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The document examines how Taiwan can engage with international carbon markets despite not being a party to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. It analyzes formal eligibility requirements and material 'market readiness' conditions across various systems, including the EU ETS, RGGI, WCI, and others. The study suggests that while formal treaty-based access is restricted, Taiwan can utilize indirect participation, bilateral cooperation, and the development of a robust domestic cap-and-trade system with absolute targets to facilitate future linkage.

The report analyzes a diverse array of cap-and-trade systems, from the established EU ETS to emerging pilots in China and South Korea. It argues that the success of these markets depends heavily on long-term political commitment, robust data collection, and centralized decision-making to avoid over-allocation. The authors highlight a shift in the center of carbon market activity toward Asia-Pacific economies, which are experimenting with novel scopes including buildings and indirect emissions.

The briefing argues that any ICAO market-based measure must rely on stringent requirements to ensure emissions reductions are real, permanent, additional, and verified. It recommends that only UNFCCC-guided offset credits be eligible, while specifically advising against the use of Joint Implementation (JI) credits, voluntary market offsets, and bilateral mechanisms due to quality and oversight concerns. Furthermore, it warns that any cap-and-trade system must avoid over-allocation and prohibits the use of surplus allowances from oversupplied schemes like the EU ETS to maintain environmental integrity.

The document proposes a 'parts approach' to overcome barriers to the adoption of automotive carbon fiber composites. Rather than attempting whole-vehicle integration, it suggests targeting specific parts (such as rear hatches or door inners) for mainstream volumes of 50,000 to 100,000 units per year by model year 2018. This strategy aims to create a viable business case, drive scale, and identify technology and funding gaps through a collaborative supply chain team including OEMs, Tier 1 suppliers, and material producers.

The Warsaw Conference (COP 19) achieved several technical milestones but failed to secure ambitious new mitigation commitments or a clear financial roadmap. Key outcomes included the creation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage and the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, alongside a draft for a universal agreement to be finalized in Paris. However, the event was marked by reduced mitigation goals from Japan and the removal of carbon taxes in Australia, highlighting a persistent divide between developed and developing nations over the priority of funding versus emission cuts.

The document argues that the global energy system is driven by neoliberalism and extractivism, benefiting a small elite while causing climate devastation and energy poverty. It critiques both fossil fuels and certain 'clean' alternatives—such as mega-dams and industrial biofuels—as destructive. The authors advocate for a decentralized, democratically controlled energy system that prioritizes human rights and ecological limits over corporate profit.

The document argues that the global energy system is unsustainable and unjust, driven by neoliberalism and extractivism. It details the environmental and social harms of fossil fuels, nuclear power, and certain 'clean' alternatives, while warning against 'techno-fixes' and corporate-led transitions. It advocates for a decentralized, democratically controlled system that prioritizes basic human rights to energy and a just transition for workers.

The report examines the 'temporal scope' of the Nagoya Protocol, specifically whether access and benefit-sharing (ABS) obligations are triggered by the initial physical access to genetic resources (GRs) and traditional knowledge (TK) or by their subsequent utilisation. It argues that the European Commission's draft proposal, which limits obligations to resources accessed after the Protocol's entry into force, contradicts the ABS laws of many provider countries (such as Ethiopia, India, and South Africa) where utilisation is the trigger. The authors contend that this discrepancy will lead to legal uncertainty for EU users, who may be compliant with EU law but liable for criminal charges in provider countries, and will disincentivise provider countries from facilitating access to their biodiversity.

The document identifies three primary quantitative perspectives—literalist, fatalist, and economist—used to measure the emissions impact of fossil fuel infrastructure. It also proposes a political economist perspective to account for systemic lock-in effects. The authors conclude that while estimates vary widely, it is highly unlikely that new infrastructure has zero impact on global emissions.

The report examines the intersection of global demographic ageing and environmental change, highlighting that by 2050, people aged 55-plus will comprise nearly a quarter of the global population. It categorizes older people as 'contributors' (through consumption patterns), 'casualties' (due to increased vulnerability to natural disasters and pollution), and 'champions' (as a reservoir of knowledge and volunteers). A web-based survey of 1,028 individuals from Australia, Canada, the UK, USA, and Sweden reveals high levels of environmental concern and a willingness to take action, though respondents often underestimate the direct impacts of climate change on their own health and security. The document argues for 'age-proofed' policies that reduce environmental footprints, protect vulnerable seniors, and mobilize their experience for disaster risk reduction.

