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The Clean Air Task Force recommends that the EU increase its 2029 public procurement mandates for low-carbon steel to 50% and low-carbon concrete and mortar to 10%. It argues that the current IAA proposal is insufficient to drive investment and suggests expanding mandates to 100% by 2040. The report also proposes extending these requirements to private construction projects over 1000 m2 and private automotive fleets by 2032, while broadening the scope to include low-carbon plastics and fertilisers.

The Clean Air Task Force asserts that Europe faces an "untenable policy gap" regarding fusion energy despite the 2024 Draghi Report's call for an innovation strategy. While the US, China, Great Britain, and Germany are advancing regulations and public-private partnerships, the EU lacks a cohesive strategy to transition fusion from research to industrial application. The author advocates for a strategy that targets commercialisation in the 2030s, separates fusion from fission regulations, and utilizes public resources to de-risk common technological challenges. This call is supported by a broad ecosystem, including startups and Members of the European Parliament, who demand concrete timelines and funding commitments rather than mere intentions.

The report examines Europe's transition from fossil fuel dependency to clean technology, highlighting that domestic manufacturing can already meet the demand for wind turbines, electric vehicles (EVs), and heat pumps. It contrasts the volatility of fossil fuel imports with the stability of clean tech infrastructure, which provides long-term energy generation from a single import. While Europe remains reliant on certain raw materials and sub-components, the report suggests that electrification reduces overall trade disruption risks and offers significant job growth potential by 2030.

Europe is facing a significant demographic shift characterized by declining working-age populations and increasing old-age dependency, which is expected to create tighter labour markets and labour shortages by 2050. While this trend may stunt GDP growth and complicate investment, it provides an opportunity for trade unions to increase worker bargaining power and revitalize their membership, particularly by organizing the expanding care sector.

The share of gas in the global power mix fell for the fifth consecutive year in 2025, dropping from 23.9% in 2020 to 21.8%. While absolute global gas generation has not yet peaked, its growth rate slowed from 2.9% (2016-2020) to 1.6% (2021-2025) as solar and wind met approximately 68% of global electricity demand growth over the last five years. By 2025, 61 out of 124 gas-generating economies had passed their historical gas generation peaks. In the G7, renewable power (2,544 TWh) nearly equaled gas power (2,577 TWh) in 2025. Conversely, gas remains central to the power sectors of the US and Canada, and continues to support demand in parts of North and West Africa.

GreenLatinos asserts that international climate spaces, such as UN COPs and specialized conferences, are critical for shaping policies and funding that affect Latino communities. The organization highlights the importance of the Belém–Antalya Mechanism and the Santa Marta Fossil Fuel Phaseout Conference in building momentum for a just transition and fossil fuel phaseout, while criticizing the lack of U.S. federal leadership under the Trump Administration.

The Center for International Environmental Law asserts that the UNFCCC is currently hindered by a consensus model that allows a small number of countries to obstruct progress. Citing the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta and the UN General Assembly's resolution on the ICJ climate Advisory Opinion, the authors argue that climate action is moving beyond the UNFCCC and that the body must evolve to incorporate majority voting, address corporate capture, and operationalize legal obligations to prevent climate harm.

The document asserts that climate disinformation in Europe is an industrialised threat that distorts public debate, delays clean energy investment, and weakens crisis response. It highlights a failure in regulatory enforcement across the EU and UK, noting that while instruments like the Digital Services Act exist, they are unevenly applied. The authors advocate for limiting algorithmic amplification of misleading content and increasing media scrutiny to protect the conditions necessary for collective climate action.

The report argues that Wales represents a significant untapped opportunity for abandoned mine methane (AMM) recovery, accounting for approximately half of the UK's modelled AMM emissions. While the UK has 16 operational AMM sites generating £2.3 million in gross profit, Wales has no active projects. The document highlights that South Wales anthracite coalfields are among the most methane-rich in Britain, with potential to generate 880 GWh of electricity and £19.5 million in profit by 2050. However, growth is hindered by a reliance on outdated 2010 DEFRA estimates and a lack of direct, site-level measurement. The report recommends that the Welsh Government mandate direct measurement, prohibit routine venting and flaring, and introduce financial incentives such as guaranteed tariffs and tax credits, citing successful models in France and Germany.

The article examines the global and European trend of restricting social media access for minors, highlighting legislative actions in Australia, France, and Spain. It contrasts the view that age bans are necessary public health measures to protect vulnerable adolescent brains from addictive algorithms with the argument that such bans punish children rather than platforms and may hinder digital participation. Experts suggest that focusing on harmful design features—such as infinite scroll and personalized recommendations—via frameworks like the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) is a more effective solution than blanket prohibitions.

