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The document examines Russia's return to Africa through the lens of its 'multi-vector' foreign policy, which seeks to establish a multipolar world order and reduce dependence on the West. It details Russia's focus on niche markets—specifically nuclear energy, arms, and extractives—and its use of 'state champions' like Rosatom and Rosneft. The paper highlights Russia's military-security cooperation, including the use of private military companies in the Central African Republic and Libya, and its strategic relationship with South Africa via the BRICS framework. It concludes that while Russia offers an alternative to Western conditionalities, its engagement often prioritizes elite networks and resource extraction over broad development.

The document analyzes Turkey's ambition to become a regional energy hub and how this goal conflicts with its assertive geostrategic vision and the emerging energy partnerships of other Eastern Mediterranean states. It details Turkey's use of 'gunboat diplomacy' and naval presence to protect the sovereign rights of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) against the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and its allies. The authors argue that the current security architecture, characterized by trilateral partnerships and maritime boundary disputes, creates a challenge for Turkish policymakers attempting to reconcile energy ambitions with national security and sovereignty claims.

The text advocates for the EU to integrate climate change into its security and foreign policy framework, proposing a 'geographical/geopolitical' approach to climate security. It suggests that climate change acts as a risk multiplier for conflict, migration, and instability, particularly in regions like the Sahel. The author proposes several Green Party initiatives, including the creation of an EU Special Envoy for Climate Security, the reservation of international funds for climate mitigation in destabilized countries, and reducing dependence on fossil fuels from autocratic regimes to enhance global stability.

The document posits that climate change adaptation involves systemic changes that influence geopolitics. While adaptation is typically framed as ecosystem preservation or conflict reduction—with developing countries viewed as the most vulnerable—this text specifically examines how shifts in water supply, demand, management, and cooperation in India impact geopolitical relations.

The Mistra Geopolitics programme, running from 2017 to 2020, is an interdisciplinary research effort involving six Swedish core partners and international institutes. It aims to help Sweden navigate geopolitical insecurity and leverage innovation to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. The programme is organized into five work packages: WP1 focuses on the frame of geopolitics and security in the Anthropocene; WP2 analyzes transnational impacts on Sweden including trade and migration; WP3 examines global governance responses to environmental security risks; WP4 explores the link between geopolitical landscapes and the SDGs; and WP5 integrates these findings through a co-creation process and foresight scenarios to strengthen Swedish competitiveness.

The document examines the role of northern Europe, particularly Sweden, in the global production of iron ore and copper. It analyzes how global demand, dominated by China, creates 'boom and bust' cycles that impact local economies and environments. Using Chile as a comparative case, it highlights how resource scarcity and social resistance can limit production, while China's market dominance creates geopolitical dependencies for exporting nations. For northern Europe, the brief suggests that stable regulatory frameworks and assured ancillary resources may attract investment, though stakeholders must remain wary of the social and political implications of foreign mining companies.

The paper argues that Egypt's decision to join the TFTA is driven by a combination of geopolitical interests, a long-term shift toward trade liberalisation, and a desire to maintain influence in Africa. While static economic gains may be modest due to existing COMESA memberships and structural barriers, the author suggests that the TFTA offers a more consistent policy path than joining a customs union, potentially enhancing Egypt's role as an investment hub and improving relations with other African states.

The document analyzes the shift in Arctic environmental governance from a cooperative 'low politics' area in the 1990s to 'high politics' linked to global markets and resource politics. It explores how issues like climate change, biodiversity, and persistent pollutants have framed the Arctic as a global concern and assesses the impact of emerging geopolitics on pan-Arctic governance.

The report identifies significant risks of cumulative supply deficits for indium, tellurium, and neodymium by 2035, which could hinder the deployment of low-carbon technologies like photovoltaics and electric vehicles. Using a scenario calculator based on IEA and WEF frameworks, the study finds that indium and tellurium face severe risks, while cobalt and lithium show limited risk. The photovoltaic industry is highlighted as particularly vulnerable, specifically second-generation thin-film technologies. Proposed mitigation strategies include material substitution, vertical integration, and increased recycling, though the latter faces technical and economic hurdles. The report argues that current government policies often treat scarcity as a technological issue, neglecting the geopolitical and economic risks that can exacerbate supply bottlenecks.

The document examines the Indian Ocean as a critical space for energy security and maritime trade, where global powers like the US, China, India, and Russia compete for influence. It argues that while these powers employ strategies such as 'lily pads' or 'string of pearls' to secure sea lines of communication, continental Africa has remained passive, lacking the political will and resources to proactively manage its own maritime domain.

The 3rd GIBSA Partners' Meeting, held in April 2009 in Tshwane, South Africa, brought together representatives from Germany, India, Brazil, and South Africa to discuss the emerging global political and economic order. Key discussions focused on the transition of power from West to East, the role of 'smart power' in international relations, and the challenges facing African states in exerting influence globally. The meeting also analyzed the rise of 'club governance' (such as the G20 and Heiligendamm Process) as a flexible alternative to traditional multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank, while emphasizing that Africa remains more of a 'field of action' than a proactive actor in international relations.

The document analyzes the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which became fully operational on 1 October 2008. It argues that while the US intends to streamline military and diplomatic activities to address counter-terrorism and energy security, many Africans perceive it as a militarization of foreign policy. The paper details the shift from a fragmented command structure—where Africa was split between EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM—to a unified command. It highlights the influence of Chinese economic and political growth in Africa as a driver for US strategic realignment. The author concludes that AFRICOM's effectiveness depends on the Obama administration's ability to prioritize diplomacy over brute force and avoid establishing permanent bases on African soil.

The document defines climate change as a "threat multiplier" that creates direct risks to critical infrastructure and indirect risks by stressing resources like food, water, and energy. It argues that while climate change is unlikely to be the sole cause of war, it increases the likelihood of conflict in unstable regions. The guide details the specific impacts on military readiness, operations, and strategy, and emphasizes the need for a comprehensive risk management approach combining adaptation and mitigation.

The document argues that the US is facing a potential transition from relative to absolute demographic decline as net migration trends toward negative values. This shift, combined with projected negative 'natural' population growth by 2030, is expected to accelerate the decline of US national power (measured via DIME factors) and create a geopolitical vacuum in Africa. The author suggests that China is already positioning itself to fill this void through more collaborative engagement with African partners, while the EU faces a similar risk of power decline unless it treats migration as an opportunity to offset its own aging population.

The text argues that Africa has lost its Cold War-era strategic importance, leading to a rise in regional conflicts and state fragility. It discusses a shift toward subregional security arrangements (such as ECOWAS and SADC) as African nations and donors move away from reliance on the UN. The author contends that stability requires a focus on domestic security and 'collaborative security' based on transparency and reassurance rather than collective defense, warning that supporting weak, undemocratic states to provide regional security without international oversight may have negative consequences.

The research examines the Central Asia Regional Security Complex (CA RSC), comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It argues that while these states share concerns regarding trans-border terrorism, extremism, and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan, their primary security drivers are internal rivalries and the strategic balancing of global powers—specifically Russia, China, and the USA. The author contends that the 'Heart of Asia' concept fails because it underestimates inter-state non-cooperation and ignores the distinct security dynamics of sub-regions. Central Asian states employ a 'multi-vector' foreign policy to maximize benefits from competing external interests while guarding their sovereignty. Consequently, their engagement with Afghanistan is fragmented and unilateral, focused on extracting economic rent or preventing security 'bleed-out' rather than a unified regional strategy.