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The 'Scan de la Finance Fossile' evaluates 56 French financial institutions on their policies regarding high-risk oil and gas sectors. The analysis finds that fewer than half of these actors have policies covering any of the five most risky sectors, and existing policies often contain loopholes that allow continued financing of companies and infrastructure that facilitate fossil fuel expansion.

The report 'Five Years Lost' details 12 major fossil fuel expansion projects globally, estimating they would collectively emit at least 175 gigatons of CO2, consuming up to 75% of the remaining carbon budget for a 66% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C. It identifies a systemic failure in the finance industry, noting that between January 2016 and August 2020, financial institutions provided $1.6 trillion in loans and underwriting and $1.1 trillion in investments to 133 companies driving these projects. The document highlights the role of public finance, specifically Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) like the World Bank Group, in de-risking these projects. Case studies cover diverse regions including the Permian Basin (USA), Vaca Muerta (Argentina), and the Barents Sea (Norway), emphasizing the associated human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and the 'myth' of natural gas as a bridge fuel.

A coalition of 133 civil society organizations, financial institutions, academics, and experts calls for the exclusion of fossil fuel developers from all SFDR fund categories, specifically targeting the "ESG basics" category to prevent greenwashing and align EU finance with climate goals.

The methodology focuses on five key indicators to evaluate the climate credibility of European oil and gas majors: alignment of decarbonization targets with a 1.5°C carbon budget, reliance on offset mechanisms, asset expansion plans, trends in oil and gas production growth, and the forecasted energy mix for 2030. The analysis employs conservative hypotheses, assuming companies will meet their pledged targets and maintain current market shares in line with the IEA Net Zero scenario to establish a 'low-estimate' of cumulative emissions.

The report asserts that new gas exploration, production, and LNG export terminals are incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. It highlights that existing fossil fuel infrastructure already threatens to exceed remaining carbon budgets and calls for financial institutions to immediately cease funding gas expansion across the entire value chain.

The briefing asserts that new gas exploration, production, and LNG export terminals are incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. It highlights that existing fossil fuel infrastructure already exceeds the remaining carbon budget for low-overshoot pathways and warns of LNG overcapacity. Consequently, it calls on financial institutions to stop presenting fossil gas as a transitional energy and to immediately cease financial services supporting fossil gas expansion.

The briefing identifies five 'non-conventional' oil and gas sectors that pose disproportionate risks to the 1.5°C warming limit and the environment. It details the high carbon intensity of oil sands and shale, the methane leakage associated with LNG and shale, and the ecological fragility of the Arctic and deepwater offshore environments. The document also highlights the financial instability of these sectors, citing high operational costs and the risk of stranded assets, and calls on French financial actors to adopt exit strategies.

The document evaluates Nigeria's macroeconomic recovery strategies following the COVID-19 pandemic, analyzing their compatibility with the nation's goal of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. While the National Development Plan (NDP) and Economic Sustainability Plan (ESP) include green initiatives—such as solar electrification and climate-smart agriculture—the author notes a lack of clear implementation tracking and a persistent reliance on oil-led growth. The brief recommends removing fossil fuel subsidies, expanding blended finance, and prioritizing gender-responsive climate-smart agriculture to ensure a sustainable green recovery.

The document argues that current political emission targets are insufficient to prevent devastating climate impacts and that global GHG emissions must decline rapidly after 2015 to reach essentially zero by midcentury. It asserts that while such a transition is technically feasible and economically affordable, it requires a 'Great Transformation' of institutions and policy, including a global climate fund and a shift in agricultural systems from emission sources to sinks. The report emphasizes that industrialized nations must reduce their emission allocations to zero or negative levels by 2020-2030 to allow developing countries the remaining carbon budget necessary to expand energy access and alleviate poverty.

The report argues that the EU's proposed 20% to 30% emissions reductions by 2020 are inadequate to maintain a 2ºC warming limit and fail to address the global inequality of the climate crisis. Using the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs) framework—which calculates obligations based on a 'Responsibility and Capacity Index' relative to a development threshold—the authors find that the EU's fair share of the global mitigation requirement is approximately 23%, amounting to roughly 850 MtC by 2020. This obligation is described as a 'two-fold obligation' requiring both deep domestic reductions and significant international investment in the South. The authors contend that the EU must provide courageous leadership by unilaterally committing to its proper share of the global burden to break the North-South negotiating impasse ahead of the Copenhagen summit.

