Search Climate Insights Directory

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coalition of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, along with Benin, was established to combat Boko Haram. While the force has achieved some operational gains since early 2016, it continues to struggle with significant financial shortfalls, political mistrust among member states, and a gap between official claims of operationality and the reality on the ground. The African Union (AU) serves as a critical strategic and technical partner, filling an institutional vacuum left by the Lake Chad Basin Commission's (LCBC) limited experience in peace operations.

The paper finds that climate actions across examined INDCs align with 154 of the 169 SDG targets, demonstrating significant potential for mutual benefits between climate and development agendas. While global alignment is high, the authors note that few countries explicitly referenced SDGs in their INDCs, often due to separate institutional oversight between environment and development ministries. Case studies of Colombia and Uganda show high goal-level alignment, though target-level alignment varies based on national priorities. The document advocates for a 'whole-of-government' approach to maximize resources and avoid implementation silos.

The report examines African election trends in 2016, noting that while multi-party elections are now standard, many processes are undermined by 'constitutional coups', the removal of term limits, and electoral irregularities. It details specific cases of instability and incumbent persistence in countries like the Central African Republic, Uganda, and the Republic of Congo, while contrasting these with more stable prospects in South Africa and Ghana.

The document examines China's deepening security role in Africa, shifting from traditional military concerns to non-traditional threats. It analyzes how China protects its citizens from crime and terrorism, its response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and its dual role in the illegal wildlife and timber trades. The authors argue that these transnational challenges are compelling China to increase its engagement with multilateral organizations and move beyond its traditional policy of non-interference.

The paper argues that Africa's institutional crisis stems from a mismatch between Western-imported formal institutions and local socio-cultural realities, compounded by a colonial legacy of authoritarianism and neo-patrimonialism. It identifies operational failures such as weak state capacity, toxic leadership, and political apathy. Using Botswana as a positive example, the author suggests that resilient institutions require economic diversification to reduce rent-seeking, the establishment of 'embedded autonomy' for the bureaucracy, and a new generation of ethical, visionary leaders.

The paper examines the dynamics of China-Africa economic cooperation, noting a significant increase in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) from $500 million in 2003 to nearly $15 billion by 2012. While acknowledging the role of Chinese firms in hiring local labour—such as the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and Chinese National Minerals Corporation—the author highlights a lack of transparency regarding training, health, and environmental standards. The document reviews several academic and scientific initiatives, including the Confucius Institutes and the 20+20 Cooperation Plan, concluding that while these signal a move beyond purely commercial interests, they have often failed to yield tangible results. The author recommends the establishment of a tighter African regulatory framework and an autonomous monitoring mechanism to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth.

The report evaluates the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and its peace and security architecture, specifically the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) and the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC). It finds a significant gap between the organization's ambitions and its operational reality, noting that conflict prevention is hampered by a highly centralized, state-focused structure and a narrow military approach to security. The document highlights critical regional threats, including the Boko Haram insurgency, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, and the instability in the Central African Republic (CAR). It concludes that ECCAS lacks a credible regional lead nation and a shared vision, remaining heavily dependent on external funding, primarily from the European Union, which undermines regional ownership of the peace and security process.

Between April 2013 and January 2014, logging companies in the Central African Republic (CAR) paid an estimated EUR 3.4 million to the Seleka rebel coalition for 'protection' and to pass checkpoints, effectively funding a regime responsible for mass human rights abuses. Following the Seleka's fall, companies continued to pay an estimated EUR 127,864 to anti-balaka militias in 2014. The report identifies SEFCA, IFB, and the Vicwood Group as primary actors who maintained operations through these payments. It argues that the EU and France failed to enforce the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) and that the EU's Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with CAR is flawed as it attempts to legitimise an industry operating in a failed state. The document recommends a moratorium on industrial logging and the establishment of a Forest Sector Review Committee, drawing parallels to post-war reconstruction in Liberia.

The document examines the diverse range of 'Sahel strategies' produced by multilateral actors, noting a general consensus on objectives—security, development, governance, and education—but significant variations in geographical scope and implementation capacity. It highlights that while some organisations possess substantial internal funding, others rely on external contributions, creating a risk that more powerful actors may dominate the region. The brief emphasizes the need for detailed action plans and transparent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to avoid redundancy and ensure that interventions meet the needs of populations in core countries like Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

The February 2015 Peace & Security Council Report details the AU's efforts to manage continental security crises. Key outcomes include the authorization of a 7,500-strong Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to combat Boko Haram and a new tiered funding model for the AU budget. However, the report notes significant setbacks, such as the deferral of the Commission of Inquiry report on South Sudan and deep divisions within the International Contact Group on Libya. It also highlights the high risk of election-related violence across 18 African states in 2015 and the ongoing struggle to defeat al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The document examines the evolution of African continental court structures, focusing on the 2014 Malabo Protocol. It argues that the protocol's creation of an 'Expanded Court' with jurisdiction over 14 international crimes is undermined by Article 46 A bis, which grants immunity to serving heads of state and senior government officials. The author contends this is a response to the perceived bias of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the use of universal jurisdiction by European states, ultimately serving to protect political elites rather than victims of human rights violations.

