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The document argues that African countries cannot rely solely on the developed world's unmet USD 100 billion annual climate finance pledge and must instead leverage collective bargaining, critical mineral resources, and regional trade agreements to secure funding. It highlights a significant finance gap and a concerning shift toward loan-based support that increases debt burdens for vulnerable nations. The author suggests that African states should link access to rare earth minerals to investments in local green industrialization and use platforms like the WTO and AU-EU negotiations to protect economic interests during the energy transition.

The Youth Enterprise Grant (YEG) was a two-year pilot project starting in late 2018 that provided 1,000 youth in Mathare, Nairobi, with smartphones and enterprise grants totaling $1,200. Implemented by GiveDirectly for FSD Africa, the project aimed to determine if digital tools—including M-PESA for payments, Touch Doh for budgeting, and the Hustle Fiti Facebook group for business advice—could enhance financial literacy, money management, and business skills among micro-entrepreneurs in informal settlements.

A keynote speech delivered by Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi of the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) at the Youth Connekt Africa Summit, advocating for increased regional labor mobility to address youth unemployment and skills gaps in Africa.

The report examines the role of indigenous knowledge in bridging climate data gaps in Africa, highlighting how traditional observation methods and community-based forecasting can enhance the accuracy of early warning systems when integrated with scientific meteorology. It identifies the decline of this knowledge due to modernization and the preference for top-down scientific models, while providing examples of successful 'co-production' of climate information in countries like Kenya.

The briefing argues that while multilateral development banks (MDBs) have made some progress in aligning direct investments with the Paris Agreement, they remain far from fulfilling their overall commitment. Key deficiencies include a lack of standardized fossil fuel exclusion policies, inconsistent greenhouse gas accounting, and a failure to align indirect investments and policy-based loans. The author emphasizes that MDBs must reform their financial instruments and engage in debt relief to ensure developing countries do not sacrifice climate action due to COVID-19 related debt burdens.

The report examines the influence of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and corporate actors on the UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS). It argues that the transition from multilateralism to multi-partnership governance allows powerful multinationals and private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the World Economic Forum, to steer global food policy toward 'technofixes' and market-based solutions. The analysis of 26 MSIs shows that corporate actors are the most influential stakeholders, often holding leadership positions. The report specifically highlights the role of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in promoting industrial agriculture and carbon offset mechanisms, which the authors claim undermine food sovereignty and exacerbate global inequalities.

The report argues that the UN Food Systems Summit has been 'captured' by corporate interests through the use of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), which shift governance from state-led multilateralism to a model dominated by transnational corporations and philanthropic foundations. An analysis of 26 MSIs reveals that the private sector holds the most influence, often occupying leadership roles. The document highlights the roles of the World Economic Forum (WEF), the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in promoting industrial agriculture and 'nature-positive' solutions that the authors claim are 'false solutions' designed to maintain corporate dominance. It specifically criticizes the appointment of AGRA's president as the UN Special Envoy for the Summit as a conflict of interest and details how companies like Nestlé and Shell use nature-based solutions to offset emissions without reducing production.

The document critiques the current global energy system as a driver of climate change and systemic oppression, particularly affecting women in the Global South. It warns against 'false solutions'—such as greenwashing and 'purplewashing'—where corporations adopt environmental or feminist rhetoric without challenging underlying power structures. The report advocates for a 'Feminist Just Energy Transition' based on energy democracy, public ownership, and the centrality of care work and life sustainability over profit accumulation.

The South African Renewable Energy Master Plan (SAREM) aims to industrialise the renewable energy value chain to drive economic recovery and a just energy transition. The plan identifies market certainty as the most critical factor for attracting manufacturing investment, proposing a shift from a percentage-of-CAPEX local content model to a points-based scoring system in the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Programme (REIPPPP). Key targets for 2030 include an annual GDP contribution of R141-164 billion, the creation of 32,500-35,000 new jobs, and achieving 70-90% localisation of key components. The strategy emphasizes integrating industrial opportunities into 'Just Transition hotspots' like Mpumalanga to reskill coal sector workers and diversifying procurement through private sector engagement and export promotion to regional markets, particularly within Africa via the AfCFTA.

The report explores the 'Use of Research Evidence' (URE) by policymakers in Africa, focusing on the intersection of CSO research and tax policy. Through case studies in Tunisia, Nigeria, Zambia, and Uganda, it finds that while the technical quality of CSO research is generally high, its influence is primarily determined by non-technical factors such as the timing of engagement, the perceived non-partisan reputation of the CSO, and existing relationships with policymakers. The document provides strategic lessons for CSOs to increase their policy impact and recommendations for funders to better support internal capacity and flexible funding timelines.

