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This policy briefing examines South Africa's role as the host and president of the 17th session of the Conference of Parties (COP 17) to the UNFCCC in November and December 2011. It analyzes the geopolitical challenges of the climate negotiations, South Africa's efforts to coordinate a common African voice, its participation in the BASIC alliance, and the necessity of aligning its domestic climate policies with its international leadership ambitions.

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  • South Africa's primary objective for COP 17 is to establish legal guidelines for reducing carbon emissions and to progress toward a post-2012 global climate change regime, while implementing the 2010 Cancun agreements.
  • International climate negotiations are stalled by a divide between developing countries, who favor a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol for its legally binding verification and sanctions, and countries like Canada, Japan, Russia, and the US, who oppose it or demand binding targets for emerging economies like China.
  • The Africa Group, comprising 54 members and 36% of UN membership, struggles to maintain a unified position due to diverse national interests. Oil-exporting OPEC members (Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria) focus on response measures to protect petroleum interests, while Small Island Developing States (SIDS) prioritize urgent adaptation and disaster risk management.
  • South Africa utilizes the BASIC alliance (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) as a coordinating group of the developing world's largest emitters to advance African interests and share positions on the developmental impacts of climate change.
  • To ensure the legitimacy of COP 17, South Africa is adopting inclusive strategies learned from previous COPs, including public outreach, youth development, media training, and the inclusion of business through a 'greening framework'.
  • South Africa has committed to reducing carbon emissions below a business-as-usual baseline by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025, provided there is adequate financial and technical support.
  • Despite approving the National Climate Change Response Policy on 12 October 2011, South Africa still requires clarity on its carbon tax design, its integrated resource plan (IRP) II, and renewable energy feed-in tariff regulations to demonstrate practical leadership.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (n.d.). policy-briefing-38-7cab671156804231.pdf. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Policy-Briefing-38.pdf
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. policy-briefing-38-7cab671156804231.pdf. n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Policy-Briefing-38.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=policy-briefing-38-7cab671156804231.pdf |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Policy-Briefing-38.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairsndpolicybriefing387cab671156804231pdf, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{policy-briefing-38-7cab671156804231.pdf}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Policy-Briefing-38.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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