The EU petrochemical industry, a €635 billion sector employing 1.2 million people, is facing a deep structural crisis characterized by ageing assets, high energy costs, and intensifying global competition. The industry is physically organized around approximately 150 chemical parks, with the Antwerp-Rotterdam-Rhine-Ruhr corridor serving as the world's densest concentration of production. However, the EU's global market share in chemical sales fell from 21% in 2009 to 13% in 2024, while China now accounts for 46% of global sales. The sector is experiencing a 'closure wave' of steam crackers—the central units for producing ethylene, propylene, butadiene, and aromatics—due to their 1970s-era scale and high carbon exposure under the EU ETS. Between 2022 and 2025, the industry lost approximately 37 Mt of production capacity, and investment CAPEX dropped from €7.6 billion in 2022 to €1.5 billion in 2025. The report highlights acute vulnerabilities in the supply of primary 'building block' molecules, noting that the EU produces less than 10% of global primary petrochemical capacity and is increasingly dependent on imports for molecules like methanol, where domestic production covers less than 15% of consumption.

The report outlines technical and operational measures to mitigate methane emissions from landfills in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where waste management emissions accounted for 10,258 kt in 2023. It categorizes disposal sites into dumpsites, controlled landfills, and sanitary landfills, emphasizing that daily operational practices—such as waste compaction, daily cover application, and leachate management—significantly impact emissions even without advanced gas capture infrastructure. The document details specific equipment requirements, slope stability guidelines, and gas collection system designs, noting that while optimal capture efficiencies can exceed 80%, many regional facilities operate between 20% and 60%. Additionally, it advocates for organic waste diversion through composting and anaerobic digestion, drawing on European precedents, and stresses the necessity of multi-level capacity building for operators and policymakers to ensure sustainable mitigation.

The report finds that between 2019 and 2025, 240 global banks provided US$590.8 billion to the top fifteen petrochemical companies, with a high concentration of funding from US, Japanese, Chinese, German, and UK institutions. Institutional investors held US$146.6 billion in exposure to these companies as of September 2025, dominated by US-based asset managers like Vanguard and BlackRock. The document argues that this financing persists despite structural risks such as overcapacity and collapsing profit margins, and often contradicts the public climate commitments of the financial institutions involved.

The report provides a detailed breakdown of aligned GSS+ debt volumes, issuer types, and geographic trends for Q1 2026, highlighting the continued dominance of green bonds and the European market.

The report argues that current transition finance frameworks lack the systemic safeguards necessary to prevent carbon lock-in, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors. It proposes moving from asset-level financing to a systemic approach underpinned by Paris-aligned, subnational net-zero pathways. The document examines the gap between corporate transition plans and the requirements for credible transition finance, noting that many high-emitting oil, gas, and agrifood entities lack mature strategies. It advocates for the use of Paris-aligned taxonomies to ensure that use-of-proceeds (UoP) instruments drive genuine decarbonisation without creating 'dead-end pathways'.

The report argues that Canada's historical advantage of low-cost electricity is at risk due to outdated grid infrastructure, cautious energy planning, and policy instability. By comparing Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec with international peers like Texas and Germany, the analysis finds that Canadian grids often under-plan for industrial growth and lag in flexibility and transmission capacity. The document recommends that the federal government support interprovincial coordination, provide targeted funding for grid expansion, ensure a stable Clean Electricity Regulation, and prioritize grid flexibility to maintain industrial competitiveness.

The document outlines a comparative framework using six indicators—energy planning, flexible grid planning, transmission planning, electricity procurement, industrial rate modernization, and climate policy predictability—to assess the competitiveness of jurisdictions including Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, British Columbia, Germany, the UK, Norway, New South Wales, Washington, and Texas.

The document outlines a benchmarking framework used to assess how jurisdictions attract investment in wind, solar, and battery projects. It defines six metrics: energy planning, flexibility planning, transmission planning, electricity procurement, industrial rate modernization, and climate policy certainty. The report provides the specific data sources, scoring rubrics, and calculation methods used to evaluate Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, British Columbia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, New South Wales, Washington, and Texas.

The report warns that climate change is increasing the probability of simultaneous crop failures in major global breadbaskets, which could trigger food price spikes, social unrest, and geopolitical instability. Using France, Germany, and India as examples, it projects significant increases in crop failure risks by 2040 and highlights how extreme heat undermines both agricultural yields and the labor and infrastructure necessary for food security. For Europe, these failures could be exploited by Russia through hybrid warfare and disinformation, while destabilizing import-dependent NATO and EU partners. The authors recommend that NATO and the EU integrate food security into resilience frameworks, protect agricultural aid, coordinate trade responses to avoid export bans, and increase investment in climate-smart agricultural R&D.

The report compares two pathways for meeting U.S. electricity demand growth through 2030: one relying on fossil fuels and another on clean energy. It finds that a clean energy scenario reduces the incremental cost of meeting demand by $5.1 billion annually in 2030 and offers greater protection against fuel price volatility. To realize these savings, the authors recommend setting ambitious clean energy targets, updating electricity system planning with market-based assumptions, reducing permitting and interconnection barriers, implementing fuel cost sharing to manage risk, improving grid utilization through technologies like surplus interconnection and high-performance conductors, and harnessing demand-side resources such as virtual power plants and distributed energy technologies.