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The document describes a case study centered on St. Charles Medical Center's evaluation of energy conservation measures (ECMs) under the US EPA's Green Lights and ENERGY STAR Buildings programs. It highlights the Green Lights Program's goal of reducing air pollution by promoting energy-efficient lighting, noting that lighting constitutes 20-25% of electricity sold in the U.S. The case focuses on the balance between strict financial analysis and intangible factors, such as workplace productivity, when deciding on retrofitting projects.

The document describes a scenario where Mike Severns, Director of Facility Services at St. Charles Medical Center in Oregon, evaluates eleven energy conservation measures (ECMs) divided into three stages. The hospital's participation in the EPA's Green Lights and ENERGY STAR Buildings programs aims to reduce electricity costs and environmental impact. The analysis is supported by a performance contract with Johnson Controls Incorporated (JCI), which guarantees energy cost reductions, and an Energy Rebate from the Bonneville Power Administration. The ECMs range from simple lighting retrofits (Stage I) to complex system upgrades like variable air volume controls (Stage II) and heat recovery chillers (Stage III), the latter of which also helps the facility meet expected chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) phaseout requirements.

The document describes a scenario where MultiPaint, Inc. (MPI), a company marketing itself as "environmentally friendly," discovers significant toxic contamination at its idle downtown paint plant. The case explores five strategic options for the site: self-cleanup and sale, contracting a third-party cleanup, selling the land "as is" at a discount, donating the land to the city, or re-opening the site to produce lead-based paint for an international contract. It further examines the internal conflicts arising from a previous $100,000 EPA fine for RCRA violations in the Stain Division and the external pressures from banks, auditors, and the press following news leaks about the pollution in Puget Sound.

The document outlines how Fred Schoeneborn, Mobil's Facilities Management Coordinator, successfully implemented the EPA's Green Lights lighting retrofit program. Despite lacking direct authority over facilities managers, Schoeneborn used a five-step model: proving the initiative's viability through a small-scale pilot at the Princeton facility, securing publicized corporate commitment, building a peer-to-peer communication network, providing incentives through high-level recognition and awards, and utilizing a 'train-the-trainer' method to distribute technical expertise. These efforts led Mobil to complete the program two years ahead of schedule, investing $2.17 million for annual savings of over $1.13 million. The success of this initiative informed a broader energy management policy, including a commitment to save $25 million annually over five years through energy efficiency projects.

The document details Mobil Corporation's 1992 commitment to the US EPA's voluntary Green Lights Program, aimed at reducing air pollution through energy-efficient lighting. It describes the organizational challenges faced by Facilities Management Coordinator Fred Schoeneborn, including a lack of direct authority over facility managers and the perception of facilities as mere cost centers. The case highlights the transition from lighting-specific goals to the broader ENERGY STAR Buildings Program and discusses the internal strategies used to drive adoption, such as financial proof from a pilot project in Princeton, New Jersey, and high-level corporate visibility through public advertorials.

Tempes Corporation is a western Massachusetts-based manufacturer of precision equipment, including timers and gauges, used in extreme sports such as SCUBA diving and mountain climbing, as well as in scientific research in deep sea and Antarctic environments.

Tempes Corporation is deciding between two designs for its Water Moccasin deep-sea diving monitor. Design A uses acrylic polymer and cadmium coating, which is cheaper but generates hazardous waste. Design B uses a more expensive, recyclable engineering thermoplastic that reduces parts and leaks but requires higher initial capital for recycling equipment. The company must analyze these options using net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) over an eight-year product lifespan, with projected first-year sales of 14,000 units and a 10% annual growth rate.

The document evaluates the WRAP program at Dow Chemical, which uses a contest format to encourage small-scale capital investments in energy savings, yield improvement, and waste reduction. It highlights the program's strengths, such as top management support and the lack of bureaucracy, while identifying weaknesses including a lack of strategic alignment and limited employee participation. The note also contrasts the Louisiana Division's WRAP approach with the Bayside Division's continuous improvement model.

The document details AT&T's transition from regulatory compliance to a leadership position in environmental management, specifically focusing on the use of TQM to eliminate toxic emissions. It highlights the company's corporate goals for CFC phaseout and waste reduction, and provides a detailed account of the Columbus Works facility in Ohio. At this site, AT&T applied process-level analysis to replace perchloroethylene (PCE) and 1,1,1 trichloroethane (TCA) with safer alternatives like butyl carbitol and n-butyl butyrate, often in collaboration with Bell Laboratories and external stakeholders such as the Ohio EPA.

The document presents a business case for Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) regarding the implementation of a vehicle take-back and secondary materials strategy. It specifically focuses on the cost-benefit analysis of using recycled polycarbonate instead of virgin polycarbonate for the bumpers of the 3-series model, providing detailed data on disassembly time, labor costs, transportation, and supplier margins to determine economic viability.

