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South Africa hosted COP 17 in 2011 with the goal of establishing legal guidelines for carbon emission reductions and advancing a post-2012 global climate regime. The document highlights the tension between developed and developing nations regarding binding targets, specifically the stalemate over the Kyoto Protocol. South Africa aims to act as a bridge-builder, championing African agency and adaptation needs while coordinating with the BASIC alliance. Domestically, the document notes that South Africa must finalize policies on carbon taxes and renewable energy tariffs to lead by example, as it is the world's 13th highest greenhouse-gas emitter.

The report estimates that at least USD 97 billion per annum in climate finance was provided in 2009/2010, with private finance (USD 55 billion) significantly outweighing public finance (at least USD 21 billion). The vast majority of these funds (USD 93 billion) are directed toward mitigation, while adaptation receives only USD 4.4 billion. The analysis highlights a critical lack of standardized definitions and a significant gap in data regarding the effectiveness of these financial flows.

The research evaluates the transition from voluntary to mandatory emissions trading in Japan using the CASE-ASIA model. It compares two primary designs—one including the electricity sector in the ETS and one applying a CO2 tax to it—across various allocation modes including full auctioning, border adjustments (BA), and output-based allocation (OBA). The findings highlight a critical trade-off between electricity prices and industrial product prices, noting that border adjustments for exports are essential for Japan due to its high export volume of steel and cement. While OBA is most effective at limiting production decreases, the study concludes there is no single superior design, and policy choices will depend on government priorities regarding revenue and competitiveness.

The briefing proposes that the US congressional super committee avoid austerity cuts to social services and environmental enforcement by targeting "environmentally harmful spending" and generating revenue through a carbon tax and other levies. It highlights the "Green Scissors 2011" report, which identifies up to $380 billion in potential savings over five years from subsidies to the oil, gas, coal, nuclear, and biofuels industries. Additionally, the authors suggest a carbon tax could generate significant revenue, citing a proposal that could have yielded $600 billion over 10 years, alongside potential taxes on sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions and a currency transaction levy.

The paper assesses how different carbon tax rates (10 and 100 yuan/tCO2) affect various Chinese industrial sectors. It finds that while a low carbon price is a safe starting point, a higher price of 100 yuan/tCO2 would significantly impact energy-intensive sectors like ferrous metals and electricity, potentially reducing GDP by 1.1% unless revenue is redistributed to stimulate consumption. The study highlights the electricity sector as the primary driver for CO2 emission reductions and suggests that targeted carbon pricing for energy-intensive sectors could be more efficient than a nationwide policy.

The analysis indicates that South Africa is vulnerable to border carbon adjustments (BCAs) from the US and EU, with potential annual charges of €380 million and US$210 million respectively. The non-ferrous metals and iron and steel sectors are the most exposed, facing ad valorem tax equivalents exceeding 10%. To mitigate these risks, the document suggests South Africa could pursue WTO redress or negotiate sectoral emissions reduction agreements to gain exemptions.

The document evaluates different strategies for distributing emission reduction burdens between ETS and non-ETS sectors in Spain, alongside the impact of replacing a CO2 tax with taxes on energy, oil, or electricity. It concludes that a cost-effective distribution—where energy-intensive sectors bear a larger share of the effort—minimizes overall mitigation costs, while taxing electricity is found to be highly inefficient for reducing CO2 emissions.

Jeremy Fisher, Ph.D., testifying for the Sierra Club, argues that Kentucky Power Company's (KPCo) analysis erroneously favors retrofitting the Big Sandy 2 unit. He identifies significant flaws in the Strategist and Aurora models, including underestimated capital costs for the retrofit, overestimated costs for natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) replacements, and an unrealistically low carbon dioxide (CO2) price forecast. Fisher asserts that when these errors are corrected and off-system sales are properly allocated, alternatives such as NGCC replacement or market purchases are substantially more cost-effective than the FGD retrofit.

The paper argues that Sectoral Approaches (SAs)—which the author suggests renaming to Sectoral Approaches, Agreements and Measures (SAAMs)—are most viable when designed as domestic policies first rather than top-down international agreements. Through analysis of the steel sector in China, India, and Japan, the document finds that national sovereignty and diverse domestic priorities make a common international solution unlikely. It concludes that SAAMs can co-exist with carbon pricing and that their implementation is hindered by both political sensitivities and technical challenges, such as data gaps and the difficulty of setting international benchmarks.