The document argues that regreening, primarily through Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR), is a cost-effective solution for restoring degraded landscapes in Africa's arid zones. It details a six-step strategy for scaling these efforts: identifying existing successes, building a community of champions, resolving policy and legal barriers, implementing communication strategies, developing agroforestry value chains, and filling knowledge gaps through research. The report highlights significant achievements in Niger, where 5 million hectares have been regreened, and emphasizes the multiple economic, environmental, and social benefits of integrating trees into agricultural systems.

The report advocates for the scaling of regreening, specifically farmer-managed natural regeneration (FMNR), as a low-cost solution to food insecurity and climate change in drylands. It details a six-step strategy: identifying successes, building grassroots movements, addressing policy barriers, implementing communication strategies, strengthening value chains, and expanding research. Using examples from Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal, the authors argue that FMNR is more cost-effective and has higher survival rates than conventional tree planting.

Friends of the Earth International and its signatories critique the Lima Conference for producing weak pre-2020 mitigation pledges and failing to secure binding commitments on finance, adaptation, and loss and damage. The statement asserts that the outcome shifts responsibility to the Global South, protects polluting corporations, and risks expanding carbon markets at the expense of land rights. It calls for a systemic transformation away from fossil fuels toward community-controlled renewable energy and agro-ecological solutions.

The policy brief argues that Nigeria is experiencing a self-inflicted decline in its diplomatic standing within Africa. Despite being the continent's nominally largest economy as of May 2014, Nigeria's foreign policy is described as inchoate and ambiguous, hampered by a 'perverse hiatus' between its domestic ecology—marked by corruption and the Boko Haram insurgency—and its international ambitions. The author contends that Nigeria has lost its pre-eminence in Africa, failing to command respect even within ECOWAS and falling behind South Africa in governance and infrastructure. The document recommends that Nigeria prioritize domestic stability, clean government, and a recomposed social contract to restore its leadership role.

The emergence of the Islamic State represents a significant shift in global jihadism, offering a divisive alternative to al-Qaeda. Africa is particularly vulnerable due to the presence of established radical Islamist groups and the potential return of thousands of battle-hardened African fighters from Iraq and Syria. The document warns that the Islamic State's model of territorial occupation and its extreme ideology could destabilise several African regions, particularly North and West Africa. It argues that governments should avoid draconian counter-terrorism measures, which often fuel radicalisation, and instead pursue criminal justice-based approaches that address local drivers of discontent.

The document argues that the IFC's 'lessons learned' process is insufficient because it ignores institutional culture, fails to address the systemic miscategorisation of project risks, and lacks a formal implementation and monitoring framework. While acknowledging some positive steps, the authors highlight ongoing failures in projects across Honduras, Burma, Indonesia, and Nicaragua, and call for a time-bound plan to integrate human rights assessments and poverty reduction goals into IFC operations.

The 2014 South African Defence Review describes the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as being in a 'critical state of decline' due to obsolescence, force imbalance, and unsustainable budgeting. The review proposes a long-term rejuvenation plan through four planning milestones extending to 2034, requiring significant budget increases. However, the author argues that the review's 'mandate-driven' approach is overly expansive given South Africa's financial constraints and actual tasks. The brief recommends refocusing the SANDF on peace operations, downsizing bloated staffing structures, and reforming the department's accountability and procurement legislation.

The report analyzes the systemic power imbalances in compensation processes for extractive industries, where benefits often accrue at the state level while costs are borne by local communities. It evaluates several mechanisms for improving outcomes: Community Development Agreements (CDAs) in mining, strategic human rights litigation, and Biocultural Community Protocols. A specific case study of the Chad-Cameroon Oil & Pipeline Project illustrates the failures of individual-based monetary compensation and argues for a paradigm shift toward livelihood restoration and 'land for land' replacement.

The paper examines the tension between 'positive' and 'negative' governance values in Africa. While the African Union has established comprehensive frameworks like the APRM and ACDEG to promote transparency, accountability, and human rights, the author argues that a lack of political will and moral leadership hinders their implementation. The document highlights persistent issues such as systemic corruption, political clientelism, the marginalisation of women, and electoral manipulation, while noting that a small group of countries has made significant progress toward democratic governance.