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The Union of Concerned Scientists finds that implementing battery recycling, improving vehicle efficiency, right-sizing battery range, and increasing non-vehicle transportation options could reduce newly mined lithium demand in the US by 48% between 2025 and 2050. This reduction equals 1.5 million metric tons of lithium. The report argues that high recovery rates (90%) could allow recycled content to meet nearly 60% of lithium demand by 2050. Key recommendations include federal recycling requirements, efficiency standards, and expanded public charging infrastructure to reduce the need for oversized batteries.

The report argues that the US can significantly reduce its reliance on newly mined minerals for electric vehicle (EV) batteries by prioritizing energy efficiency, right-sizing battery range, and implementing robust recycling policies. Through a 'Very Low Demand Scenario,' the authors demonstrate that newly mined lithium needs could be reduced by 48% from 2025 to 2050, saving 1.5 million metric tons of material. The analysis emphasizes that while electrification is essential for decarbonization, a systems-wide approach—including investments in public transit and rail to reduce vehicle miles traveled (VMT)—is necessary to create a sustainable and just supply chain.

The document analyzes the potential for African nations to move beyond the "pit to port" model of mineral extraction by building integrated battery mineral value chains. It highlights Africa's significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite, and vanadium, and examines the macroeconomic shift from fossil fuel revenues to transition mineral revenues. The paper identifies Morocco as a leader in integrating automotive assembly with battery material production and discusses the potential for South Africa to act as a regional integrator. It concludes that while a continent-wide strategy is unlikely, sub-regional strategies and national policy instruments—such as strategic non-alignment and targeted industrial policies for e-mobility—can help African countries capture more value from their mineral endowments.

The document highlights the absence of directly impacted communities from the UN Secretary-General's Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals. It asserts that these frontline communities, who face the impacts of 'green extractivism' on their land, health, and rights, are essential for the panel to achieve its goal of leaving no one behind. The briefing specifically references concerns regarding lithium, nickel, and bauxite mining and processing in Argentina, Indonesia, and Guinea.

The report argues that battery minerals are not like oil because their demand can be managed through six key solutions: changing chemistries, increasing energy density, recycling, extending battery lifetimes, improving vehicle efficiency, and enhancing mobility efficiency. Under a 'continued trend' scenario, virgin demand for lithium, nickel, and cobalt is projected to peak in the mid-2030s. Under an 'accelerated trend' scenario, net-zero mineral demand is achievable by 2050, turning mining into a one-off effort. The report highlights China's leadership in recycling and suggests that the Global South can leverage used vehicle imports to build its own recycling industries. Ultimately, the transition to a circular battery loop offers a path from oil dependence to circular energy independence.

The document examines how African nations have responded to the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting a trend toward non-alignment and a reluctance to support punitive measures against Russia. It argues that African responses are driven by a combination of historical grievances with Western leadership (such as the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya and COVID-19 vaccine inequity) and strategic national interests. The report details the economic opportunities arising from Europe's shift away from Russian energy, specifically regarding natural gas and critical minerals, while warning that geopolitical rivalry between the US, Russia, and China may undermine regional security initiatives like the Accra Initiative. It concludes by advocating for a foreign policy based on 'non-alignment' and 'indivisible security' to avoid becoming proxies in a new Cold War.

The Lobito Corridor is a 1,300 km railway line in Angola, extending into the DRC, designed to transport minerals to the EU and US. While several MoUs have been signed to secure critical raw materials (CRMs) and EV battery value chains, the author argues the project faces significant risks due to China's established supply chains, the TAZARA railway alternative, and the EU and US's lag in EV technology. The paper suggests that the EU and US should move beyond raw material extraction to support comprehensive industrialization across Africa.

The report examines how the rivalry between the US and China in the technological domain threatens Indonesia's economic growth and national security. It highlights vulnerabilities in investment flows, market access for electronics and critical minerals, and risks related to cyber-espionage and technological interoperability. The authors argue that Indonesia's current regulatory and institutional framework is inadequate, as it fails to integrate geopolitical and security considerations into its technology strategies. To address these gaps, the report recommends investing in national tech champions, formulating domestic technological norms, and establishing a dedicated office for critical minerals, emerging technologies, and cybersecurity.

The report examines the social and environmental risks associated with the surge in demand for transition minerals like nickel, lithium, and cobalt. It criticizes current IFI approaches, such as the World Bank's 'climate-smart mining,' for treating environmental and social governance (ESG) as commercial risks rather than human rights imperatives. Through case studies in Indonesia, Guinea, Argentina, and the DRC, the document illustrates harms including forced evictions, water scarcity, and corruption. It proposes solutions centered on reducing mineral demand through circular economy models, implementing binding due diligence, and supporting mineral sovereignty for resource-rich countries in the Global South.

