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The Mirova Sustainable Land Fund 2 (MSLF2) is a private sector-focused investment programme targeting Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, and the Philippines. With a total target size of EUR 350 million, the fund uses a blended finance structure—including a GCF-funded junior tranche—to de-risk investments for institutional investors. The programme consists of an investment facility providing long-term debt and equity to companies in the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector, and a Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) to improve company bankability and impact monitoring. The fund aims to sequester 17.2 MtCO2e and enhance the resilience of 63,000 direct beneficiaries through practices such as agroforestry and soil conservation.

The report assesses the nascent green bond market in Africa, which has raised approximately USD 9.6 billion through 76 issuances since 2013. While the market is growing, it remains a niche segment constrained by high issuance costs—up to 5% of total deal value compared to 0.9% in Europe—and macroeconomic instability. The analysis finds that green bonds provide financial additionality for issuers through faster capital raising and access to diverse investors, but primarily fund mitigation projects, with only 7% of proceeds going to pure adaptation. Social inclusion and gender considerations are generally absent from design but occur as indirect co-benefits, such as job creation. The report recommends the development of an African Sustainable Finance Taxonomy, the mandatory inclusion of 'Do no harm' and gender provisions, and the use of project preparation facilities to make adaptation projects more bankable.

The document defines a climate change adaptation investment plan (CCAIP) as a detailed set of investment-ready priority activities linked to specific financial sources. It outlines a structured process for developing these plans—including risk assessment, bundling activities into 'packages', and economic appraisal—to bridge the global adaptation finance gap. The briefing distinguishes CCAIPs from broader NAP financing strategies by their narrower scope, higher granularity, and focus on immediate implementation. It identifies key enabling factors such as political leadership (particularly from ministries of finance), institutional arrangements, and the integration of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI). The text also details various domestic and international funding sources and financial instruments, such as green bonds, blended finance, and debt-for-climate swaps, to support these investments.

Brazil has announced a new NDC targeting a greenhouse gas emissions reduction of 59–67% by 2035 relative to 2005 levels. To achieve this, the government is developing a 2024-2035 Climate Plan consisting of an Adaptation Plan and a Mitigation Plan. The document argues that private sector investment is essential for success and recommends harmonizing sectoral policies, promoting corporate transition plans, and strengthening public-private dialogue. Key focus areas include halting illegal deforestation, decarbonizing agriculture, transitioning energy and industry away from fossil fuels, and implementing a national Emissions Trading System (ETS).

The briefing outlines Brazil's updated NDC targets for 2035 and argues that the successful implementation of these goals depends on a strong 'Plano Clima' and a collaborative relationship with the private sector. It identifies key opportunities and barriers across land use, agriculture, energy, transport, and industry, while proposing mechanisms to increase transparency and corporate transition planning ahead of COP30.

The report examines the role of public development banks (PDBs) in supporting the adoption of domestic carbon markets in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). It identifies key benefits of these markets, such as directing private finance to emission reduction projects and helping countries retain carbon revenues locally to avoid paying full fees under mechanisms like the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). However, adoption is hindered by a lack of strategic integration, technical capacity gaps, and reputational risks associated with credit integrity. PDBs are positioned to address these barriers by providing strategic guidance, technical assistance for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems, and innovative financial tools—such as minimum price floors and carbon-linked bonds—to manage risk and frontload finance. The report recommends increased coordination between national and multilateral PDBs, the sharing of best practices, and the development of comprehensive climate strategies to ensure carbon markets are embedded within national development goals.

The research paper advocates for South Africa to move away from a market-led 'blended finance model' (BFM) for its just energy transition, arguing that market failures necessitate a state-led approach. The author proposes a 'climate response fund' to be financed by a combination of carbon tax increases, earmarking the General Fuel Levy and Mineral and Petroleum Resource Royalty, and implementing public sector efficiency reforms and retirement tax deduction caps. Together, these measures could generate over R100 billion annually for adaptation and equity. The paper also suggests the issuance of sovereign green bonds to fund renewable energy grid infrastructure, arguing for a gentler fiscal deficit glide path to accommodate this strategic investment.

The policy brief contends that South Africa must move beyond the blended finance model for its just energy transition due to market failures and risks of insufficient or unpredictable private capital. It proposes a suite of domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) measures—including sovereign green bonds, carbon tax reforms, and earmarking existing revenues—to generate approximately R100bn annually for climate priorities. These funds would be pooled into a central climate response fund dedicated to adaptation, equity, and supporting displaced workers, particularly in Mpumalanga. The author argues that this assertive domestic commitment is essential for maintaining state control over infrastructure and for unlocking larger-scale international finance between 2030 and 2050.

The document argues that while green guarantees can mobilize up to five times more capital than loans, they are underutilized due to complexity, lack of technical assistance, high costs, and time horizon misalignments. It showcases case studies from the World Bank Group, Green Guarantee Company, TCX, GuarantCo, and a Sida-IFU partnership to demonstrate how streamlining processes, providing targeted technical support, subsidizing currency hedges, extending guarantee tenors to 20 years, and fostering bilateral cooperation can unlock private capital for the green transition in EMDEs.

The report finds that sustainable agriculture finance in India averaged INR 22,393 billion annually between FY 2020-21 and FY 2021-22, with a heavy reliance on domestic private finance (67%) and commercial financial institutions. While public funding remains significant, international flows are negligible at 0.5%. The study highlights a concentration of funds in farming practices and storage/markets, while critical areas like research, natural capital, and alternative supply chains are severely underfunded. It recommends the creation of a sustainable agriculture taxonomy, improved granular data reporting, the diversification of financial instruments beyond debt, and expanded capacity building to foster a more resilient agricultural ecosystem.

