Can the BRICS Co-operate in the G-20? A View from Brazil

The document argues that while the G-20 provides a more inclusive framework for global economic governance than the G-8, BRICS cooperation within it remains issue-based rather than institutionalized due to diverging national interests. It highlights that Brazil and South Africa share a reliance on soft power and a desire for institutional reform, which strengthens their bilateral alignment. The author identifies two primary areas for BRICS consensus in the G-20: the reform of international financial institutions like the IMF and a shift toward developmental issues. While the BRICS have successfully influenced the G-20 agenda and blocked certain industrialized-nation proposals, they struggle to speak with a single voice on trade and monetary policy.

• The G-20 has increased the legitimacy and inclusivity of global economic governance by representing traditionally neglected regions, including South America, the Middle East, Africa, and the Arab World, through the inclusion of Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia.
• Brazil and South Africa share a strategic alignment in the G-20 because both are aspiring global powers that lack 'hard power'—specifically nuclear weapons or permanent seats on the UN Security Council—and must therefore rely on soft power and multilateral institutions to project influence.
• South Africa's membership in the BRICS is viewed positively by Brazil as it 'globalises' the group, ending Brazil's geographic isolation and enhancing the group's legitimacy as a representative of the 'Global South'.
• Despite their influence, BRICS cooperation in the G-20 is limited to specific issues rather than a formal institutionalized bloc because member interests diverge on key matters such as agricultural trade, financial transaction taxes, and monetary policy.
• The BRICS have achieved significant success in the G-20 by coordinating to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions, resulting in a quota shift of more than 6% in favor of large emerging countries in 2010 and increased presence in the Financial Stability Board and Basel Committee.
• The author identifies two main areas where the BRICS can effectively influence the G-20 agenda: the continued reform of financial institutions like the IMF and shifting the G-20's focus toward developmental issues to address the needs of more than just the G-20 member countries.

APA

Stuenkel, O. (2012). Can the BRICS Co-operate in the G-20? A View from Brazil. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Occasional-Paper-123.pdf

Chicago

Stuenkel, Oliver. Can the BRICS Co-operate in the G-20? A View from Brazil. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2012. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Occasional-Paper-123.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Stuenkel |first1=Oliver |title=Can the BRICS Co-operate in the G-20? A View from Brazil |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=December 2012 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Occasional-Paper-123.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{stuenkel2012can, author = {Stuenkel, Oliver}, title = {{Can the BRICS Co-operate in the G-20? A View from Brazil}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2012}, month = dec, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Occasional-Paper-123.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }