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The report argues that current international climate targets often rely on incoherent 'effort-sharing' models rather than ethical budget-sharing. It proposes a framework where the global greenhouse gas budget to 2050 is back-calculated from 1990 and divided among nations based on their 1990 share of the global population. Under this model, the EU would have a budget of 204 billion tonnes, of which 57% was used by 2012. The author advocates for international emissions trading of fossil and industrial CO2 to reconcile national responsibilities with cost-effective abatement opportunities. For the EU, the report suggests a domestic trajectory aligned with the 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap (-25% by 2020, -40% by 2030, -60% by 2040, and -80% by 2050) as a minimum unilateral commitment.

The authors analyzed sample offset projects across five programs—the Clean Development Mechanism, Climate Action Reserve, Chicago Climate Exchange, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the U.S. EPA’s former Climate Leaders programme—focusing on landfill methane, manure management, and afforestation/reforestation. They found that variations in accounting boundaries, baseline methods, measurement rules, emission factors, and discounts result in significant differences in credited offsets, sometimes exceeding 50%. The paper argues for the harmonization of these protocols to improve offset quality and facilitate the linking of trading systems.

The speech emphasizes that climate change is no longer a specialized environmental issue but a cross-sectoral risk affecting national security, health, and infrastructure. It highlights the need to rethink worst-case scenarios as temperature increases may exceed previous estimates, and argues that Canada requires a national adaptation approach to move beyond piecemeal provincial efforts. The author calls for 'climate proofing' infrastructure and using tax policy lessons from the fossil fuel sector to attract private investment into resilience.

The document analyzes the divergent paths taken by Canada and Australia to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. While Australia implemented a unified national carbon pricing system (transitioning from a carbon tax to cap-and-trade), Canada adopted a decentralized, sector-by-sector regulatory approach utilizing provincial equivalency agreements. The authors argue that Canada's fragmented system is likely to result in higher regulatory costs for emitters compared to Australia's streamlined national approach, although the actual emission reductions of both schemes remain uncertain.

The document examines Australia's carbon pricing scheme, which began on July 1, 2012, targeting the largest emitters to achieve a 5 per cent emissions reduction below 2000 levels by 2020. It details the transition from a fixed-price period to a flexible cap-and-trade system, the role of the Clean Energy Regulator, and extensive compensation packages for trade-exposed industries and households. The brief highlights the importance of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme (NGERS) as a foundation for implementation and warns against locking in fixed prices during volatile international market conditions.

The document highlights a massive surplus of 13.1 billion tonnes of CO2 from the first Kyoto commitment period (CP1), far exceeding estimated demand. It notes that weak emissions pledges and lenient offset rules are likely to create an additional 3.6 billion tonne surplus by 2020. In response, the G-77 and China, incorporating views from the African Group, AOSIS, and Brazil, proposed restrictions on the use of CP1 Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) surpluses in the second commitment period (CP2).

The report finds a significant surplus of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from the first Kyoto commitment period (CP1), totaling 12,637 Mt, which vastly exceeds the estimated demand of 11.5 Mt. It notes that the ability to carry over these surpluses to the second commitment period (CP2) depends on a country's participation in CP2, meaning Russia's stated intent not to join would remove 5.8 Gt CO2e from the available surplus.

CCAP and CDM Watch support the G77 proposal to cancel 13Gt of AAU surplus by the end of the second commitment period (CP2) in 2017 or 2020. While the proposal allows for the carryover of AAUs for domestic compliance, it prohibits their trading. The organizations further welcome the proposal's aim to prevent a new surplus after 2012 by cancelling the difference between CP2 targets and actual 2012 emissions if emissions are lower than the target, which may require some EU Member State targets to be strengthened.

The paper analyzes the evolution of energy and climate change economics, noting a massive increase in research output since 2005. While quantity has surged, the author suggests a potential relative decline in originality compared to the 1990s.

The document examines the risk posed by a projected surplus of up to 13 billion Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) that could be carried over into a second Kyoto Protocol commitment period. It argues that without restrictions, this surplus could eliminate additional emissions reductions and threaten the goal of limiting global warming to 2°C, thereby undermining the viability of the global climate deal planned for 2020.