The report uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate two scenarios: a reduction in global beef consumption and a combined scenario of reduced beef and increased poultry/pork consumption. The findings indicate that reducing beef consumption leads to significant declines in cattle production and pasture land, particularly in the US, Latin America, and Australia. In the US, a beef-only reduction would decrease cereal grain acreage by 4% (3.5 million acres) and pasture land by 16% (100 million acres). The combined scenario shows that while beef production falls, poultry production increases significantly in regions like India (166%) and the US (36%), with global pasture land reductions totaling millions of acres across several regions.

The document examines Malawi's use of predominantly fiscal investment incentives, such as tax breaks and industrial rebates, to attract investment. It highlights a tension between the government's need for tax revenue to manage public debt and the private sector's demand for incentives. The author argues that these incentives result in significant revenue loss and may not be the primary driver of investment decisions, suggesting a shift toward improving the overall domestic business environment.

The document argues that while the G-20 provides a more inclusive framework for global economic governance than the G-8, BRICS cooperation within it remains issue-based rather than institutionalized due to diverging national interests. It highlights that Brazil and South Africa share a reliance on soft power and a desire for institutional reform, which strengthens their bilateral alignment. The author identifies two primary areas for BRICS consensus in the G-20: the reform of international financial institutions like the IMF and a shift toward developmental issues. While the BRICS have successfully influenced the G-20 agenda and blocked certain industrialized-nation proposals, they struggle to speak with a single voice on trade and monetary policy.

As of November 26, 2012, 23 developed countries and the European Commission pledged USD 33.92 billion in fast-start climate finance, exceeding the collective goal of 'approaching USD 30 billion'. However, the World Resources Institute finds that the alignment of these funds with Cancun Agreement principles—specifically regarding balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation, additionality, and prioritization of the most vulnerable—remains unclear due to inconsistent reporting and a lack of agreed-upon definitions.

The document provides a detailed breakdown of climate finance pledges from various developed nations and the European Union, detailing the amounts pledged, the actual allocations made, the channeling institutions used, and the countries' positions on whether the funds are 'new and additional' to existing Official Development Assistance (ODA).

The report examines how unilateral carbon pricing leads to carbon leakage—where emissions are shifted to foreign locations—across energy-intensive industries (EII) such as steel, cement, and chemicals. It evaluates the effectiveness of various policy remedies, including border adjustments and output-based free allocations, across different regional contexts. Findings indicate that while the EU can mitigate leakage from a 30% reduction target at moderate cost, a mandatory Japanese ETS would significantly impact steel and cement production. In China, a carbon price of 100 Yuan/t CO2 would most affect ferrous metals, basic chemicals, refining, and cement, potentially serving as a tool to reduce carbon intensity and restrain exports during high growth periods.

The briefing distinguishes between two types of demand-response: 'capacity' and 'balancing'. Demand-response as capacity reduces the need for new power plants by moderating peak demand events, while demand-response as balancing uses automated technology to adjust electricity use in real-time to complement variable renewable energy output.

The document analyzes the divergent paths taken by Canada and Australia to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. While Australia implemented a unified national carbon pricing system (transitioning from a carbon tax to cap-and-trade), Canada adopted a decentralized, sector-by-sector regulatory approach utilizing provincial equivalency agreements. The authors argue that Canada's fragmented system is likely to result in higher regulatory costs for emitters compared to Australia's streamlined national approach, although the actual emission reductions of both schemes remain uncertain.

The report argues that South African institutional investors, as 'universal owners', face material financial risks from climate change and water scarcity, which are currently underpriced in securities markets. It highlights that listed coal reserves exceed scientific carbon budgets and that water scarcity poses significant operational risks to water-intensive sectors. The document recommends a shift toward low-carbon and water-responsible investments, calling for regulatory interventions to create investment-grade green financial products and mandatory ESG disclosures to avoid stranded assets and systemic market shocks.

The report finds that South African coal reserves earmarked for domestic use exceed the country's potential carbon budget through 2050, creating a risk of 'unburnable carbon' and stranded assets. It argues that current capital expenditure on developing new coal resources is incompatible with climate goals and urges investors to challenge the business models of coal miners.