The report argues that the traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) model is outdated and failing to meet 21st-century challenges. It identifies six key pressures: shifting poverty geographies, rising demands for climate and health financing, fragmentation from new actors, changing flow natures, geopolitical rivalries, and declining public trust. The author contends that incremental tweaks are insufficient and proposes a 'reset' that integrates ODA into a broader Global Public Investment (GPI) framework. This new architecture would distinguish core poverty reduction from global public goods financing, reform governance to include the Global South, and shift the narrative from donor-driven charity to mutual interest. The report outlines five future scenarios for 2040, ranging from 'Incremental Change' to a 'Managed Handover' to non-governmental actors, urging policymakers to proactively shape a transition to avoid a fragmented 'Wild West' of bilateralism.

The Sevilla Commitment outlines a comprehensive global strategy to mobilize resources for the 2030 Agenda, focusing on domestic resource mobilization, private capital, international cooperation, and debt sustainability. It calls for systemic reforms to the international financial architecture to increase the representation of developing countries and lower the cost of capital. Key initiatives include the creation of a global central debt data registry, the operationalization of the Africa Credit Rating Agency, and the expansion of blended finance to catalyze sustainable investments.

The report details Brazil's GSS+ debt market, which reached USD 67.8bn in cumulative volume by June 2025, with a strong emphasis on green bonds and corporate issuance. It highlights the role of the upcoming Brazilian Sustainable Taxonomy (BST) and the government's Sovereign Sustainable Bond Framework in driving market growth. Key sectors for investment include renewable energy, sustainable agriculture (AFOLU), and water sanitation, while noting a significant investment gap of USD 200bn to meet 2030 transition targets.

Global climate finance reached a record USD 1.9 trillion in 2023, with private contributions exceeding USD 1 trillion for the first time. While mitigation finance more than doubled between 2018 and 2023, driven by energy and transport, adaptation finance remains significantly underfunded at USD 65 billion. Investment is heavily concentrated in East Asia and the Pacific, Western Europe, and North America, with 80% of finance sourced domestically. Despite growth, a substantial gap remains to meet the estimated annual need of USD 6.3 trillion by 2030.

The South African Climate Finance Landscape 2025 reports an annual average of ZAR 188.3 billion in climate finance for 2022–2023, though this remains well below the estimated annual need of up to ZAR 499 billion. Investment is heavily skewed toward the energy sector, which receives 74.1% of total flows, primarily for renewable electricity generation. In contrast, adaptation finance is lagging, accounting for only 11.3% of tracked flows. While domestic sources provide nearly 60% of funding, international flows are dominated by public development finance institutions, particularly from Western Europe. The report highlights significant barriers, including grid bottlenecks, policy uncertainty, and a lack of concessional capital for high-risk or non-revenue-generating adaptation and just transition projects.

The document outlines a proposed African-led financial architecture to move from crisis resolution to prevention. The first pillar, the African Financial Stability Mechanism (AFSM), is a proposed regional financing arrangement (RFA) providing concessional liquidity, including a specific climate shock liquidity facility, to manage exogenous shocks. The second pillar, the African Stability and Growth Pact (ASGP), is a flexible fiscal governance framework that uses peer accountability and nationally tailored fiscal rules rather than uniform targets. The two are integrated such that access to AFSM liquidity is linked to a country's commitment to and performance under the ASGP. The framework is designed to be hosted by the African Development Bank (AfDB) with oversight from the African Union (AU), and capitalised through a blend of member contributions, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and development finance.

The report outlines a strategic framework to strengthen Africa's financial stability by combining a regional liquidity facility (MASF) with a flexible budgetary governance pact (PASC). The MASF is designed to provide rapid, concessional liquidity to counter exogenous shocks, including climate-related disruptions, while the PASC encourages national budgetary discipline through peer accountability and tailored rules. Together, they aim to reduce dependence on external donors and improve market credibility through a phased implementation starting with a pilot phase between 2025 and 2027.

The Energizing Healthcare 2025 conference addressed the energy access gap affecting 1 billion people served by health facilities with unreliable or no electricity. The report highlights the need for approximately USD 5 billion in funding by 2030 to close this gap. Key discussions centered on moving beyond simple connections to focus on energy consumption, sustainable operations and maintenance (O&M), and the adoption of innovative financing models like Energy-as-a-Service and blended finance. The event also emphasized the integration of healthcare electrification into national climate plans and the critical need for energy-efficient medical equipment, noting that up to 70% of such equipment in developing countries is currently unused due to power issues.

The Forests Forward Impact Report 2025 details the outcomes of a WWF programme that partners with 26 companies across 9 sectors in 23 countries to transition from forest extraction to conservation and regeneration. Key achievements include the management of 2.679 million hectares of tropical forests, with 75% being FSC certified, and the implementation of large-scale landscape projects in Brazil, Viet Nam, and the Congo Basin. The programme focuses on three action areas: responsible sourcing, improving forest management, and financing forest landscapes, while emphasizing the role of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in forest stewardship.

The document frames ocean health as a critical component of U.S. national security and economic strength. It highlights how ocean degradation, illegal fishing, and competition over seafood supply chains drive regional conflict and economic instability. To address these risks, it recommends elevating ocean governance within national security directives, strengthening international partnerships to counter illegal fishing, and incentivizing private sector investment in sustainable ocean management.