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The document analyzes Norway's strategic management of its petroleum resources to avoid the 'resource curse' and foster a competitive high-tech sector. Key mechanisms included the creation of Statoil in 1972 to build independent technological capacity and the establishment of the Government Pension Fund Global in 1990 to manage revenue volatility. The government implemented local content requirements, such as mandating that 50% of petroleum R&D be conducted domestically, and forced collaboration between multinationals and local universities. These efforts transformed Norwegian manufacturing into a specialized engineering and supply industry, with the oil and gas sector serving as an enabling market for broader high-tech innovations in telecommunications, satellites, and automation. The study concludes that Norway's success was predicated on its pre-existing skills base, strong government enforcement, and a long-term approach to innovation.

The document analyzes the challenges and initiatives related to women's participation in Papua New Guinea's extractives sector. It highlights the Women in Mining (WIM) initiative and the WIM National Action Plan 2007–2012 as strategic efforts to address gender inequality and empower women in remote areas. While some private sector programs, such as at the Lihir mine, have successfully increased female employment, the report notes that overall economic growth from minerals has not significantly reduced income poverty or social inequalities in the country.

The review of Jacob Zuma's presidency highlights a period of economic decline characterized by low GDP growth, high unemployment, and state-owned enterprise debt. While the administration saw successes in renewable energy investment via the Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme and international acclaim for its HIV/Aids response, it was marred by corruption, state capture, and investor-unfriendly policies in mining and land expropriation. The presidency also shifted diplomatic focus toward China and the BRICS grouping, though this came at the expense of other strategic partnerships.

Friends of the Earth International asserts that the current global energy model, dominated by fossil fuels and corporate-led 'false solutions', is driving a planetary emergency. The statement criticizes the Paris Agreement as insufficient and legally unenforceable, calling for urgent emission reductions by wealthy nations and a shift toward decentralized, community-led energy systems.

Friends of the Earth International calls for a global movement to replace the centralized fossil fuel industry and other harmful energy sources—including nuclear power and large hydroelectric dams—with community-centered, sustainable energy. The statement asserts that the Paris Agreement is insufficient to limit warming to 1.5 degrees and demands that developed nations, responsible for the majority of emissions, lead emission reductions and provide financial support to the Global South.

The document asserts that meeting the Paris Agreement's goals of keeping warming "well below 2°C" requires a phase-down of coal, oil, and natural gas production. It identifies six primary mechanisms within the UNFCCC framework to achieve this: incorporating supply-side targets in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), planning managed declines in long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LTSs), tracking extraction via the global stocktake, providing technical capacity-building support, redirecting finance away from fossil fuel infrastructure, and providing developed-country assistance to developing nations for economic transitions.

The document examines the impacts of coal, oil, gas, and megadams across Africa, highlighting how these 'dirty energy' sources drive climate change and cause severe social and health crises. It details specific cases, such as South Africa's coal reliance, Uganda's oil expansion, and Mozambique's megadams, while warning against the 'extreme energy' frontier of fracking and tar sands. The briefing concludes that African governments must reject these outdated pathways in favor of decentralized, sustainable energy systems supported by climate finance from developed nations.

The document examines the impacts of 'dirty energy' (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, industrial biomass, mega-dams, and waste incineration) across Africa. It highlights how these technologies drive climate change, cause severe health and environmental damage, and often benefit elites and multinational corporations over local populations. The report provides case studies on coal in South Africa, oil in Nigeria and Uganda, mega-dams in Mozambique, and the risks of 'extreme energy' like fracking and bitumen extraction in the Maghreb and Nigeria. It concludes by calling for 'energy sovereignty' and a just transition to decentralized, renewable energy systems.

The document examines the impacts of 'polluting energy'—including fossil fuels, industrial biomass, and large dams—across Africa. It highlights how these systems often benefit elites and corporations while leaving local populations to face health crises, land grabbing, and climate vulnerability. Specific case studies focus on South Africa's coal dependency, oil extraction in Nigeria and Uganda, the influence of European energy policies in the Maghreb, and the social and environmental costs of large dams in Mozambique. The report concludes that African nations must avoid 'locking in' obsolete polluting technologies and instead pursue energy sovereignty through decentralized renewables.

The paper estimates that Chinese financiers provided US$86.3 billion to African governments and state-owned enterprises between 2000 and 2014, a figure lower than many common beliefs. The authors argue that Chinese lending is driven by business interests—specifically generating construction contracts for Chinese firms—rather than a primary desire to secure natural resources. While transportation and energy are the largest sectors receiving funds, approximately one-third of the loans are secured by commodities or exports to mitigate risk in unstable environments. The authors warn that while a debt crisis has not yet occurred, rising debt levels and the unlikely nature of policy bank debt cancellation pose future risks.

