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The fact sheet proposes a Universal Basic Income Guarantee (UBIG) as a tool to support South Africa's Just Energy Transition (JET). It argues that while the shift to renewables is necessary for climate goals, it threatens coal-dependent industries and communities. A UBIG would provide a non-conditional financial safety net to cushion economic shocks, build resilience against climate crises, and ensure that the risks and benefits of the energy transition are redistributed equitably, particularly for vulnerable groups like informal workers and caregivers.

The document analyzes the global distribution of agricultural methane emissions, highlighting that while low- and middle-income countries produce the most, high-income countries have higher per capita emissions due to consumption patterns. It proposes a transition toward climate-smart agriculture through technology, policy reform, and targeted finance, particularly for smallholder farmers in Africa, to meet global reduction targets by 2030.

The document is an open letter from a broad coalition of individuals and organizations calling for COP30 to move beyond the mere recognition of climate disinformation and instead implement binding, verifiable measures to protect information integrity. It argues that coordinated disinformation, primarily funded by the fossil fuel industry, sabotages the energy transition, threatens public health and human rights, and undermines the goals of the Paris Agreement. The signatories call on governments to regulate tech platforms that profit from manipulative content and demand an end to greenwashing and the monetization of disinformation.

The report details Brazil's recent efforts to institutionalize the bioeconomy under President Lula da Silva, highlighted by the creation of the National Secretariat of Bioeconomy (SNB) and the 2024 National Bioeconomy Strategy. It analyzes the bioeconomy through three lenses: biotechnological, bioresources, and bioecological, noting that the current national strategy primarily aligns with the bioecological vision. The document maps the roles of multiple ministries—including the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA), the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC), and the Ministry of Finance (MF)—in implementing this framework. It also identifies complementary regulations such as the Fuel of the Future Law and the Productive Forests National Program, while emphasizing the upcoming National Bioeconomy Development Plan (PNDBIO) as a key opportunity for cross-sectoral coordination.

Non-CO2 emissions account for approximately 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet they are frequently overlooked in NDCs, which often lack gas-specific quantitative targets. While some countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Japan provide good practice examples of quantitative targets, major emitters including China, Russia, India, and Brazil generally only include non-CO2 gases as part of overall GHG targets. China, whose current NDC covers only CO2 despite non-CO2 gases making up 18% of its national emissions, has indicated it will include these gases in its updated NDC. The brief argues that the 2025 NDC update cycle is a critical opportunity for major emitters, particularly China, to adopt sector-specific targets and align with international initiatives like the Global Methane Pledge and the Kigali Amendment to maintain the 1.5°C warming limit.

The report evaluates several major global climate pledges, finding that most are currently off-track. While there are isolated successes—such as the UK closing its last coal plant and growth in electric car sales—critical goals like tripling renewable energy by 2030 and halting deforestation are not being met. The document highlights a significant gap between high-level commitments and implementation, particularly in the financial sector where net-zero plans are deemed insufficient and fossil fuel subsidies have reached record highs. It calls for a shift from loose networks to platforms of accountability as countries develop their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025.

The briefing highlights a significant funding gap in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where current climate finance flows represent only 0.5% of regional GDP, far below the 3.7% to 4.9% estimated by ECLAC to meet Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While developed nations eventually met the USD 100 billion annual pledge in 2022, the LAC region's share of international finance (17% between 2016-2020) consists largely of loans (81%), exacerbating regional debt. Financing is heavily concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia, with a strong preference for mitigation over adaptation projects.

The document outlines the structure of climate negotiations at COP29, listing various negotiating blocs such as the G77+China, EU, and AOSIS, while providing a glossary of terms and a calendar of thematic focus areas.

The guide outlines the critical themes of COP29, emphasizing its role as a "finance COP" focused on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) and the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund. It highlights the tension between rich and poor nations regarding climate aid, the influence of the United States, and the controversies surrounding Azerbaijan's role as host. Additionally, it provides logistical details for media personnel attending the event from November 11 to 22, 2024.

The report analyzes private climate finance for Brazil's land use sector, focusing on thematic bonds, CBIOs, and BNDES operations. It finds that bioenergy and biofuels are the primary recipients of these flows, though thematic bond issuance for land use declined sharply between 2021 and 2023. The BNDES remains a central actor through direct credit, blended finance pilots, and the management of the Amazon and Climate Funds.

