contradicted official narratives on issues like crime and child safety. The paper concludes that for the APRM to be an effective vehicle for policy development, it requires greater transparency, a separation of the Focal Point and National Governing Council (NGC) chair roles, and a responsive media strategy from the APRM Secretariat.

The author argues that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in South Africa missed a critical opportunity for public engagement because the government, specifically through the office of Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, centralized and dominated the process. This centralization marginalized civil society and the media, leading to a lack of transparency and public interest. The paper highlights the tension between the Sunday Times, which attempted critical coverage of the process, and the government, which reacted defensively to reports on national failures such as crime and child safety. It concludes that for the APRM to be an effective policy tool, governments must adopt a less defensive posture, ensure genuine transparency, and actively engage the media to translate complex reports into public-interest news.

The document analyzes two legal pathways for prosecuting Robert Mugabe: the principle of universal jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court (ICC). While legal grounds exist for crimes committed after July 2002—such as 'Operation Murambatsvina' and election violence—the author concludes that prosecution is 'extremely unlikely' due to political obstacles. These include Zimbabwe's lack of ratification of the ICC statute and the likelihood that immunity from prosecution will be a key negotiation point to secure Mugabe's removal from power.