Search Climate Insights Directory

The report identifies a portfolio of low-carbon opportunities for the European steel sector, ranging from energy efficiency and fuel shifting to breakthrough technologies like Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) and increased recycling. It argues that current EU ETS mechanisms, particularly free allocation based on historic volumes, fail to provide sufficient incentives for deep decarbonisation and high-value product innovation. The authors recommend a structural reform of leakage protection, specifically proposing a combination of output-based allocation and the inclusion of consumption in the EU ETS to create a credible business case for breakthrough technologies and material efficiency. The report also emphasizes the need for sustained public funding for process innovation to overcome the 'valley of death' in technology scaling and suggests strengthening links between steel producers and downstream consumers, particularly in the automotive and construction sectors, to drive demand for lightweight, high-strength steels.

The briefing warns that loopholes in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) have created a massive surplus of emission rights. This "hot air"—estimated at 4 billion tonnes—threatens to undermine the EU's 2030 climate ambitions by allowing continued pollution, effectively lowering a proposed 40% emission reduction target to 26%. The author calls for the permanent removal of these surpluses to protect climate goals.

The paper examines the fragmented nature of global energy governance, mapping institutions like OPEC, IEA, and the World Bank. It argues that while most international bodies provide weak or indirect incentives to limit fossil fuel extraction, the UNFCCC and WTO offer multilateral platforms to implement supply-side policies, such as extraction-based accounting, fossil fuel subsidy reform, and mechanisms for net avoided emissions.

The document outlines a proposal to introduce a 'Charge' for carbon-intensive goods, such as steel and clinker, based on the EU ETS permit price and Best Available Technology (BAT) benchmarks. Drawing on the European excise system, it suggests a 'Production Sphere' where registered 'Carbon Keepers' and 'Carbon Warehouses' can handle goods under duty suspension, and a 'Consumption Sphere' where the charge is triggered upon sale to unregistered entities or final consumers. The report recommends a Carbon Monitoring and Control System (CMCS) for tracking movements and the use of de minimis thresholds for imports based on the ratio of carbon value to product value.

The document critiques the proposal for 'dynamic allocation' of free emission allowances in the EU ETS post-2020, which would remove caps on free permits for industrial sectors. It argues this model enables windfall profits, reduces incentives for innovation, and shifts a significant financial burden to taxpayers. The author recommends full auctioning of allowances as the default method to uphold the polluter-pays principle and suggests using auctioning revenues to fund an industrial innovation fund for low-carbon technologies.

The document evaluates the EU's climate policy instruments, finding that while 2020 targets are likely to be met, the reductions were driven more by the economic crisis than by policy. It highlights low cost-effectiveness due to a lack of uniform carbon pricing and notes that energy efficiency targets are at risk.

The EU ETS is currently failing to promote low-carbon solutions due to a carbon price that has plunged to around 5 euros per tonne of CO2, driven by a surplus of 2.1 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent allowances. This oversupply is attributed to weak emission targets, the inflow of international offsets, and reduced demand following the economic crisis. The document warns that this surplus allows the EU to transform current emission reductions from other policies into 'future rights to pollute', potentially reducing the domestic impact of the 2030 climate target from 40% to 34%. To fix the market, the author recommends increasing the linear reduction factor to 2.6%, permanently cancelling 1.6 billion excess allowances, enacting the Market Stability Reserve by 2017, and transitioning to full auctioning for all industrial sectors post-2020 to eliminate windfall profits and adhere to the polluter-pays principle.

The report finds that while the EU ETS initially focused management attention on CO2, a declining carbon price and free allocation rules have since diminished its impact. Most emission reductions were driven by economic cycles or non-ETS regulations. The authors argue that current free allocation creates distortions, such as discouraging asset rationalization and incentivizing excess clinker production. To unlock deep mitigation like Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and clinker substitution, the report recommends strengthening the carbon price signal, reforming leakage protection through output-based allocation or the inclusion of consumption, and providing targeted innovation support.

The document examines Europe's position within a global 'leading group' of countries advancing energy efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon pricing. It argues that staying in this group is essential for Europe to attract investment, drive innovation, and reduce dependence on energy imports. The authors contend that energy prices are not the primary driver of global competitiveness for most industries, as 92% of German manufacturing spends less than 1.6% of revenue on energy. For the small minority of energy-intensive sectors, the report asserts that price differentials are primarily caused by natural resource endowments rather than climate policies, and that existing 'Carbon Leakage' protections in the EU ETS mitigate competitive risks. The report concludes that a coordinated European low-carbon strategy can create net-employment gains and maintain international credibility in climate negotiations.

Carbon Market Watch warns that a leaked draft of the 2030 Council Conclusions contains 'technical loopholes' that could reduce the effective EU greenhouse gas emission reduction target from 40% to as low as 26%. The organization specifically criticizes the potential banking of 'phantom pollution rights' (surplus allowances), the use of afforestation offsets for agriculture, the dynamic allocation of free permits to industry, and the possible inclusion of transport fuels in the EU ETS.