This report analyzes the landscape of climate finance for agricultural risk management in Brazil between 2021 and 2023, focusing on public and private instruments used to protect rural production from extreme weather events. It details the financial flows of key programs like PROAGRO and PSR, highlighting a shift toward increased spending on loss and damages due to intensifying climate events, and discusses the role of Agricultural Climate Risk Zoning (ZARC) in improving resilience and sustainability.

This report analyzes the rural credit policy landscape for climate finance related to land use in Brazil from 2021 to 2023. It examines the volume of climate-related credit, the criteria used for classification, the sources of funding, and the challenges regarding the verification and actual environmental impact of these financial flows.

This report by the Climate Policy Initiative analyzes the landscape of climate finance for land use in Brazil from 2021 to 2023. It identifies rural credit as the primary source of funding but highlights significant gaps in sustainability verification and monitoring. The document outlines the roles of agriculture risk management, government spending, capital markets, and international cooperation, providing recommendations to improve transparency, align socio-environmental criteria, and leverage private investment to meet climate targets.

This report analyzes international development and cooperation finance flows for land use in Brazil from 2021 to 2023, identifying multilateral development banks and international governments as the primary sources of funding, with a strong emphasis on the forest sector.

The document examines the role of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAMs) in preventing carbon leakage and reducing emissions, with a primary focus on the EU CBAM. It argues that while the EU CBAM aims to promote global decarbonisation, it may only slightly reduce overall emissions while imposing significant economic burdens on developing nations, potentially costing them billions in income. The briefing highlights a growing, uncoordinated global trend of countries introducing their own carbon tariffs, which risks fragmenting trade and creating high compliance costs for small producers. It concludes that international cooperation, aligned with UNFCCC principles and supported by climate finance, is essential to ensure these mechanisms support global climate goals without unfairly penalising vulnerable economies.

India aims for 500 GW of non-fossil electricity capacity by 2030, but the target has slipped to 2031-32. While India produces 70-80% of its wind turbines domestically and exports significantly to the US, its solar PV sector is heavily dependent on China, which held over 80% of the global module market in 2022. India is attempting to build domestic solar supply chains via the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme and the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM), though it remains reliant on imports for critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, and nickel. Recycling is identified as essential for future supply chain security, with solar PV waste projected to reach nearly 19,000 kt by 2050.

This report describes the methodology used by the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) to quantify and compare financial flows for land use with climate action components in Brazil for the period 2021-2023. It details the criteria for classifying finance into mitigation, adaptation, dual benefits, and loss and damage, while outlining the data sources and the 'Climate Finance Ecosystem' used to track public and private resources.

Climate finance for land use in Brazil averaged US$ 17.1 billion annually from 2021 to 2023, a 99% increase from the 2015-2020 period. Domestic sources provided 97% of these resources, with the private sector contributing 72% of domestic finance. Rural credit was the primary financial instrument, accounting for 58% of total flows. While crops received the most funding (74%), the native forest sector remained heavily dependent on the federal public budget and international public sources. Mitigation-focused finance dominated at 57% of total flows, while spending on climate losses and damages grew significantly, reaching US$ 2.0 billion by 2023.

The re-election of Donald Trump may slow US clean technology deployment through the potential repeal of Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funds and EV tax credits, potentially shifting leadership to emerging economies. The global market for six key technologies—solar PV, wind turbines, EVs, batteries, electrolysers, and heat pumps—is projected to exceed USD 2 trillion by 2035, with global trade reaching USD 575 billion. China currently leads with 70% of the market for these technologies, though it faces risks from proposed US tariffs of 60% on all imports and 100% on EVs. Other nations may benefit: India could become a net exporter of clean technologies by 2035 with annual exports of USD 30 billion, and Brazil is well-positioned in wind turbine blade production, currently accounting for 5% of the global market. In the Global South, renewable energy potential is 400 times greater than fossil fuel production, and solar is expected to have lower upfront costs than coal in Vietnam from 2024 and in India from approximately 2027.

The briefing examines the climate impact of 22 global meat and dairy corporations, finding that their combined emissions are comparable to those of entire countries or major oil companies. It argues that the industry uses 'green smokescreens'—such as weak net-zero targets, unproven techno-fixes, and regenerative agriculture—to distract from the need to reduce livestock production. The document further highlights a lack of mandatory agricultural methane targets in the 11 countries where these companies are headquartered, attributing this to 'agricultural exceptionalism' and industry political influence.