The report analyzes the evolution of gender-related provisions in trade agreements, categorizing them into five types: reaffirmation of commitments, avoidance of adverse effects, preservation of the state's right to regulate, promotion of women's economic empowerment, and cooperation mechanisms. It highlights a shift toward dedicated 'trade and gender' chapters in recent agreements, such as those involving Canada and Chile, though it notes these often lack enforceable targets or budgets. The author argues that current provisions are frequently 'gender-blind' or overly focused on women as formal workers, neglecting their roles as consumers, carers, and rights holders. To improve policy, the report advocates for ex ante gender impact assessments—citing Canada's GBA+ and the UNCTAD Trade and Gender Toolbox—and ex post monitoring to generate sex-disaggregated data. It concludes that for trade to be inclusive, gender mainstreaming must move beyond symbolic cooperation toward a holistic approach grounded in human rights frameworks like CEDAW.

The report examines the challenges in operationalizing the AU Peace Fund, specifically disagreements over contribution scales among member states. It warns against the increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group in Africa, citing human rights risks. Additionally, it advocates for a revamp of the AU's PCRD approach to better address post-authoritarian transitions and the role of women in peacebuilding, using The Gambia as a model for small, expert-led deployments.

The document examines China's role as a primary funder and contractor of ICT networks in the Global South, specifically through the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. It compares the implementation of a submarine fibre optic cable in Cambodia and the National ICT Broadband Backbone in Tanzania. The analysis finds that while these projects generally had limited environmental impacts and provided essential connectivity, they suffered from a lack of transparency and mixed results in socioeconomic mitigation, such as limited high-level technology transfer and underutilisation of infrastructure.

The document outlines the financial gap for climate action in Africa, noting that NDCs will require approximately $3 trillion by 2030. It identifies significant barriers to private investment, including political, project, and economic risks, as well as a lack of 'bankable' projects. To address these, the brief recommends the development of NDC implementation plans, the use of credit enhancement mechanisms via blended finance, and the provision of technical grant-based funding to help borrowers reach the bankability stage. It specifically emphasizes the need for catalytic public finance to unlock private investment in adaptation and nature-based solutions.

The document argues that Africa faces an existential crisis due to climate change, yet adaptation finance remains critically low compared to mitigation. It identifies barriers such as the perception of adaptation as a public good, lack of bankable proposals, and inadequate climate data. To address these, the brief recommends demonstrating the business case for adaptation to attract private capital, strengthening government technical capacity, introducing adaptation levies, and lobbying for a distinct international goal for adaptation finance.

The document examines the industrial and trade policy challenges Africa faces during the transition to a lower carbon economy. It emphasizes that for the transition to be 'just,' Africa must move beyond exporting primary products and importing green technology to becoming a manufacturer of value-added lower-carbon products. The author highlights the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a key mechanism for creating regional value chains for renewable energy components. The paper warns against premature trade liberalization and unilateral carbon-based import restrictions from developed nations, which it characterizes as 'green-washed protectionism.' It concludes that Africa should advocate for a Global Green New Deal that explicitly recognizes the right of developing countries to industrialize and receive real resource transfers for climate adaptation and mitigation.

The document examines the geopolitical competition between the US and China in Africa, suggesting that African nations can increase their agency by playing rival powers against each other to obtain better investment, infrastructure funding, and trade agreements. It highlights examples from Guinea and Ethiopia where this strategy yielded better contract terms and infrastructure packages. The author proposes five measures for African governments: avoiding opportunistic short-term offers, adopting integrated strategic plans (citing Senegal's Plan Emergent Senegal), learning from other regions like Latin America and Southeast Asia, enhancing bureaucratic capacity and local expertise on foreign partners, and promoting trilateral or quadrilateral cooperation between traditional and new partners.

Mighty Earth argues that the European Commission's decision to exclude natural rubber from its proposed anti-deforestation law is based on an incomplete dataset that ignores processed rubber imports. The briefing highlights that rubber expansion has caused millions of hectares of forest loss in Southeast Asia and Africa, and warns that a projected 33% increase in global demand by 2030 will further drive biodiversity loss and carbon emissions.

The document presents recommendations from African stakeholders to improve the quantum and quality of climate finance. Key priorities include establishing a global goal for adaptation finance, streamlining access to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and creating national regulatory environments to unlock private investment. It emphasizes the need for grant-based finance to avoid exacerbating debt crises and calls for a broader definition of return on investment for adaptation projects.

Natural Justice and the Inclusive Green Economy Network (IGEN-East Africa) condemn the arrest of six staff members from the Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO) in Uganda. The organization asserts that these arrests are part of a trend of harassment against environmental defenders challenging the East Africa Oil Pipeline (EACOP), which they describe as the longest heated oil pipeline in the world. The statement calls for global solidarity and urges the Ugandan government to operate within the law to protect human rights and environmental activists.