The report estimates that a transition to a low-carbon economy could put nearly $25 trillion of fossil fuel asset value at risk, with approximately 80% of this risk borne by governments rather than private investors. The analysis highlights that oil represents the majority of value at risk (close to 75%), while coal offers the highest emissions reduction potential with relatively low stranding risk (12%). The document argues that the net economic impact depends heavily on policy: a purely tax-based approach to reducing oil demand could cost the global economy $3 trillion, whereas an innovation-led transition could yield a net benefit of $7 trillion. It recommends prioritizing the phase-out of coal and utilizing financial mechanisms to lower the cost of renewable energy in emerging markets.

The report examines the 'peace potential' of oil and gas resources, analyzing how joint development, revenue sharing, and infrastructure projects like pipelines can either mitigate or fuel conflict. It contrasts successful cooperation, such as the Saudi-Kuwaiti Partitioned Neutral Zone and Turkey-Iraqi Kurdish relations, with failures in the Caucasus and disputes in the South China Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. The study also addresses the role of international environmental law and the climate impact of transitioning from coal to natural gas.

The paper examines the impact of Chinese resources-for-infrastructure (R4I) swaps on the 'resource curse' in Africa, specifically analyzing mechanisms like price volatility, Dutch disease, rent-seeking, and political conflict. Through case studies of countries such as Angola, the DRC, and Ghana, the author finds that R4I swaps are neither inherently harmful nor a panacea; their developmental impact depends on the capacity of host government institutions to manage risks and opportunities.

The 2014 survey of Maryland residents indicates a strong public perception that climate change harms human health, particularly through respiratory issues and heat stroke. While medical professionals are highly trusted sources of information, residents perceive fossil fuels and nuclear power as health hazards, contrasting with a view of solar and wind energy as non-harmful. The report also notes an increase in concern regarding chemical exposure and pollution, and identifies health care access and environmental health as top state policy priorities.

The report examines Greenland's approach to sustainable development amidst rising international interest in its petroleum, minerals, and rare earth resources. While it praises the adoption of 'best-in-class' environmental and social impact assessments, it warns of gaps in emergency preparedness, dispute resolution, and the potential for a 'two-tier wage system' for migrant workers. The authors argue that Greenland must diversify its economy beyond extractives and improve its capacity to negotiate with powerful global investors to avoid the 'natural resource curse'.

The report proposes a transition for China from fossil fuels to a system based on radical efficiency and renewable energy. It identifies three key areas for innovation: ultralighting and electrifying vehicles to eliminate oil dependence, using 'integrative design' to drastically reduce energy use in industry and buildings, and shifting toward a hybridized, distributed electric grid. The authors suggest these changes can be driven by profit and business innovation rather than just regulation.

The statement denounces the persecution of Berta Cáceres and other activists in Honduras, attributing the violence to a 'model extractivo minero' and 'energías sucias' driven by international financial capital and neoliberal globalization. It highlights the systemic impunity for officials who militarize indigenous territories while defenders of Lenca, Garífuna, and Miskito lands are targeted by state forces and private security for multinationals in the mining, oil, and hydroelectric sectors.

The research investigates why South Africa is a founding member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) but remains absent from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). It argues that the South African government's justifications—namely the existence of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA)—are insufficient because these frameworks do not provide the specific, multi-stakeholder corporate-state payment reconciliation that the EITI requires. The author suggests that South Africa's reluctance is partly ideological, tied to perceived double standards in the global North, and that the country may only join the EITI if it sees it as a means to bolster its status as an emerging global power.

The research examines how the physical and economic characteristics of natural resources predispose them to be exploited by warring factions in Africa. It posits that resources requiring low specialized skills, high portability, and high liquidity (like alluvial diamonds) are more likely to fuel conflict. Conversely, capital-intensive resources (like deep-level gold or oil) are less attractive to rebels but can still be linked to conflict through state weakness and elite rent-seeking. The author emphasizes that while resource characteristics create vulnerabilities, the state's capacity to manage grievances and maintain territorial control determines whether these vulnerabilities lead to actual conflict.

The document analyzes the evolution of China's strategies to secure mineral resources in Africa, moving from a primary reliance on 'infrastructure-for-resources' loans to a more diversified approach emphasizing mergers and acquisitions (M&A). While infrastructure-for-resources deals have been effective in locking in long-term supply, they have often failed to secure hard equity assets due to project delays and political instability. In contrast, the 2008-09 global financial crisis enabled Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to use their high liquidity to acquire significant mining and oil assets through M&As, particularly in the mining sector. The author concludes that while the Chinese state remains a critical financier, the strategy has shifted toward more market-oriented, direct acquisitions to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers and gain control over commodity prices.