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The document outlines a proposed carbon tax for South Africa, starting at R120 per tCO2-eq in 2015 with annual increases of 10% through 2019. It argues that a carbon tax is more suitable than an emissions trading system (ETS) in the short term due to the oligopolistic nature of the domestic energy sector. The design includes a basic tax-free threshold of 60%, with additional allowances for trade-exposed and process-emission sectors, and the possibility of using carbon offsets to reduce tax liability. Economic modelling suggests the tax would have a largely neutral impact on GDP and employment if revenues are recycled effectively through tax shifting or government investment. The paper also details complementary flagship programmes in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and public transport to support a just transition.

The document aggregates data from multiple polling organizations, indicating a general rise in American concern regarding climate change and a growing belief in its human causes. While there is broad support for renewable energy and power plant emission regulations, public support for carbon taxes and cap-and-trade measures remains low. The data highlights significant demographic variations, with higher levels of concern and support for government action among Democrats, minorities, and younger adults compared to Republicans.

The report examines how carbon pricing mechanisms—such as carbon taxes and emissions trading systems—affect the competitiveness of the mining and metals sector. It focuses on aluminium, copper, iron ore, and coal across the EU, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and the US. The analysis highlights that electricity-intensive processes, like aluminium smelting, are most vulnerable to indirect costs passed through from power grids. The report advocates for a principles-based approach to policy design to prevent carbon leakage and maintain international competitiveness, recommending a transition toward a harmonized global emissions system.

The document argues that Ontario should implement a unified carbon-pricing scheme, specifically a cap-and-trade system, to preempt federal sector-by-sector regulations and ensure cost-effective mitigation. Using economic modelling, the authors suggest that full compliance flexibility—including offsets and potential linking with the Western Climate Initiative (WCI)—could reduce compliance costs to below $15 per tonne by 2020. The brief cautions against overcompensating firms through free permit allocations, particularly in the electricity sector, to avoid windfall profits, and suggests a 25,000 tonne coverage threshold to align with California and Quebec systems.

The document discusses the tension between the EU's unilateral inclusion of international aviation in its Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the need for a global agreement via ICAO. It warns against the use of low-quality offset credits, specifically industrial gas offsets and non-additional CDM credits, arguing that any global mechanism must prioritize real, permanent, and verified emissions reductions over supplementary offsets.

The report analyzes the design and operational experiences of various emissions trading systems, including the EU ETS, RGGI, WCI, NZ ETS, TMG ETS, and the Australian CPM. It highlights key design trade-offs regarding coverage, allowance distribution, and price management, while emphasizing that the EU ETS experience demonstrates that over-allocation does not necessarily preclude abatement. The document also provides a toolkit for policymakers to assess the environmental and economic effectiveness of such systems.

The report finds that while global economic impacts of market-based measures (MBMs) for international aviation and shipping are small, effects vary significantly by country. Small, remote island states dependent on air tourism, such as Samoa, face the highest GDP risks, while large economies like China and India experience minimal impacts. The study concludes that MBM revenues and increased demand for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offsets can be used to mitigate these undesired economic effects.

The document analyzes Canada's 2012 carbon policy transition, marked by the official withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the implementation of federal sector-based regulations for transport and coal-fired electricity. It highlights a growing trend toward 'equivalency agreements' where the federal government defers to provincial policies, potentially leading to a fragmented national landscape. The report also notes provincial initiatives, such as Quebec's cap-and-trade linkage with California and Ontario's coal phase-out, while recommending greater compliance flexibility and a clearer federal policy vision to reduce costs and meet 2020 targets.

The document examines how Taiwan can engage with international carbon markets despite not being a party to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. It analyzes formal eligibility requirements and material 'market readiness' conditions across various systems, including the EU ETS, RGGI, WCI, and others. The study suggests that while formal treaty-based access is restricted, Taiwan can utilize indirect participation, bilateral cooperation, and the development of a robust domestic cap-and-trade system with absolute targets to facilitate future linkage.

The report analyzes a diverse array of cap-and-trade systems, from the established EU ETS to emerging pilots in China and South Korea. It argues that the success of these markets depends heavily on long-term political commitment, robust data collection, and centralized decision-making to avoid over-allocation. The authors highlight a shift in the center of carbon market activity toward Asia-Pacific economies, which are experimenting with novel scopes including buildings and indirect emissions.

The briefing argues that any ICAO market-based measure must rely on stringent requirements to ensure emissions reductions are real, permanent, additional, and verified. It recommends that only UNFCCC-guided offset credits be eligible, while specifically advising against the use of Joint Implementation (JI) credits, voluntary market offsets, and bilateral mechanisms due to quality and oversight concerns. Furthermore, it warns that any cap-and-trade system must avoid over-allocation and prohibits the use of surplus allowances from oversupplied schemes like the EU ETS to maintain environmental integrity.