The policy brief introduces the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs) framework to resolve the impasse between climate mitigation and the right to development. It proposes a system where climate obligations are based on a 'Responsibility and Capacity Indicator' (RCI), which excludes income below a development threshold of USD 20 per day. The analysis suggests that to keep warming below 2°C, Annex 1 countries must take responsibility for emission cuts exceeding 100% by 2025, combining deep domestic reductions with financial and technological support for the South. The brief recommends that Annex 1 countries lead the transition and fulfill unmet financing commitments before expecting legally binding commitments from non-Annex 1 countries.

The fact sheet outlines three scenarios: a Baseline scenario (BAS) where business-as-usual leads to a 98% likelihood of temperatures increasing by more than 2°C; a Basic Energy Access scenario (BEA) that provides basic energy for all while limiting global GHG emissions to 1,300 Gt CO2; and a Shared Development Agenda scenario (SDA) which aims for a more balanced global income distribution with per capita incomes of at least $10,000 for all nations by 2050.

The report details the creation of the LEAP Ireland 2050 model to simulate GHG emissions from Ireland's energy and agriculture sectors. It evaluates the impact of the 2019 Climate Action Plan (CAP) targets, specifically electric vehicle (EV) penetration and residential retrofitting, while introducing the Application Script Editing Tool (ASET) to improve model topology and sensitivity analysis.

The document examines the risk of 'stranded assets'—assets that lose economic value before the end of their useful life—driven by climate regulations and the global transition to low-carbon economies. It highlights that Latin America, despite low emissions, holds significant fossil fuel reserves that may become unexploitable to meet the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C target. For Colombia, the risk is acute due to a high economic dependence on oil, gas, and coal exports. The report provides a qualitative framework for investors to identify these risks and points toward renewable energy, specifically solar photovoltaics and wind, as profitable alternatives.

The report critiques the Indonesian government's strategy of using natural gas as a 'bridge' fuel, specifically focusing on planned gas infrastructure in Bali, including a Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) and several gas power plants (PLTG). It argues that gas is not a clean energy source due to methane leaks and carbon emissions, which contribute to the extreme weather and water crises already affecting Bali. The document highlights social and environmental damages from existing gas projects, such as the PLTGU Pemaron, and argues that Bali's significant renewable energy potential—estimated up to 26 GW—should be prioritized over fossil fuels to achieve true energy independence and climate resilience.

The Union of Concerned Scientists developed the Climate 2030 Blueprint using a modified version of the National Energy Modeling System (UCS-NEMS) to evaluate a 'Blueprint case' against a 'Reference case'. The Blueprint case centers on a cap-and-trade program starting in 2011, designed to reduce U.S. emissions to 26 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 56 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. This cap is supported by complementary policies in energy efficiency, electricity generation, and transportation to lower the overall cost of compliance. The analysis incorporates supplemental data on building and industrial efficiency from the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy and biomass supply curves from the University of Tennessee and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The report proposes a U.S. cap-and-trade system to limit global warming emissions, citing the success of the 1990 Acid Rain Program. It outlines design criteria including a stringent declining cap, full auctioning of allowances, and the inclusion of all major heat-trapping gases. The author emphasizes that while cap-and-trade is a lynchpin, it must be paired with parallel sector-based policies to be effective.

The document asserts that corporate net-zero targets are fundamentally dependent on the continued function of natural carbon sinks, which are currently declining. It argues that value-chain decarbonization alone is insufficient because significant nature-related emissions occur in informal sectors and many companies lack science-based targets. To address a projected $4.1 trillion finance gap for nature, the briefing proposes that if 1,700 of the world's highest emitters compensated for 10% of their annual emissions through nature-based solutions, they could mobilize 30 Gt of climate solutions by 2030, representing over 10% of the remaining 1.5°C carbon budget.

The report examines the UK's progress toward an 80 percent emission reduction by 2050 as mandated by the Climate Change Act 2008. While the UK is projected to meet carbon budgets up to 2022, the analysis indicates that meeting the fourth carbon budget (2023–27) will require an acceleration of emission reductions and the timely implementation of additional measures. Key policy levers discussed include electricity market reform, the Green Deal, the Energy Company Obligation, the EU Emissions Trading System, and the EU Renewable Energy Directive.

The study calculates India's share of the global carbon budget using four allocation methods and employs four energy-economy models to map low-carbon pathways for the power, industry, and transport sectors through 2050. It finds that while the power sector's 500 GW non-fossil capacity target aligns with these budgets, the industry and transport sectors will become the largest and fastest-growing emission sources, requiring demand reduction and R&D. To support a just transition and ensure emissions reductions, the models suggest a carbon tax of INR 4,000–6,000 per tCO2e (2018 prices) by 2050 for 1.5°C scenarios, noting that India will underconsume its equity-based carbon budget share and requires international finance and technology.