The report examines the SADC region's role in the global energy transition, focusing on critical minerals like copper, lithium, cobalt, graphite, manganese, nickel, and rare earth elements. It highlights the risk of SADC countries remaining raw material suppliers unless they implement robust governance and strategic value-addition policies. The analysis covers the geostrategic influence of China, the US, and the EU, while providing country-specific case studies and recommendations for regional value chain development.

Zambia is seeking approximately $8 billion in debt relief under the G20 Common Framework to address a public debt estimated at nearly $34 billion by the end of 2021. The process has been slowed by disagreements among the Official Creditors Committee, including tensions between China and the United States, and the reluctance of private-sector creditors. To mitigate the impact of austerity measures required by IMF and World Bank programs, the document recommends protecting the poor and unemployed from the removal of electricity, fuel, and agricultural subsidies. The briefing argues that debt restructuring should be linked to the global energy transition by securing investment in copper and other critical minerals like cobalt, lithium, and nickel. Additionally, it proposes 'debt for nature swaps' to fund mine rehabilitation, climate-smart agriculture, and ecosystem preservation.

The document examines how African nations have navigated the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting a preference for non-alignment driven by historical grievances with Western leadership and strategic national interests. It details the varied voting patterns of African states at the UN General Assembly, the potential for Africa to fill Europe's energy gap through gas and critical minerals, and the risks posed by great-power competition to regional security, particularly in the Sahel.

The document argues against the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to subsidize the mining of critical minerals, advocating instead for a circular economy based on recycling and reuse. It demands that if DPA mechanisms are used for metals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, the US government must mandate free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) from Indigenous communities, binding human rights due diligence, and strong anti-corruption measures. The authors emphasize the need to avoid repeating the 'generational trauma' of past government-subsidized mining and suggest the US adopt frameworks similar to the EU Battery Directive.

The document defines 'critical minerals' as raw materials essential for renewable energy and clean technology, noting that criticality is context-specific and varies by country. It identifies two primary perspectives on criticality: security and control of supply (emphasized by the US, EU, and Japan) and value capture (emphasized by China, Australia, and Canada). The guide highlights the role of rare earth elements (REEs) in permanent magnets and lists key demand drivers such as e-mobility and decarbonization. It also discusses supply sources, including the significant role of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) for cobalt and tantalum, and emerging sources like deep-seabed mining. Finally, it outlines the macroeconomic and geopolitical risks associated with mineral dependency, such as 'Dutch disease' and supply chain concentration.

The report analyzes base metal beneficiation in Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia, comparing their outcomes with the successful industrial policies of Japan and China. It argues that China's state-led expansion of smelting and refining capacity has caused a 'Great Compression' of margins, making autonomous beneficiation in Africa commercially unattractive. The study concludes that African countries can only succeed in beneficiation through comprehensive industrial policies and strategic partnerships, particularly with Chinese state-owned enterprises.

The Basque Country exhibits a high resource dependency, with a Total Material Requirement of 108 tons per capita in 2004, 83% of which is imported. This consumption pattern drives significant environmental and social degradation abroad, including oil spills in Nigeria, deforestation for palm oil in Indonesia, toxic pollution from nickel mining in Russia, and watershed degradation from tin mining in Bolivia. The document argues that the economic prosperity of developed regions is linked to an unsustainable use of global resources and calls for a transformation in consumption and production patterns to meet basic human needs without exceeding planetary limits.

Between 2021 and 2023, mining for copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel was linked to 334 incidents of violence or protest across 19 top-producing countries, averaging 111 per year. Nearly 90% of these events occurred in emerging and developing economies, while the majority of production is controlled by companies from advanced economies and major consumer countries, primarily China. The report warns that social unrest is likely to increase as production is forecast to spike by 2028 to meet climate goals, potentially destabilizing supply chains and increasing costs for renewable technologies.

The document highlights the risks associated with the rapid extraction of transition minerals, specifically noting violence and human rights abuses in the Philippines. It urges the EU to implement strict sustainability standards in trade agreements and funding to ensure a just transition for mining communities.

The report reveals that the Philippines' push to become a leading exporter of transition minerals, such as nickel and copper, is causing significant land loss for Indigenous Peoples and the destruction of critical biodiversity hotspots. It highlights a pattern of state-driven violence, where the military is identified as the primary perpetrator of killings and detentions of land defenders. The document argues that the global shift to renewable energy is fueling a 'green mineral rush' that relies on 'red-tagging' activists and militarising infrastructure, particularly in Mindanao, to facilitate extractive projects.

Global Witness reports that while the US and UK have banned Russian-origin nickel, the EU has not, creating a loophole where Russian nickel is refined in Finland and then legally exported to the US. The report highlights the environmental degradation and human rights abuses linked to Norilsk Nickel's operations in the Arctic, the company's ties to the Russian military-industrial complex, and the challenges of conducting corporate due diligence in a repressive political environment. It recommends that the EU implement targeted sanctions on Russian nickel, maintain strict thresholds for the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), and prioritize circular economy strategies to reduce dependency on Russian minerals.