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The report finds a significant gap in methane action within the dairy and coffee sectors, with only three companies setting 2030 reduction targets and 15 failing to disclose emissions for 2024 or 2025. While members of the Dairy Methane Action Alliance (DMAA) generally outperform non-members, performance varies widely, and dairy co-operatives are noted as lagging. Danone is highlighted as a leader, having achieved a 29.8% reduction in methane emissions from fresh milk and dairy products by 2025. The report also notes that major global supermarkets are currently failing to disclose methane emissions or set targets, and warns that upcoming EU regulations like the CSRD and CSDDD will make such disclosures a legal obligation.

The document argues that the traditional carbon offsetting model is fundamentally flawed and misleading, urging companies to adopt Beyond Value Chain Mitigation (BVCM). Unlike offsetting, which claims to 'cancel out' emissions, BVCM involves supporting external climate projects as a contribution to global goals without claiming carbon neutrality. The guide outlines the legal and reputational risks of offsetting—including a September 2026 EU ban on product-level offsetting claims—and provides a five-step implementation framework for BVCM. It suggests diversifying contributions beyond carbon credits into durable carbon removals (CDR), 'high-hanging fruit' technology research, and climate impact funds, while emphasizing that external action must not replace internal decarbonization aligned with a 1.5°C trajectory.

Carbon Market Watch proposes that the EU replace 'net' climate targets with three distinct targets for emissions reductions, land-based sequestration, and permanent carbon dioxide removals (CDR). The guide argues that current EU governance is inadequate, noting that the Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming (CRCF) Regulation lacks rigour and the Net-Zero Industry Act's goal of 50 Mt of geological CO2 storage does not specify the volume for permanent removals. To implement this, the author suggests integrating permanent removal targets into the Effort Sharing Regulation and strengthening the Governance Regulation to require credible feasibility and sustainability assessments by March 2027. Proposed target designs include a 'floor' for minimum delivery and a 'ceiling' to prevent over-reliance on CDR, with targets expressed in absolute volume (MtCO2) and as a percentage of 1990 gross emissions. Financing should be shared between the public sector and high-polluting companies through progressive taxation or direct removal obligations.

The report argues that the proposed Turkish ETS is fundamentally weak due to its reliance on an intensity-based cap, broad unconditional free allocation, and the use of offsets. These design choices are expected to prevent the system from generating a meaningful carbon price signal, thereby failing to drive emissions reductions aligned with the Paris Agreement and leaving Turkish exporters exposed to significant CBAM fees. The authors recommend transitioning to an absolute declining cap, phasing out offsets, and shifting toward auctioning to retain climate revenues domestically.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as new plants are increasingly built for backup reliability rather than primary generation. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting most new demand. While the number of countries developing coal projects fell to 32, political interventions in the US and energy security concerns in the EU have delayed planned closures. The EU continues a terminal decline in coal, with solar and wind producing more energy than all fossil fuels combined for the first time in 2025.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal is increasingly used as system 'insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While Latin America achieved a 'No New Coal' status in 2025, several countries in the region, including Brazil and Chile, experienced delays or reversals in planned plant retirements. China and India continue to lead global capacity expansions, accounting for 95% of all coal capacity under construction worldwide.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The global iron and steel industry faces a 'coal lock-in crisis' as blast furnace (BF) capacity continues to expand despite decarbonization targets. While electric arc furnace (EAF) and direct reduced iron (DRI) capacities are growing, the transition is slowed by massive legacy assets in China and aggressive new coal-based developments in India. Green hydrogen remains a critical but underutilized bottleneck, with only 2% of operating DRI capacity using it as a primary reductant. The report highlights a significant gap between announced net-zero goals and actual industrial investment, particularly regarding the relining of existing blast furnaces.

The document analyzes a structural contraction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and a persistent under-allocation of climate finance toward adaptation. It argues that while the sector possesses the foresight to predict these trends, institutional barriers prevent this knowledge from translating into action. The paper highlights the failure of blended finance to scale in high-exposure contexts, the inability of alternative donors like China and Gulf states to replace Western ODA, and emerging risks such as the centralization of risk analytics and sovereign debt traps.

The document outlines a framework for a voluntary circular textile initiative in South Africa, facilitated by GreenCape. It argues that shifting from a 'take-make-waste' model to a circular economy will reduce import dependency, create local jobs, and mitigate environmental degradation. The proposed initiative follows a four-phase roadmap (2025–2032) moving from a 'coalition of the willing' to the eventual development of informed mandatory Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations. Key focus areas include data collection, circular design, and supply chain decarbonisation, with a governance structure comprising core members (producers), supporting members, and an advisory committee.

The report examines the ESG frameworks of Chinese mining and processing companies, contrasting domestic voluntary standards with international benchmarks like IRMA 2.0 and RRA 3.0. It finds that while Chinese standards are increasingly aligned with international environmental norms, significant gaps remain in social dimensions, particularly regarding Indigenous Peoples' rights and community engagement. Using Indonesia's nickel sector as a case study, the study highlights challenges such as duplicative audits, tensions between transparency and Chinese data security laws, and the transfer of ESG risks from downstream buyers to suppliers. The report recommends aligning Chinese standards with global benchmarks, introducing financial incentives for ESG performance, and establishing bilateral technical cooperation with mineral-rich countries.

The report argues that the surge in demand for critical minerals essential for the energy transition and digital economy risks amplifying existing gender inequalities. It identifies three compounding risk factors: specific environmental impacts (such as water scarcity and pollution), the high concentration of mineral reserves on Indigenous and agricultural lands, and the trend toward accelerated permitting processes. To mitigate these, the report recommends that stakeholders apply intersectional gender analysis in impact assessments, ensure inclusive consultation and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), and establish gender-equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms, including fair land compensation and inclusive employment practices.

The report argues that commercial insect farming in high-income, temperate regions often fails to meet its theoretical sustainability promises. While insects have lower greenhouse gas emissions than beef, they often perform worse than the soymeal and fishmeal they are intended to replace. The authors identify seven key challenges: outdated life cycle assessments, under-utilization of organic waste as feed, limited substitution of meat in human diets, the reinforcement of industrial animal agriculture through use as feed, biodiversity risks from unintentional releases, emerging animal welfare concerns, and the opportunity cost of diverting investment from more promising plant-based or cultivated proteins.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While the number of countries pursuing new coal projects dropped to 32, China and India continue massive expansions. In Indonesia, the growth of captive coal plants for nickel and aluminium processing contradicts national climate commitments, with the RUPTL 2025-2034 continuing to plan for on-grid coal investment despite a formal moratorium.