The EU-ETS is the world's largest cap-and-trade system, regulating approximately half of the EU's CO2 emissions across 30 countries. While it has evolved through three trading periods to include more greenhouse gases and airline emissions, the system has suffered from severe over-allocation of allowances, leading to price collapses and a surplus of approximately 2 billion allowances by the end of 2012.

The report examines how unilateral carbon pricing leads to carbon leakage—where emissions are shifted to foreign locations—across energy-intensive industries (EII) such as steel, cement, and chemicals. It evaluates the effectiveness of various policy remedies, including border adjustments and output-based free allocations, across different regional contexts. Findings indicate that while the EU can mitigate leakage from a 30% reduction target at moderate cost, a mandatory Japanese ETS would significantly impact steel and cement production. In China, a carbon price of 100 Yuan/t CO2 would most affect ferrous metals, basic chemicals, refining, and cement, potentially serving as a tool to reduce carbon intensity and restrain exports during high growth periods.

The document analyzes the mismatch between the stated environmental goals of biofuel policies and their actual political objectives, such as supporting agricultural constituencies. It argues that subsidies often create market distortions and unintended consequences, such as increasing food prices and harming the environment. The authors recommend phasing out support for food-based biofuels, adopting carbon pricing and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies as 'first-best' alternatives, and adhering to good governance principles and the Precautionary Principle to manage uncertainty regarding indirect land use change and food security.

The document analyses the EU's negotiating strategy at the 2011 Durban Summit, arguing that a combination of realist bargaining and normative alliance-building with vulnerable developing nations was key to preventing the collapse of the UNFCCC process. It examines the internal complexities of the EU as a negotiating bloc and the shifting dynamics of developing country coalitions, such as the BASIC group and the Cartagena Dialogue. The author concludes that while the Durban roadmap was a success, significant challenges remain regarding climate finance, emission targets, and the willingness of major emitters like the US and China to commit to legally binding agreements.

The document outlines the two primary forms of carbon pricing: emissions trading schemes (ETS) and carbon taxes. It details the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as the world's largest, alongside regional programs like the RGGI in the US and the Tokyo Cap and Trade Program. It also lists numerous national carbon taxes, noting Finland as the first to introduce one in 1990, and describes hybrid systems in Australia and New Zealand.

The document examines Australia's carbon pricing scheme, which began on July 1, 2012, targeting the largest emitters to achieve a 5 per cent emissions reduction below 2000 levels by 2020. It details the transition from a fixed-price period to a flexible cap-and-trade system, the role of the Clean Energy Regulator, and extensive compensation packages for trade-exposed industries and households. The brief highlights the importance of the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme (NGERS) as a foundation for implementation and warns against locking in fixed prices during volatile international market conditions.

China transitioned from being 'slow off the mark' in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to dominating the market by employing a coordinated capacity-building strategy and strong governmental oversight. Central to this success was the appointment of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as the Designated National Authority (DNA), ensuring that climate policy was managed by a powerful 'heavy-hitting' ministry rather than a less influential environment ministry. China implemented unique restrictions to protect its interests, including a floor price for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), revenue levies ranging from 2% to 65% to fund the state-controlled CDM Fund, and requirements for Chinese control of project entities. These experiences have served as a foundation for China's transition toward a domestic emissions trading system, with pilot programs in cities like Beijing and Shanghai starting in early 2013 and a nationwide goal for 2015. Furthermore, China integrated carbon intensity reduction goals into its national 5-year plans, linking the performance of local officials to the achievement of these environmental targets.

The document examines China's strategic approach to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), highlighting the role of powerful ministries, coordinated capacity building, and specific market restrictions to ensure local benefits.

The report argues that the EU ETS is failing due to a massive oversupply of allowances caused by the 2008 economic recession and industrial overallocation. Sandbag identifies a total excess of 3.1 billion tonnes (Gt) of allowances, including 2.2Gt from obsolete demand forecasts and 0.9Gt from industrial overallocation. The document highlights that 78% of the net surplus is concentrated among ten steel and cement companies, which have generated significant revenues from selling surplus permits. To remedy this, the report recommends the permanent cancellation of 3.1Gt of allowances from Phase 3 auctions, the establishment of a more ambitious Phase 4 carbon budget aligned with 2050 goals, and the introduction of mechanisms like a "heat exchanger" and a strategic demand-correction reserve to protect the system from future exogenous shocks.