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The document argues that while the EU's 2030 target of at least 40% domestic greenhouse gas reductions is a positive step, it may conflict with plans to link carbon markets. The author warns that linking with external emissions trading schemes could introduce 'foreign' allowances that dilute domestic targets, especially given the existing oversupply of over 2 billion allowances in the EU market. To effectively participate in a future global carbon market, the document suggests the EU must scale up its ambition to at least 55% and permanently resolve the surplus of allowances from the pre-2020 period.

The report analyzes the EU's 2030 climate deal, which includes a binding 40% domestic greenhouse gas reduction target, a 27% renewable energy target, and a 27% energy efficiency target. Carbon Market Watch argues that these targets fall short of the 55% reduction required for a fair contribution to global climate goals. The analysis highlights significant risks to the 40% target, specifically the oversupply of EU ETS allowances (estimated at 2.6-4.5 billion by 2020) and the use of ETS allowances to meet non-ETS sector targets. It also criticizes the continuation of free emission allowances for industry and the provision of financial support to the power sectors of low-income Member States, which may prolong the use of coal.

The 2014 European elections saw a significant rise in far-right and eurosceptic forces, particularly in France where the Front National achieved 25% of the vote. While the German Greens maintained a double-digit result, they lost three mandates. Across Europe, the Green faction became more regionally diverse with new representatives from countries like Spain, Hungary, and Croatia, though it lost influence due to the collapse of a progressive majority in the Parliament. The author argues that the Greens must counter the narrative of the EU as a neoliberal tool and push for an end to unilateral austerity policies to restore trust in European integration.

The document is a statement from various EU, U.S., and international organizations urging the U.S. Trade Representative and the European Commission to exclude chemicals—including pesticides and industrial chemicals—from the TTIP. The authors argue that regulatory cooperation frameworks, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, and harmonization efforts would freeze the development of stronger health-protective laws, empower corporations to challenge environmental regulations, and erode the EU's leadership on emerging issues like endocrine disruptors and nanomaterials.

The EU ETS is currently failing to promote low-carbon solutions due to a carbon price that has plunged to around 5 euros per tonne of CO2, driven by a surplus of 2.1 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent allowances. This oversupply is attributed to weak emission targets, the inflow of international offsets, and reduced demand following the economic crisis. The document warns that this surplus allows the EU to transform current emission reductions from other policies into 'future rights to pollute', potentially reducing the domestic impact of the 2030 climate target from 40% to 34%. To fix the market, the author recommends increasing the linear reduction factor to 2.6%, permanently cancelling 1.6 billion excess allowances, enacting the Market Stability Reserve by 2017, and transitioning to full auctioning for all industrial sectors post-2020 to eliminate windfall profits and adhere to the polluter-pays principle.

The document argues that subnational governments are essential for implementing sustainable development policies because they are closest to citizens' needs and can foster grassroots innovation. It emphasizes the need for 'vertical coordination'—the linking of local, subnational, national, and supranational levels—to ensure policy coherence. Using empirical research, the author identifies good practice examples in Europe (such as Tyrol, Austria) and other regions (such as Bhutan), while noting that many regions lack systematic links to national strategies due to political independence or administrative bottlenecks. The briefing recommends a 'metagovernance' approach that mixes hierarchical, market, and network styles to better integrate sustainable development across all levels of government.

A coalition of social movements and NGOs argues that the FAO's current forest definition is reductionist and primarily benefits industrial timber, pulp, paper, and rubber companies. The authors contend that by defining forests simply as land with a certain percentage of tree cover, the FAO erroneously classifies large-scale monoculture plantations as 'reforestation' and ignores the structural and cultural importance of forests to the 300 million people who depend on them for their livelihoods. The letter calls for a new, community-led definition process that recognizes the role of forests in food sovereignty and biological diversity.

The document introduces the CaRROT toolkit, an MS Excel-based tool for Kenya's flower industry to account for GHG emissions, energy, and water consumption. It outlines the assessment methodology based on ISO, IPCC, and GHG Protocol standards, and identifies climate-related business opportunities such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and voluntary carbon markets. The report recommends establishing sectoral baselines and enhancing capacity building to transition the industry toward a low-carbon model.

The document is an open letter addressed to ministers and delegates of UNFCCC signatory states, urging them to adopt ambitious climate protection measures and stop the use of emissions trading to weaken climate commitments. The signatories, representing 33 countries, demand the rejection of a pilot phase for emissions unit trading under the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA), the prevention of double counting, and the exclusion of non-additional projects and coal from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). They also call for the cessation of fossil fuel subsidies and the implementation of human rights safeguards in climate projects.

