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The report examines Ghana's progress in localising the SDGs, highlighting the use of its decentralised planning system to align global goals with local development plans. While it finds robust institutional and legal frameworks, it identifies significant challenges in funding and data collection.

The report finds that Canadian governments provided over CAD 23 billion in support for oil and gas pipelines between 2018 and 2020, with over CAD 10 billion provided after the onset of COVID-19. This support, which includes loans, loan guarantees, and equity investments, is argued to undermine Canada's climate commitments and expose taxpayers to significant financial risk due to cost overruns, legal challenges, and declining private sector interest in fossil fuel infrastructure.

The document analyzes Canada's 2020 COVID-19 recovery spending, noting a higher commitment to clean energy (CAD 14.7 billion) than fossil energy (CAD 3.6 billion) according to Energy Policy Tracker data. However, it highlights significant transparency gaps regarding credit support from public finance institutions like EDC and BDC. Compared to France, Germany, and the UK, Canada's per capita investment in electric vehicles is lower, while its investment in building retrofits is relatively high. The brief warns that Canada's hydrogen strategy leans toward 'blue hydrogen' (fossil-based) while European peers prioritize 'green hydrogen'. It recommends applying strict 'green strings' to stimulus, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, and aligning ambition with international standards.

The document argues that Export Development Canada (EDC) provides disproportionately high levels of support for oil and gas compared to clean technology, often lacking transparency in its transactions. It highlights that EDC's domestic mandate expansion, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, has facilitated continued fossil fuel financing. The brief recommends that EDC phase out public finance for fossil fuels, set clear climate action targets, and implement 'green strings' (climate-related conditionalities) to ensure economic recovery is aligned with the Paris Agreement and Canada's 2050 net-zero goal.

The Canadian government provided at least CAD 1.91 billion in federal fossil fuel subsidies in 2020, representing a jump of over 200% from 2019 levels. This increase was primarily driven by COVID-19 recovery measures, specifically funding for orphan and abandoned well reclamation and support for Newfoundland's offshore oil industry. The report argues that these subsidies are inconsistent with Canada's net-zero emissions by 2050 target and G20 commitments to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. It highlights significant data gaps regarding tax-related subsidies and public finance provided through Export Development Canada (EDC). The author recommends a transparent roadmap for subsidy phase-out by 2025, the alignment of EDC policies with climate goals, and the inclusion of subsidy reform in Canada's next Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement.

The report analyzes climate finance in South Africa for 2017-2018, tracking an annual average of R62.2 billion. It identifies a significant gap between current funding and the R8.9 trillion estimated by the IFC as necessary to achieve South Africa's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by 2030. Public finance averaged R22 billion annually, with a strong domestic preference, while private finance averaged R35.3 billion, focused exclusively on mitigation. The document recommends developing standardized climate finance definitions, improving public-private coordination, and scaling blended finance to leverage private capital.

The briefing outlines four priority areas for climate negotiations leading up to COP26: finalizing the Paris Agreement rulebook (specifically common timeframes for NDCs, transparency frameworks, and Article 6 carbon markets), establishing metrics for adaptation and loss and damage, addressing the shortfall in public climate finance for developing nations, and bridging implementation gaps for the 'decade of ambition'. It highlights the role of the 2020 Climate Dialogues in maintaining momentum and warns that a lack of public funding and transparency from developed nations threatens trust and the success of future negotiations.

The report analyzes the tracking of 'high-emissions finance'—defined as primary investment in assets with a material contribution to global GHG emissions—focusing on the power sector in 2017 and 2018. Using project-level datasets, the authors tracked USD 40.8 billion in annual average commitments, representing roughly one-third of the total fossil fuel power investment estimated by the IEA. The analysis reveals that public institutions, particularly export credit agencies and state-owned banks, and private commercial banks are major sources of this finance. Significant data gaps exist because investments made through corporate balance sheets are not captured in project-level data, particularly in Europe and China. The report recommends that public authorities mandate the disclosure of capital expenditures for high-emissions assets and establish technical emission thresholds to deter harmful investments.

The report finds that the value of Uganda's upstream oil reserves has declined by 70% since 2013 due to structural changes in the global oil market, with a further $10 billion at risk in a transition aligned with the Paris Agreement. Current commercial terms are deemed insufficient for international oil companies like Total and CNOOC to reach a final investment decision, likely necessitating costly renegotiations for the Ugandan government. The authors argue that relying on oil for economic development is increasingly risky and recommend diversifying the economy, potentially through electrification, while incorporating climate transition and physical risks into public debt sustainability forecasts.

Japan is ranked second among G20 OECD member countries for its low level of support for fossil fuel use and overall progress, yet it remains the second-highest supplier of public finance for domestic and overseas fossil fuel projects within that group.