The briefing argues that Shell exerts significant influence over the Rio+20 process by occupying senior leadership roles in a 'complex and hermetic web' of interlinked business associations and UN-affiliated initiatives. It details Shell's presence in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), UN Global Compact, IPIECA, and IETA, highlighting how these entities coordinate through Business Action for Sustainable Development 2012 (BASD) to shape sustainable development policy.

The policy note argues that revisions to the ACM0013 methodology can only partially address the issues surrounding CDM coal power projects. It identifies three fundamental challenges: a low signal-to-noise ratio in efficiency data, the ineffectiveness of additionality assessments for multi-billion-dollar projects, and the contradiction of using climate finance to lock in long-lived, emissions-intensive infrastructure. The authors conclude that these combined factors likely defy easy resolution through methodology revisions alone.

The report finds that the EU ETS is significantly oversupplied, with industrial sectors accumulating large surpluses of permits while the power sector faces a shortfall. This imbalance, exacerbated by the 2008 recession, threatens to weaken the Phase 3 cap by approximately 1.9Gt. The author highlights abuses in international offsetting, where surplus-holding installations use offsets for profit (arbitrage) or to subsidize foreign competitors. To rectify this, the report recommends a 1.7Gt set-aside of Phase 3 permits, a steeper annual cap reduction of 2.4% by 2016, and increased transparency in reporting installation ownership and waste gas transfers.

The document concludes that a federal US carbon market is unrealistic for the foreseeable future, but identifies potential for linking the EU ETS with regional systems like the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and California. It highlights that while the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is operational, its low prices make it an unattractive linking partner. The authors argue that a bottom-up climate architecture, rather than a single global carbon market, is the most likely trajectory for international climate cooperation.

Based on interviews with approximately 800 manufacturing firms in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the UK, the study examines how carbon pricing influences corporate behavior. It finds that while many firms implement energy-saving measures and process innovation, product innovation is more strongly driven by the expected stringency of emissions caps. The research highlights a 'trading threshold' where firms with small excess allowances avoid the market and suggests that generous free allocation of allowances may hinder innovation by reducing the signaling effect of tight carbon budgets to senior management.

The paper addresses the 'windfall' emissions permits (AAUs) held by countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. It analyzes the conflicting positions of Russia and the EU, noting that Russia views its surplus as a hedge against future emissions growth. To resolve this, the authors propose creating a non-tradable strategic compliance reserve for first-period surpluses and implementing 'optimized trading' for second-period over-allocations. This approach aims to maintain carbon market prices and recognize the 'early action' of transition economies while preventing the market saturation that would occur if all surpluses were traded.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) supports the EPA's proposed Transport Rule to replace the judicially invalidated Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) but argues it should be strengthened to further reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). CATF specifically advocates for the passage of S. 2995, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 2010 (CAAA of 2010), asserting it would deliver greater emissions reductions, save more lives, and provide more regulatory certainty than the Transport Rule alone. The testimony details the severe health and environmental impacts of power plant emissions, including premature death from fine particulate matter, acid rain damage to eastern ecosystems, and ozone-related crop losses.

The paper examines the likely balance of demand and supply for carbon units in 2020, analyzing the 'emissions anyway' projections for major developed nations against their pledges. It concludes that while a theoretical demand gap exists, actual market demand for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) may be low due to policy preferences for sectoral crediting in the US and EU, and a likely oversupply of CERs. The author warns that this suggests a potentially low-value international carbon market, which could hinder global efforts to peak emissions by 2020.

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Toolkit is a resource for civil society to navigate the complex process of carbon credit generation under the Kyoto Protocol. It details the seven-step project cycle—from the creation of the Project Design Document (PDD) to the issuance of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)—and highlights critical technical requirements such as additionality and baseline estimation. The document emphasizes the role of Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) as validators and verifiers and outlines specific rules for small-scale, sinks, and Programme of Activities (PoA) projects. It specifically guides users on how to utilize the 30-day public comment period and other intervention points to challenge non-additional or socially harmful projects.

The research paper analyzes Germany's engagement with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) up to July 2009, arguing that both the global mechanism and German state policy prioritize the quantity of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) over the quality of sustainable development. The author finds that German projects are heavily concentrated in Asia, particularly China and India, and are dominated by large-scale industrial 'end-of-pipe' projects that offer minimal sustainable development benefits. The document concludes that the German government uses the CDM primarily as a tool for economic and export promotion rather than as a means to achieve genuine climate and development goals, thereby 'abusing' the mechanism's original purpose.