The document outlines the state of climate finance negotiations leading up to COP19, focusing on the mobilization of US$100 billion per year by 2020 and the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. It details the work of the Standing Committee on Finance, the challenges facing the Adaptation Fund due to falling carbon prices, and the need for 'enabling environments' in both developed and developing countries to attract and deploy investment. The guide emphasizes that providing financial assurance to developing countries is critical for securing their commitment to a new global climate agreement in 2015.

Carbon Market Watch argues that international carbon offsets have failed to deliver promised climate benefits and have undermined the EU's domestic abatement efforts. The brief recommends a legally binding EU domestic GHG reduction target of at least 55% below 1990 levels for 2030, the total elimination of international offsets for meeting mitigation obligations post-2020, and the implementation of safeguards when linking the EU ETS to other trading schemes. It further suggests that climate finance should shift away from carbon markets toward regulation, standards, and incentive programs, such as performance-based financing for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).

The report analyzes the transition of water from a public commons to a financial asset, examining how privatization, commoditization, and financialization are driven by corporate interests and international financial institutions. Through case studies from Palestine, Australia, Sri Lanka, the US, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Switzerland, England, Mozambique, Mexico, and El Salvador, it documents the social and ecological impacts of this shift, including water scarcity, pollution, and the violation of territorial rights. It advocates for a public/community-based management model that prioritizes the human right to water over profit.

The report by Friends of the Earth International analyzes how water is being transformed from a common good into a financial asset through corporate capture, international trade agreements, and extractive projects. It provides case studies from various regions—including Palestine, Australia, Sri Lanka, the US, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Switzerland, England, Mozambique, Mexico, and El Salvador—to illustrate the social and environmental impacts of this trend. The document concludes that the 'financialization' of water allows transnational agents to speculate on natural resources, often with the complicity of states, and advocates for the recognition of water as a common good managed through community-led and public systems.

The authors contend that mandatory minimum building codes are essential for public safety and environmental sustainability. They advocate for a three-year update cycle to keep pace with building science and technology, arguing that current codes—specifically the 2012 International Energy Conservation Code (IECC)—significantly reduce energy waste and operational costs for homeowners. The paper highlights the role of the International Code Council (ICC) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in creating consensus-based standards. It also emphasizes that statewide adoption of these codes reduces disaster-related losses and supports the competitiveness of U.S. building suppliers against international competitors, particularly those in Europe.

A group of international environmental and science organizations called on IATA to support a global market-based measure (MBM) to reduce aviation emissions. The letter argues that technical and operational measures alone are insufficient to meet climate targets and that a fragmented approach of domestic policies will not achieve science-based goals. The signatories demand that any MBM include science-compatible targets, strict compliance, and limited access to offsets.

The document discusses the outcome of the COP18 meeting in Doha concerning the approximately 13 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) from the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period (2008-2012). It identifies Russia, Ukraine, and Poland as the largest holders of these surpluses and notes that without restrictions, these units could allow countries to meet their second commitment period (2013-2020) targets without taking further action. The text outlines the various proposals from the African Group, AOSIS, Brazil, the G-77 and China, and Switzerland, as well as the internal EU compromise reached between countries seeking strict limits (Germany, UK, Denmark) and Poland.

The report details the Green Climate Fund's administrative spending and trust fund status through the end of 2012. It tracks expenditures for the Board, Interim Secretariat, and Interim Trustee, while noting that all received contributions and anticipated pledges had been allocated to administrative budgets through December 31, 2013, leaving no funds available for new funding decisions.

The document examines Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as a tool to incentivize agricultural land managers to provide non-market environmental benefits. It distinguishes between action-based payments, which reward the adoption of specific practices, and outcome-based payments, which reward actual environmental results. The authors argue that outcome-based approaches are more effective at delivering biodiversity and ecosystem services because they encourage farmer innovation and target the most ecologically valuable land. While European examples often focus on site-specific biodiversity in grasslands, the report suggests that shifting from top-down contractual agreements to local governance and participatory design is essential for scaling these mechanisms. Barriers to implementation include scientific uncertainty, high administrative costs, and the risk of 'leakage' where environmental damage is displaced outside the PES zone.

The Green Economy Coalition (GEC) met in February 2013 to establish its 2013-2015 strategy. The coalition aims to counter 'green growth' narratives that ignore equity and ecological limits by engaging with the G20, World Economic Forum, and national governments. Its work plan consists of three core activities—dialogue, knowledge sharing, and collective influence—and five thematic projects: Measuring What Matters, Financial Sector Reform, Greening Economic Sectors, Investing in People, and Managing Natural Systems. The GEC intends to transition into a network of collaborating partners, expanding its membership to include more developing countries and private sector entities.

The author argues that the European Commission's proposal for the 7th EU Environment Action Programme is a 'mockery' of environmental policy because it contains no concrete actions, instead repeating existing Treaty provisions and vague objectives. The text claims this approach prioritizes economic growth over environmental protection and warns that the EU's failure to provide strong environmental leadership may lead to the renationalization of environmental issues by Member States.