The document examines how carbon pricing can lead to 'carbon leakage' and competitive disadvantages for domestic industries. It categorizes policy responses into domestic measures (subsidies, cost containment, and flexibility) and international measures (border adjustments and policy extension). Using the EU ETS as a primary case study, it highlights the risks of free allowance allocation, such as windfall profits and political rent-seeking, while noting that empirical evidence often suggests competitiveness concerns are overstated. It concludes that while border adjustments are theoretically effective, they pose significant risks of trade disputes and diplomatic tensions.

The document evaluates the potential for carbon leakage in South Korea as it implements the Korean emission trading scheme (KETS). Using methodology from the EU ETS Directive, the analysis finds that several manufacturing sectors face a moderate to high risk of leakage, primarily driven by high trade intensity rather than additional production costs. The report highlights that while energy efficiency and fuel switching have historically reduced emissions intensity, the recovery of emission-intensive industries like steel and cement has increased structural risks. It recommends that the South Korean government consider mitigation policies such as free allowances, border adjustments, or import taxes to prevent the displacement of emissions to regions with less stringent climate policies.

The document examines the evolution of the EU ETS through its first three phases, focusing on how carbon pricing affects the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. It analyzes the phenomenon of 'carbon leakage'—where production relocates to countries with laxer environmental rules—and argues that while this risk exists for specific sectors like steel and cement, it is often mitigated by free allowance allocations and broader economic restructuring trends. The author suggests that for countries like South Korea, the EU experience shows that the risk of leakage is manageable if policy focuses on the most vulnerable sectors and the decarbonization of the energy mix.

The report argues that current international climate targets often rely on incoherent 'effort-sharing' models rather than ethical budget-sharing. It proposes a framework where the global greenhouse gas budget to 2050 is back-calculated from 1990 and divided among nations based on their 1990 share of the global population. Under this model, the EU would have a budget of 204 billion tonnes, of which 57% was used by 2012. The author advocates for international emissions trading of fossil and industrial CO2 to reconcile national responsibilities with cost-effective abatement opportunities. For the EU, the report suggests a domestic trajectory aligned with the 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap (-25% by 2020, -40% by 2030, -60% by 2040, and -80% by 2050) as a minimum unilateral commitment.

The report argues that the EU ETS has failed to drive domestic emissions reductions due to a cap set against inflated projections and a flood of low-quality offsets. It finds that the system is now cancelling out approximately 700 million tonnes of abatement from other EU policies. The author recommends the permanent removal of 1.7 billion allowances from Phase 3 auctions to restore environmental integrity and increase Europe's 2020 climate target to 30% below 1990 levels.

The document outlines a proposed carbon tax for South Africa, starting at R120 per tCO2-eq in 2015 with annual increases of 10% through 2019. It argues that a carbon tax is more suitable than an emissions trading system (ETS) in the short term due to the oligopolistic nature of the domestic energy sector. The design includes a basic tax-free threshold of 60%, with additional allowances for trade-exposed and process-emission sectors, and the possibility of using carbon offsets to reduce tax liability. Economic modelling suggests the tax would have a largely neutral impact on GDP and employment if revenues are recycled effectively through tax shifting or government investment. The paper also details complementary flagship programmes in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and public transport to support a just transition.

The report examines how carbon pricing mechanisms—such as carbon taxes and emissions trading systems—affect the competitiveness of the mining and metals sector. It focuses on aluminium, copper, iron ore, and coal across the EU, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and the US. The analysis highlights that electricity-intensive processes, like aluminium smelting, are most vulnerable to indirect costs passed through from power grids. The report advocates for a principles-based approach to policy design to prevent carbon leakage and maintain international competitiveness, recommending a transition toward a harmonized global emissions system.

The report assesses how carbon pricing affects the competitiveness and investment strategies of energy-intensive industries (EIIs). It finds that while carbon costs are a factor, they are often secondary to energy and raw material prices. The analysis highlights the risk of carbon leakage, where production shifts to regions with lower emissions costs, particularly as demand grows in Asia. The report emphasizes that current short-term policy horizons, such as the EU's 2020 targets, are insufficient for the 20- to 40-year investment cycles typical of these sectors, suggesting a need for longer-term regulatory certainty and support for breakthrough technologies like Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

The report analyzes the design and operational experiences of various emissions trading systems, including the EU ETS, RGGI, WCI, NZ ETS, TMG ETS, and the Australian CPM. It highlights key design trade-offs regarding coverage, allowance distribution, and price management, while emphasizing that the EU ETS experience demonstrates that over-allocation does not necessarily preclude abatement. The document also provides a toolkit for policymakers to assess the environmental and economic effectiveness of such systems.

The report analyzes a diverse array of cap-and-trade systems, from the established EU ETS to emerging pilots in China and South Korea. It argues that the success of these markets depends heavily on long-term political commitment, robust data collection, and centralized decision-making to avoid over-allocation. The authors highlight a shift in the center of carbon market activity toward Asia-Pacific economies, which are experimenting with novel scopes including buildings and indirect emissions.