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The author contends that the EU must integrate shipping into its carbon market by 2023 because the IMO has postponed concrete actions, such as slow-steaming. The text highlights the significant emissions of the shipping sector and suggests that carbon pricing, potentially as a tax, could effectively reduce CO2 emissions and generate revenue for research and development.

The production of basic materials accounts for approximately 25% of global CO2 emissions and 16% of EU GHG emissions. While industry commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 is growing, current innovation funds and carbon pricing are insufficient to make climate-friendly technologies commercially viable. The Climate Friendly Material Platform proposes a policy package including a 'Climate Contribution' as an alternative to Border Tax Adjustments, Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCFDS), Contracts for Difference for Renewables, Green Public Procurement (GPP), and Product Carbon Requirements to stimulate investment and prevent the relocation of production to regions with less stringent climate policies.

The document asserts that carbon border taxes must be contingent on the removal of free pollution permits under the EU ETS to avoid double-protecting industry and to provide a real incentive for emissions reductions. It argues that carbon leakage is not evidenced and that free allocations have historically functioned as subsidies. The author suggests that border measures should be temporary, non-protectionist, and complementary to global climate policies, while advocating for the use of enforceable environmental chapters in trade agreements to drive global ambition.

The analysis argues that large compensation payments to German lignite operators are unlikely to be legally justified because the sector is currently loss-making and most plants have already amortised their investments. Under the German Constitution, compensation is only required in cases of 'exceptional hardship', which is unlikely given the plants' low profitability. Furthermore, such payments would likely be classified as EU State aid, requiring European Commission approval. The document suggests the Commission would struggle to find such aid proportionate or necessary, as market forces and high carbon prices are already driving closures, and other countries like the UK have phased out coal without compensation.

The report argues that current carbon pricing and innovation funds are insufficient to transform the basic materials sector. It proposes a five-part policy package: a Climate Contribution to ensure full carbon cost internalisation, project-based Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfDs) to hedge investment risks, Contracts for Difference (CfDs) for renewables to lower electricity costs, Green Public Procurement (GPP) to create lead markets, and long-term Product Carbon Requirements to phase out carbon-intensive materials.

The aviation sector lacks an official international climate target, with emissions growing exponentially and projected to increase by 300% by 2050 compared to 2015. The author criticizes CORSIA as a weak measure and warns that recognizing it as the sole global market-based measure could undermine the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

The policy brief examines the interaction between the European Union's coal phase-out and the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). It warns that closing coal plants without adjusting the ETS could create a 'coal bubble' of up to 6.18 billion excess permits by 2040, depressing carbon prices and undermining climate incentives. While the EU ETS supports the transition by making coal less profitable, the author argues it cannot deliver a full phase-out alone. The document recommends increasing the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) intake rate to 36% from 2024, increasing the Linear Reduction Factor to 4.2%, and allowing the cancellation of allowances for any closed ETS installation to maintain market effectiveness.

Ember argues that the UK's priority should be to remain within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to maintain a shared Europe-wide approach to carbon pricing. The organization warns against the creation of a standalone UK ETS due to risks of market dysfunction and volatility, suggesting that if the UK must leave the EU ETS, it should implement a carbon tax on power, industry, and aviation with a price floor based on the previous year's average EU ETS price. Furthermore, Ember asserts that carbon pricing must be complemented by direct regulation and public funding to achieve net zero emissions.

The report evaluates options for replacing Poland's Bełchatów Lignite Power Plant, concluding that a 'Coal Exit' strategy by 2035—replacing coal with renewables (RES) and gas—is more cost-efficient and beneficial for health and employment than maintaining current policies. The Coal Exit scenario is projected to reduce CO2 emissions by 38% and total system costs by €64 billion compared to the Reference scenario, while increasing total employment by 76%. Specifically, phasing out Bełchatów earlier contributes €4 billion to these savings and approximately 50 million tonnes to the overall CO2 reduction.

