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The document highlights a significant disparity in climate finance distribution, noting that LDCs received only 1% of global mitigation finance in 2022. It argues that current debt-based financial mechanisms are ill-suited for LDCs due to limited fiscal space, currency risks, and weak enabling environments. To address this, the report showcases successful innovations such as the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) for parametric insurance and the Peace Renewable Energy Credit (P-REC) for electrification in conflict zones. It concludes that donor governments, philanthropies, and development finance institutions must prioritize grant-based and highly concessional capital to build resilience in the most vulnerable nations.

Ember's submission to the Independent Review of Greenhouse Gas Removals warns against overreliance on Power BECCS, citing significant delays at the Drax power station, technological uncertainty, and high costs to consumers. The document highlights that Drax's BECCS project has been delayed to the early 2030s despite substantial public subsidies and that the technology's carbon neutrality is scientifically contested. Ember notes a 60.1% decrease in estimated residual emissions to be balanced by engineered removals between the 6th and 7th Carbon Budgets. It further argues that Power BECCS creates a dangerous dependence on imported biomass, with over 99% of Drax's 2024 wood pellets being imported, primarily from North America. The report recommends winding down Drax subsidies after 2031 and prioritising decarbonisation of easier-to-abate sectors like power, buildings, and transport.

The document examines how governors in at least 14 US states have addressed rising electricity costs, which have increased by an average of 23% over the last decade. It identifies key cost drivers, such as grid modernization and natural gas volatility, and evaluates specific state-level interventions including regulatory reforms, energy efficiency programs, and the removal of coal plant subsidies.

The EU is projected to reduce total gas demand by 7% by 2030 compared to 2023 levels, falling from 326 bcm to 302 bcm. This trend follows a sharp decline between 2021 and 2023, where demand dropped from 404 bcm to 326 bcm. Despite this decline, LNG import capacity is expected to increase by 54% by 2030 relative to 2023, suggesting a risk of over-investment in infrastructure. Simultaneously, the EU is increasing its electrification rate, with National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) indicating a planned increase from 23% today to 30% by 2030, approaching the EU-level target of 32-33%. All 17 NECPs that reported 2030 electricity demand forecast an increase compared to 2023, reflecting a transition toward replacing fossil fuels with domestically generated clean electricity.

The EU aims for a 66% share of renewables in electricity generation by 2030, requiring significant increases in wind and solar capacity. While solar deployment is outpacing expectations, wind power faces challenges from grid bottlenecks and permitting issues.

Nigeria faces a substantial annual climate financing gap of $15.8 billion, with tracked inflows of $1.9 billion remaining low relative to its economy. The document argues for a Country Platform for Climate Action (CPCA) to coordinate government, private sector, and international efforts, citing the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Senegal as models. While JETPs have mobilized $46.5 billion across four countries, they are criticized for narrow focuses on energy systems and inadequate local engagement. A proposed Nigerian CPCA would expand this scope to include resilience, industrial growth, and social equity, while balancing geopolitical relationships with the EU, US, China, and India to meet a $1.9 trillion energy transition target by 2060.

The report argues that while Canada has a competitive advantage due to its clean electricity grids, the mining sector's emissions are rising as mines deepen and ore grades decline. It identifies three primary barriers to decarbonization: a lack of market demand for 'green' minerals, fragmented traceability infrastructure, and technological gaps in open-pit mining. The author proposes a policy toolkit including emission-intensity criteria for funding, support for R&D in emerging technologies like direct lithium extraction, and the maintenance of carbon pricing systems to incentivize the transition.

The report argues that Canada can capitalize on the global energy transition by increasing production of cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements. To achieve this, it recommends that the federal government implement financial risk-sharing agreements to mitigate price volatility, support Indigenous self-determination and equity ownership, strengthen provincial mining regulations to meet international environmental standards, and avoid shortening regulatory reviews by cutting environmental or consultation safeguards.

The report argues that Canada has significant potential to become a leading supplier of critical minerals—specifically cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements—to support the global clean energy transition. However, it identifies a substantial investment gap, estimating that $30 billion in additional capital is needed by 2040 to meet domestic demand, which is projected to reach $16 billion annually. The document highlights three primary risks hindering investment: high price volatility in immature markets, environmental hazards such as tailings dam failures and abandoned mines, and the lack of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) from Indigenous communities. To address these, the report recommends that the federal government implement financial risk-sharing mechanisms like contracts for difference and equity investments, while provincial governments should tighten mining regulations to align with international standards and provide loan guarantees and capacity-building resources to Indigenous communities to foster genuine partnerships and self-determination.

