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The report alleges that Adaro Energy, a major Indonesian coal company, used subsidiaries in Singapore, Mauritius, and Labuan to shift profits offshore, potentially reducing its Indonesian tax contributions by US$125 million between 2009 and 2017. Despite a public image of national contribution, the company is identified as a partner in the US$4 billion Batang coal-fired power plant, which is supported by Indonesian government financial guarantees. The document recommends that the Indonesian government review these tax practices and transition away from coal toward renewable energy, while urging banks to cease financing for new coal projects and companies dependent on coal power in Indonesia.

The report evaluates the 41.1 km Rabat bypass road project using the SAVi tool, simulating six risk scenarios and four externalities. It finds that the project is not financially viable based on its own revenues across all scenarios, with negative net present value and insufficient internal rate of return. However, the inclusion of externalities—specifically the value of time saved and the cost of accidents—significantly improves key financial indicators, demonstrating that traditional financial analyses underestimate the project's broader socio-economic value and the risks associated with reduced maintenance or climate change.

CIEL welcomes the IFC's official position against retaliation—including threats, intimidation, harassment, or violence—by IFC clients against those voicing opinions on projects. CIEL emphasizes the importance of integrating retaliation risks into contextual risk screening procedures to prevent harm and urges the IFC to compel its clients and co-financing partners to adopt similar zero-tolerance commitments.

Absa Bank Limited states that its risk assessment processes regarding the funding of the proposed Thabametsi and Khanyisa coal-fired power plants are still underway and will determine the bank's final position on the projects.

The paper addresses the financial risk in India's renewable energy sector caused by the poor financial health of state-owned electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs), which can add up to 1.07% to the cost of debt. It defines a Payment Security Mechanism (PSM) as a funded capital reserve providing interest-free working capital during default events. The authors propose a five-step stochastic methodology to determine the optimal PSM size required to achieve specific credit rating enhancements for projects. Applying this to eight sample DISCOMs, the study finds that most require approximately 12 months of payment support to reach a BB rating, typically representing 10%-20% of a project's total capital expenditure. The paper concludes that the maximum credit enhancement achievable through a PSM is a BB rating, as other non-counterparty risks limit further improvement to BBB or higher.

The document examines the systemic failures of public-private partnerships (PPPs), citing the collapse of Carillion in the UK and concerns over the US 'Rebuilding Infrastructure' plan. It argues that PPPs often fail when used primarily to keep debt off public balance sheets, leading to poor project preparation and skewed risk allocation. To improve outcomes, the author suggests moving toward systemic master planning, enhancing public sector negotiation skills, and adopting procurement strategies that prioritize lifecycle value over the lowest bid. The paper emphasizes that for PPPs to support the UN Sustainable Development Goals, they must be designed with transparent, equitable contracts and a focus on sustainable development rather than just financial returns.

The document proposes the Green FIDC, a specialized securitization vehicle that transforms risky greenfield projects into bankable assets for institutional investors. By utilizing a two-stage process—initial development finance followed by refinancing through senior shares in the Brazilian capital markets—the instrument aims to reduce reliance on the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and lower the cost of capital for renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives. The analysis highlights two pilot opportunities: a 90 MW solar PV project in Ceará and a municipal street lighting LED retrofit in Rio de Janeiro. Financial modeling suggests the instrument is commercially viable, with the potential to leverage USD 1 billion in investment and avoid 10 million tons of CO2 if scaled.

The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) has developed a new finance and business model for a Clean Energy Investment Trust aimed at institutional investors. By addressing the specific cashflow fundamentals of wind and solar projects—which differ from conventional fossil fuel generation due to higher initial investments and lower operating costs—the proposed model aims to reduce the cost of renewable energy by 15-17% compared to existing practices.

The report argues that traditional utility and project finance models are inefficient for renewable energy because they do not align with the specific risk-reward profiles of wind and solar assets. It proposes the Clean Energy Investment Trust (CEIT), a liquid, exchange-traded vehicle targeting liability-hedging investors (such as pension funds and insurance companies) by offering investment-grade, bond-like returns. To achieve this, the CEIT unbundles project cashflows into four streams: construction finance, predictable contracted cashflows (the CEIT core), volatile 'surplus' cashflows, and 'tail' cashflows occurring after the fixed-price regime expires. By using risk-mitigation tools—including diversification of 5-10 assets, conservative P75-P95 production estimates, and long-term O&M contracts—the model claims it can reduce the cost of wind-generated electricity by 15-17%.

The paper examines two contrasting models for financing clean infrastructure in middle-income countries: Brazil's centralized approach led by the national development bank (BNDES) and India's decentralized system involving various public and private institutions. Through case studies of wind energy projects, the authors find that despite their structural differences, both systems are dominated by public financing and struggle with a lack of true non-recourse project finance and limited financial innovation. Brazil's model effectively supports national industrial goals through local content requirements and centralized auctions but faces risks of crowding out private investment and governance issues. India's model allows for more diverse participants and smoother integration of international development finance but suffers from higher system costs, uneven investment across sectors, and significant revenue risks due to the poor financial health of state-owned power distribution companies (discoms). The report concludes that the effectiveness of these models is heavily dependent on complementary regulatory and policy frameworks rather than the financing structure alone.