The document describes a case study focused on the environmental challenges facing the pulp and paper industry during the 1990s, specifically the production of toxic dioxin during chlorine bleaching. It highlights the tension between environmental groups demanding the total elimination of chlorine and companies that viewed scientific evidence as inconclusive and were reluctant to invest billions in new equipment. The text introduces the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's 'cluster rule' as a regulatory attempt to base decisions on better science and proposes a stakeholder dialogue to find sustainable solutions for the industry.

The document details a 1994 scenario where the U.S. pulp and paper industry faced pressure to eliminate chlorine bleaching due to the production of dioxins and other organochlorines. It contrasts the positions of the EPA, which proposed the 'cluster rule' to integrate air and water regulations, Greenpeace, which advocated for totally chlorine-free (TCF) processes, and industry players who argued that elemental chlorine-free (ECF) substitution was a more economically viable solution. The text explores the technical differences between ECF and TCF, the estimated costs of compliance—ranging from $4 billion (EPA) to $10 billion (industry)—and the potential for a voluntary 'covenant' to guide the industry's environmental future.

The WRAP (Waste Reduction Always Pays) program was implemented by Dow Chemical Company's Louisiana Division starting in 1987. Evolving from an energy-saving contest initiated in 1981 to address oil price shocks and capital scarcity, the program expanded to include yield improvement and waste reduction. The program's creation was influenced by a 1985 congressional survey on emissions, pressure from environmental groups, and the upcoming SARA Title III reporting requirements. Over time, the program's financial criteria shifted from requiring a 100% return on investment (ROI) to a 30% ROI, with a minimum savings threshold of $10,000 per project.

The WRAP program at Dow Chemical's Louisiana Division incentivized employees to propose waste reduction projects by linking environmental goals with financial returns. Starting as an energy contest in 1981, it evolved into a comprehensive waste reduction initiative by 1986, utilizing a competitive submission process and ROI-based justification. By 1992, the program achieved significant waste reductions and cost savings, fostering a corporate culture of pollution prevention through recognition and knowledge sharing.

The document is a teaching guide designed to simulate negotiations over a proposed European Union carbon tax. It combines negotiation theory—drawing on works by Raiffa, Bazerman, Neale, Fisher, and Ury—with a technical game-theory model to show how cooperation can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes. The guide discusses the challenges of unilateral climate policy, specifically the risk of 'leakage' where emissions shift outside the EU, and the potential for carbon tax revenues to be used for fiscal reform to reduce unemployment.

Platanera Rio Sixaola S.A., the first banana plantation to receive Eco-O.K. certification, faced significant financial losses in 1994, with production costs of $7.22 per box exceeding revenues of $5.32. Despite implementing standards more stringent than the Rainforest Alliance's Eco-O.K. requirements—such as avoiding chemical fertilizers and herbicides—the company struggled to differentiate its product from the 'Big Three' (Chiquita, Dole, and Del Monte) who dominate 70% of the global market. The company's efforts were further complicated by European Community import quotas on Latin American bananas, which raised retail prices in Germany but limited supply. To achieve profitability, the owner, Volker Ribniger, explored options including the introduction of a Black Sigatoka-resistant banana strain, personal branding, and agritourism.

The document details a scenario where Treeton Chemical, a U.S. firm, acquires Tossico Chemical in Italy during a period of intense 'greening' of European politics and the push for a unified internal market. Following the acquisition, it is revealed via a whistleblower that Tossico had improperly dumped 650 tons of toxic waste in Koko, Nigeria, using unscrupulous waste brokers. This leads to a major international scandal, with the Italian Environment Minister seeking $75 million in compensation and environmental groups placing Treeton on a 'Corporate Toxic Enemies List'.

The Bayside Division of Dow Chemical implemented waste reduction through statistical process control (SPC) training and a 'suggestion box' system, rather than the WRAP program used in the Louisiana Division. Bayside's projects were typically smaller, costing under $200,000, and focused on housekeeping and materials handling rather than process design. Funding for these initiatives competed with other capital expenditures within a fixed annual budget allocated to individual plants.

The document outlines a pedagogical approach to teaching Total Quality Environmental Management (TQEM) using AT&T as a primary example. It details the use of process flow diagrams to identify risks associated with hazardous substances like 1,1,1 trichloroethane (TCA) and perchloroethylene (PERC), and discusses various measurement frameworks for environmental performance, including scientific data, management data, and systems assessment tools like the GEMI Self-Assessment Program.

The document analyzes the environmental trade-offs between disposable and reusable diapers, noting that disposables use more raw materials while reusables require more water and nonrenewable energy. It highlights how regional priorities—such as solid waste management in New York versus water scarcity in California—determine which product is environmentally superior. Additionally, it discusses the role of labor costs in the economic assessment of reusable diapers and details Procter & Gamble's corporate efforts to mitigate negative publicity through research funds, recycling projects in Seattle, and lobbying campaigns using the Arthur D. Little study.