India's transition to electric vehicles (EVs) presents a dual reality for automotive MSMEs, which comprise 80% of the auto-component manufacturing base. While the decline of internal combustion engine (ICE) components threatens traditional revenue streams, the shift creates opportunities in high-value EV components like battery housings and motor casings. However, MSMEs face significant barriers, including high capital expenditure, a 'Valley of Death' in prototype financing (TRL 4-6), and a shortage of skilled labor. To address these, the report recommends the establishment of the Automotive Component Technology Upgradation Financing Facility (AC-TUFF) to provide blended finance and risk-mitigation tools.

The briefing warns that 63 oil and gas fields in development could emit 2,300 kilotonnes of methane annually by 2030, a volume comparable to current fossil fuel production emissions in Europe. It highlights a critical gap where high-emitting projects in countries exporting to the EU will reach peak capacity before EU methane regulations take full effect in 2027 and 2030. The report notes significant data transparency failures among top operators and argues that continued investment in new infrastructure undermines the Global Methane Pledge and overall climate mitigation efforts.

The report argues that South Africa's current free basic services (FBS) for electricity and water are insufficient to lift households out of poverty, providing only 'survival access' rather than 'developmental access'. It finds that for 40% of the population living below the lower-bound poverty line, current tariffs are unaffordable, often forcing a trade-off between paying for utilities and purchasing adequate nutrition. The document identifies 'adverse inclusion'—where physical connection to a grid exists but the terms of use are restrictive or unaffordable—as a primary barrier to socioeconomic development. It recommends increasing free electricity from 50kWh to 150kWh and water from 6kl to 8kl per month for the poorest 7.5 million households, while replacing municipal discretion in indigent registration with a national policy.

The 2024 assessment of 40 global banks reveals a slight increase in the average seafood policy score to 25%, up from 21% in 2023. While 48% of banks showed year-on-year improvements, the majority of policies remain insufficient to address key business resilience risks. European banks continue to lead in policy depth, while Asian banks are showing strong progress in sustainable finance frameworks. Despite 83% of banks recognizing general climate and nature risks, only 33% have seafood-specific policies. The report highlights a growing but still small market for 'blue' financial products, with 38% of assessed banks now disclosing blue-labeled products or eligibility criteria.

The Clean Air Task Force criticizes recent U.S. executive orders on nuclear energy for failing to provide the financial mechanisms needed to scale deployment, especially as Congress moves to reduce tax credits and restrict the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office.

The report examines the energy demands of data centres in ASEAN, particularly those driven by AI, and argues that a dual approach of increasing solar and wind power procurement and enhancing energy efficiency is essential. It highlights that current grid emission targets in key hubs are insufficient and suggests that at least 30% of electricity demand in five ASEAN data centre hubs could be met by wind and solar by 2030 without immediate battery storage. The document emphasizes the critical role of cooling systems in tropical climates and the potential for software optimisation to reduce energy consumption.

Honduras' first Adaptation Communication outlines the country's institutional and legal frameworks for climate adaptation and identifies key national priorities, including disaster risk reduction, financing access, and the establishment of a national loss and damage mechanism.

Indonesia can reduce road transport emissions by up to 84% by 2050 through a multifaceted strategy of avoiding travel demand, shifting to public transport, and improving vehicle efficiency via electric vehicles and biofuels. The document recommends stronger policy enforcement, stricter fuel efficiency standards, targeted infrastructure incentives, and improved data collection and emission tracking to achieve these goals.

The report argues that the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) can unlock significant renewable energy potential and enhance energy security by connecting resource-rich countries with high-demand markets. It highlights specific planned solar and wind projects, the role of the ASEAN Interconnection Master Plan Study (AIMS), and the potential for 30 GW of additional renewable capacity to generate 109 TWh of electricity and create 182,000 jobs.

ASEAN electricity demand grew by approximately 50% between 2013 and 2023 and is projected to rise by up to 41% by 2030. While the IEA's Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) targets 100,000 km of transmission line expansion for Southeast Asia between 2021 and 2030, the combined plans of Indonesia, Viet Nam, Thailand, and the Philippines total 45,078 km, covering only about 45% of that target. The document argues that grid planning must shift from merely meeting peak demand to managing the intermittency of wind and solar power, which saw cost reductions of 55% and 85% respectively in the decade to 2020.

The report argues that ASEAN's transmission grid expansion must roughly double to align with IEA pathways, as current national plans for Indonesia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, and Thailand cover only about 45% of the required expansion. It highlights that 30 GW of solar and wind potential is located along planned interconnection routes in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Brunei. To support this transition, the report proposes a six-pillar framework for future-ready grid planning—including smart modernisation, strategic expansion, and market reforms—and suggests learning from the integrated power systems of Europe and Southern Africa to move from bilateral to multilateral power trade.