The document examines how hard currency loans create asset-liability mismatches in infrastructure projects within emerging and frontier markets. It argues that IFIs should move away from direct lending and instead use guarantees and credit enhancements to leverage private capital and stimulate local currency financing. The paper details specific financial tools, such as local currency bonds and derivatives, to mitigate currency, political, and project risks.

The document argues that while PPPs are often viewed as a means to access private capital, the primary goal should be maximizing value for money (VFM). It challenges the assumption that PPPs must be 100 per cent privately financed, suggesting that a hybrid structure—combining low-cost public financing with private capital—can reduce the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) without sacrificing risk transfer. By applying and then critiquing the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the author asserts that in practice, private lenders do not significantly increase their rates when public financing is introduced, allowing for a more cost-effective project structure. The paper concludes that an optimal capital structure minimizes private financing to the level required for bankability and concessionaire incentive (net security), thereby reducing the total cost to society.

The paper argues that while the principle of allocating risk to the party best able to manage it is widely accepted, generic application often erodes value for money. It suggests that practitioners should focus on managing both the occurrence and the impact of risks, utilize partial risk transfer to incentivize private sector mitigation, and avoid overly complex mechanisms that increase transaction costs. The author emphasizes that risk allocation must be customized to project characteristics and informed by the financial and legal structures of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and market conditions.

The report examines the systemic risk posed by credit rating agencies' failure to account for climate change in their methodologies. It argues that by assuming a 'business-as-usual' scenario of $\ge 4^{\circ}C$ warming rather than a dynamic trajectory aligned with a $2^{\circ}C$ goal, agencies are artificially inflating the credit ratings of fossil fuel projects. Using a case study of the Adani Abbot Point Terminal in Australia, the document demonstrates how generic project finance methodologies ignore risks such as stranded assets, decreased coal demand, and physical climate impacts. The report concludes that this failure not only threatens global financial stability by creating a 'carbon bubble' but also exposes rating agencies to significant legal liability under the Dodd-Frank Act and common law.

The document argues that green project bonds can provide a viable alternative to traditional bank lending for green infrastructure PPPs, especially in the wake of Basel III regulations. It details the characteristics of project bonds, the risks involved—such as construction risk and negative carry—and the necessity of credit enhancements to achieve investment-grade ratings. The paper also provides guidance for public procurers on integrating bond financing into tender processes and highlights the growing global market for climate-themed bonds.

The document analyzes the shift from traditional official development assistance (ODA) and commercial bank lending toward alternative financing for infrastructure in Africa. It highlights the role of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), blending finance, and institutional investors like pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. A significant portion of the text focuses on the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP), which requires an estimated $500 billion in capital, and the systemic challenges facing the region, including underdeveloped financial markets and high utility tariffs.

The report examines how institutional investors—such as pension funds and insurance companies—can bridge the financing gap for renewable energy. It identifies three investment channels: corporate investment, direct project investment, and pooled vehicles. While corporate investment is easiest, direct investment offers the most potential to lower the cost of capital, though it is constrained by liquidity needs, lack of specialist expertise, and policy inconsistencies. The authors suggest five steps to unlock this potential, including fixing policy barriers and improving investor practices.

Institutional investors manage approximately $71 trillion in OECD assets, but their ability to fund renewable energy is constrained by liquidity needs, fund size, and policy barriers. While they could potentially cover all corporate equity and debt needs for renewables, their capacity for direct project investment is limited to roughly 24% of equity and 49% of debt requirements. The report suggests five steps to unlock this potential: fixing policy barriers, improving investor practices, modifying regulatory constraints, developing better pooled investment vehicles, and encouraging corporate investors.

The document examines the internal and external financial sustainability of public-private partnerships (PPPs), emphasizing the role of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), project finance, and risk allocation. It argues that while PPPs can address infrastructure deficits, they require rigorous contracts and governance to ensure value for money. The briefing also suggests that PPPs can be used to promote green jobs, energy efficiency, and social equity through thoughtful design and political will.

The Walney Offshore Windfarms project, the world's largest installed offshore windfarm at the start of 2012, overcame significant investment barriers through a dual approach. First, the UK government provided a robust policy framework centered on green tradable certificates (ROCs), which provided approximately 60% of expected project revenues. Second, the developer, DONG Energy, employed extensive financial engineering to 'de-risk' the investment for non-utility investors, such as the Dutch pension fund PGGM and Ampère Equity Fund. By using Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), construction management agreements, and vendor financing, DONG Energy reallocated construction, operation, and price risks away from these institutional investors, effectively transforming their equity stakes into quasi-fixed income positions. The project attracted GBP 1.3 billion in private investment and is projected to avoid 8.3 MtCO2 and 193,000 tons of SO2 over its lifetime.