The methodology note describes a comprehensive framework for scoring G20 countries on their support for fossil fuels, covering direct budget transfers, tax expenditures, price support, public finance, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) investment. It details seven indicators—transparency, pledges, and the scale of support for coal, oil and gas, power, and end-use, plus overall progress—to assess whether governments are meeting climate commitments. The framework specifically includes an analysis of public money commitments made in response to the COVID-19 crisis up to August 12, 2020.

G20 governments provided an annual average of $584 billion in support for fossil fuels from 2017 to 2019, with oil and gas production receiving the largest share. While overall support dropped by 9% compared to 2014–2016, this decline was inconsistent across countries and partly driven by lower oil prices. The report finds that state-owned enterprise (SOE) investment is the only support mechanism that increased overall, and that COVID-19 recovery packages have introduced at least $170 billion in new commitments to fossil fuel-intensive sectors, threatening to undo previous progress.

The policy brief addresses the systemic corruption and lack of enforcement in South African public procurement, which accounted for 19.5% of GDP in 2017. It highlights the failure of existing oversight bodies, noting that corruption-related convictions of government officials declined to 183 in the 2020 financial year. To address this, the authors propose a 'qui tam' or encouraged whistleblowing system where private individuals are incentivized with a percentage of recovered damages to report fraudulent claims. This model, which recovered $44.7-billion for the US federal government since 1988, is suggested as a way to empower citizens and reduce the burden on under-resourced state prosecutors. The brief provides a specific legislative framework to be inserted into the Public Procurement Act, including provisions for double damages and tiered rewards for whistleblowers depending on whether the state adopts the legal action.

The report argues that private equity firms use dividend recapitalizations to extract short-term profits from health care companies by loading them with debt, which can lead to bankruptcy, reduced patient care, and the diversion of public funds. It highlights several case studies where firms paid billions in dividends while facing legal issues or financial decline, and calls for increased transparency and limits on leverage and dividends.

Corruption Watch and the Public Affairs Research Institute call for decisive leadership and civil society collaboration in the drafting of South Africa's Public Procurement Bill. The authors argue that the pandemic-related corruption and the legacy of state capture highlight critical weaknesses in the current system, which requires a radical overhaul to ensure transparency, accountability, and constitutional compliance.

The document argues that the 24 June 2020 Supplementary Budget reneges on the promised R500 billion COVID-19 rescue package by providing only a net increase of R36 billion in non-interest spending. The authors contend that the budget relies on reprioritising existing funds, leading to dangerous cuts in basic education, higher education, transport, and energy, while failing to provide adequate support for social security, job creation, and health. They recommend the budget's rejection in favour of counter-cyclical measures financed through solidarity taxation, increased borrowing, and reserve bank action.

Japan has provided over US$17.5 billion in public finance for 21 GW of coal power abroad since 2013, often justifying this by claiming to support "best available technologies" like ultra-supercritical plants. However, the document asserts that these plants are still too polluting to meet Paris Agreement goals and that Japan's withdrawal would not prevent the use of inferior technologies, as China and South Korea are also major funders. Furthermore, the briefing notes that Japanese-funded overseas projects often use inferior emission controls compared to domestic standards and that coal is increasingly an unsafe investment compared to cheaper solar and wind power.

South Korean state-owned financial institutions have invested US$5.6 billion in overseas coal-fired power plants since 2013, primarily in Vietnam and Indonesia. These investments face significant risks of becoming stranded assets as renewable energy costs drop and private lenders withdraw from coal. The document notes that new coal plants in Southeast Asia may operate for less than five years before becoming economically unviable. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted construction schedules and reduced electricity demand. These trends conflict with the South Korean Democratic Party's Green New Deal, which calls for phasing out public coal funding. Specific high-risk projects include the Jawa 9 and 10 plants in Indonesia, for which US$232.5 million in funding is under consideration.

South Korean public financial institutions face up to $6 billion in stranded asset risks due to investments in overseas coal power plants, particularly in Indonesia and Vietnam. This trend contradicts the South Korean government's 'Green New Deal' policy to phase out public funding for coal. The economic viability of coal is declining as solar and wind power costs drop, and the COVID-19 pandemic has further disrupted construction schedules and reduced electricity demand. Specific high-risk projects include the Jawa 9 and 10 plants in Indonesia and the Bung Ang 2 plant in Vietnam. Meanwhile, private financial institutions and several Southeast Asian nations are increasingly transitioning away from coal toward renewables.

The document records a dialogue on the crisis facing South African State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), focusing on the need for clear mandates, financial sustainability, and the removal of political interference. Panelists and officials highlighted systemic failures in entities like Eskom, PRASA, and SAA, attributing their decline to state capture, corruption, and poor governance. Proposed solutions include rationalizing the number of SOEs, implementing forensic audits, adopting 'just transition' plans for energy, and strengthening the role of civil society in institutional oversight.