The document argues that Sectoral Approaches (SAs) are often misunderstood as top-down international carbon pricing schemes, whereas practical implementation requires a 'bottom-up' approach starting with domestic policies. Through case studies of the steel industry in China, India, and Japan, the author demonstrates that national priorities and sovereignty concerns make a single internationally agreed common solution unlikely. Instead, the paper suggests renaming SAs to 'SAAMs' to remove pejorative connotations and recommends that these measures co-exist with carbon taxes or Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) to drive the breakthrough technologies and RDD&D investment needed for deep decarbonization. The author concludes that while domestic schemes are more feasible, they should be linked internationally to manage trade competitiveness and leakage.

The document analyzes the transition from traditional energy to fossil fuels in the UK between 1500 and 1920 to derive lessons for the current shift toward a low carbon economy. It finds that past transitions were driven by the ability to provide cheaper or better energy services, often starting in niche markets where consumers paid a premium for superior characteristics. The author argues that because consumers are unlikely to pay a premium for the social benefits of climate stability, governments must actively protect and manage the innovation chain for low-carbon technologies. Given that past sector-specific diffusion phases took nearly fifty years on average, the author concludes that a complete transition to a low carbon economy will be slow, likely spanning decades, and may not reduce fossil fuel consumption for a long time.

The report presents survey data from 1,000 American adults on their priorities and policy preferences regarding global warming and clean energy. It finds that while a majority of Americans support renewable energy research and tax rebates for energy-efficient vehicles, there is significant political polarization regarding the priority of global warming and the implementation of carbon taxes. The data also indicates a general public belief that environmental protection can improve economic growth.

South Africa's climate policy is shaped by a conflict between its role as an international 'bridge-builder' and domestic structural barriers. While the government pursues a leadership role in multilateral forums and the BASIC group, domestic progress is hindered by a 'minerals-energy complex' dominated by coal-reliant entities like Eskom and Sasol, alongside urgent priorities to expand energy access and employment. The document highlights the diplomatic challenge of balancing relations with major emerging economies and other African nations while managing internal political and industrial pressures.

The report analyzes the BASIC group's role in global climate diplomacy, arguing that while they appear as a unified bloc, their cooperation is conditioned by diverse domestic priorities and broader geopolitical ambitions. It examines the specific drivers for Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, and explores how the group balances its identity as developing nations with its rising global influence.

The report outlines a proposed sectoral approach for the Japanese steel industry to meet a projected 50% emission reduction by 2050. It presents two variants: one based on a fully-resourced research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) plan, and another based on regulating CO2 limits for steel plants. The document emphasizes that sustainable reductions require breakthrough technologies or CCS, noting that while the Japanese sector has the financial resources to scale up RDD&D, the high cost of full CCS implementation could lead to competitiveness issues and carbon leakage without international coordination or protective measures like border taxes.

The document outlines Africa's high vulnerability to climate change and its significant investment gaps in adaptation and mitigation. It evaluates the AGF's proposal to mobilise US$100 billion annually by 2020, highlighting potential public funding sources like carbon taxes and fossil fuel subsidy redirection, while stressing the need for grants for adaptation and regulatory reforms to attract private investment in carbon markets.

The document analyzes Asia's climate investment requirements, estimating annual mitigation needs at US$90–180 billion and adaptation costs at US$40–45 billion by 2030. It argues that while private finance can drive mitigation in major economies like China and India, public resources are essential for adaptation and for less developed countries. The briefing highlights opportunities in carbon markets and public-private leveraging, but warns that the Copenhagen Accord's US$100 billion target is insufficient for Asia's needs and that transport or financial transaction levies could negatively impact Asian trade and financial hubs.

The document outlines the climate finance requirements for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, estimating annual mitigation needs between US$40–80 billion and adaptation needs between US$18–21 billion by 2030. It highlights the region's unique emissions profile, where land-use change is the primary driver of greenhouse gases, particularly in South America. The briefing argues that the AGF's recommendations for public-private partnerships and carbon-based revenue sources offer significant opportunities, provided that the region secures an equitable share of adaptation grants and establishes a robust framework for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+).

The document examines how the AGF's goal of mobilising US$100 billion annually can support SIDS, noting that while public grants are essential for adaptation, private capital can be leveraged for mitigation. It highlights risks such as the impact of international transport levies on trade and tourism, and the potential for non-LDC SIDS to be underserved by existing aid patterns.

The document critiques carbon trading as an unreliable mechanism that shifts the burden of mitigation to developing countries and benefits the Northern financial industry. It proposes a comprehensive package of alternatives: for mitigation, it suggests global feed-in tariffs for renewables, energy efficiency standards, sustainable small-scale agriculture, and the protection of Indigenous forest rights. For climate finance, it identifies a potential US$420 billion per year in new funding through a global Financial Transaction Tax, cracking down on tax evasion, redirecting fossil-fuel producer subsidies, issuing new Special Drawing Rights, and implementing carbon and energy taxes.