In the first half of 2019, EU coal generation fell by 19%, driven by the growth of wind and solar power, a shift toward fossil gas due to rising carbon prices, and specific plant closures. Germany experienced the largest absolute decline, while eastern European countries saw smaller reductions due to slower renewable energy deployment. The report argues that while carbon pricing has made coal less profitable, further declines require accelerated plant closures and increased investment in clean energy and grid infrastructure to ensure a full transition.

The document criticizes the veto by Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary against the EU's long-term climate strategy, arguing that such political obstruction harms businesses by removing investment certainty. It highlights that energy-intensive industries—specifically steel, cement, and chemicals—account for approximately 40% of greenhouse gas emissions under the EU emissions trading system and have seen no decrease in pollution since 2012. The author asserts that a formal commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050 is essential to signal a clear decarbonisation path, enable the development of financial frameworks, and inform the EU 2030 industrial strategy.

The briefing argues that eligible EU Member States, primarily in Central Eastern Europe, should maximise the Modernisation Fund by transferring allowances from the Article 10c derogation and the Solidarity & Growth Provision. It concludes that the Modernisation Fund is more flexible and effective for energy transition than Article 10c, which has strict financing requirements and limited eligibility. The document also discusses the potential financial impact of Market Stability Reserve (MSR) recalculations on Member State auction revenues.

The analysis of draft NECPs reveals that the EU is set to miss its 2030 coal phase-out goals, with 11 Member States planning no phase-out and 60 GW of coal capacity projected to remain. The report highlights a disconnect where countries receiving EU just transition funding, such as Poland and Czechia, lack credible phase-out plans in their NECPs.

The document assesses the failure of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to reduce emissions in heavy industry due to free pollution permits and inadequate sectoral plans. It proposes a transition based on electrification, circular economy models, and breakthrough technologies like hydrogen-based steelmaking, while calling for the phase-out of free allowances and the introduction of green public procurement.

The document criticizes the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) for granting excessive free pollution permits to heavy industry, citing court cases involving ArcelorMittal in Luxembourg and ExxonMobil in Germany as evidence of systemic abuse. It argues that lax 'carbon leakage' rules allow companies to profit from selling surplus permits while emissions remain stagnant, and advocates for a transition to a carbon-free industrial framework based on meaningful carbon pricing and innovation.

The document estimates that failing to meet 2030 transport sector emission targets could cost Germany between 3 and 36 billion euros, primarily through the purchase of emission rights from other EU member states.

The document assesses the German Coal Commission's plan to be coal-free by 2038, noting that while it avoids up to 1.8 GtCO2e of emissions, it is insufficient to meet the 2°C target. It emphasizes that the EU-ETS is a vital but insufficient tool on its own, and warns of a "waterbed effect" where allowances from closed German plants are used by other EU entities unless they are explicitly cancelled. The author advocates for a "just transition" where public funds support affected workers and communities rather than compensating private shareholders of utility companies like RWE.

The German coal commission's plan to be coal-free by 2038 aims to avoid up to 1.8GtCO2e of emissions compared to a business-as-usual scenario. However, the author contends that the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) alone is insufficient to force a phase-out and warns that closing plants without cancelling permits allows other polluters to use them, known as the 'waterbed effect'. The document advocates for using public funds to support workers and communities in a Just Transition rather than compensating private shareholders of utilities like RWE.

The report finds that currently agreed EU and Member State policies are on track to deliver a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, surpassing the existing 40% target. Using the E3ME model, the analysis suggests that further adjustments to coal phase-outs, energy efficiency, and electric vehicle penetration could increase this reduction to 58%. However, the report warns that the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) remains vulnerable to a growing surplus of allowances as emissions fall faster than the current cap, necessitating reforms such as a one-off cap reset in 2026 to maintain a meaningful carbon price.

The document critiques carbon markets, specifically cap-and-trade and offsetting, asserting they fail to reduce global emissions and instead facilitate corporate power and human rights abuses. It highlights the failures of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD, and warns that the negotiation of Article 6 at COP25 could lock in these flawed mechanisms, further delaying urgent emissions cuts at the source.