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The briefing assesses synthetic natural gas (SNG), produced from electrolytic hydrogen and captured carbon dioxide, concluding it is an inefficient decarbonization tool. While SNG can utilize existing natural gas infrastructure, its production is energy-intensive and costly, with landed costs in Northwest Europe estimated at 4 to 9 times the wholesale price of natural gas. The author contends that SNG creates a 'value trap' by consuming clean hydrogen that should be prioritized for sectors where no other decarbonization options exist. Furthermore, the document notes that replacing 20% of 2023 EU LNG imports with SNG would require approximately 12 million tons of clean hydrogen and roughly 17% of total U.S. electricity production.

The document highlights that just 1% of Syria's estimated superhot rock geothermal resource could provide 194 GW of energy capacity, generating over 1,613,788 GWh of electricity. This amount is 95 times the country's 2021 electricity consumption and could theoretically replace all fossil fuels used for electricity production, supporting Syria's Nationally Determined Contribution goal of 10% renewable power by 2030. The technology is described as a land-efficient, 24/7 energy source that could reduce Syria's dependence on coal imports, primarily from Turkey, and provide raw energy for desalination and hydrogen production.

The document highlights that just 1% of Tajikistan's estimated superhot rock geothermal resource could provide 68 GW of energy capacity, far exceeding the country's 2021 electricity consumption of 20,719 GWh. This resource could potentially replace all coal, natural gas, and electricity imports, reducing electricity sector carbon emissions by approximately 2 megatonnes, which represents 32% of Tajikistan's Nationally Determined Contribution goal. While not expected to reach commercial scale by 2030, the technology is presented as a way to complement hydropower and improve air quality by reducing fossil fuel combustion.

The document highlights that just 1% of Tanzania's estimated superhot rock geothermal resource could provide 31 GW of capacity, far exceeding the country's 2021 electricity consumption of 8,665 GWh. While unlikely to meet 2030 climate goals, the technology could replace all coal and gas in electricity production, reducing emissions by approximately 3 megatonnes of CO2eq. The report emphasizes the technology's low land footprint (12 km² per 1 GW) and its potential to address energy poverty for the 80-90% of Tanzanians lacking electricity access.

The document highlights that just 1% of Thailand's estimated superhot rock geothermal resource could provide 294 GW of energy capacity, potentially replacing all coal and gas used for electricity production and reducing emissions by approximately 82 megatonnes of CO2eq. It argues that this technology offers a low land-use footprint and a reliable 24/7 power source that could significantly reduce Thailand's dependence on energy imports from Myanmar, Qatar, and Indonesia.

The document highlights Timor-Leste's significant superhot rock geothermal resources, noting that just 1% of its endowment could provide 10 GW of energy capacity. It argues that this technology offers a low-land-footprint alternative to other energy sources and provides a transition pathway for the country's oil and gas workforce.

The EU steel sector, which contributes 5% of the region's annual CO2 emissions, faces significant technical and economic hurdles in its transition to net zero. While hydrogen-based DRI is a prominent pathway, its scalability is limited by the massive requirements for renewable electricity and low-carbon hydrogen. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is presented as a complementary, potentially lower-cost near-term solution for both blast furnace and DRI plants. The report concludes that a portfolio of technologies is necessary to mitigate risks and ensure the industry's survival, supported by carbon pricing, border adjustments, and demand-side policies.

The document highlights that just 1% of Türkiye's superhot rock geothermal resource could provide 594 GW of energy capacity, potentially replacing all coal and gas used for electricity production and meeting the country's projected 2050 electricity demand of 609,503 GWh. It argues that this technology would enhance energy security by reducing dependence on coal (58% imported) and natural gas (98% imported), while requiring significantly less land (12 km² per 1 GW) than solar, wind, or biomass.

The document highlights the massive potential of superhot rock geothermal energy in the United States, noting that just 1% of its resource could provide 4,291 GW of capacity and generate over 35 million GWh of electricity. It argues that this zero-emission, firm power source is more land-efficient than solar, wind, or biomass and offers a transition pathway for oil and gas workers.

The document outlines the potential of superhot rock geothermal energy in Utah, noting that just 1% of the state's resource could provide 327 GW of energy capacity. It argues that this technology offers a low land-use footprint and a transition pathway for oil and gas workers.

The document highlights superhot rock geothermal as an emerging, energy-dense renewable source that could provide firm power globally. In Vanuatu, preliminary modeling suggests that just 1% of the country's superhot rock resource could provide 6 GW of energy capacity, equivalent to 27 million barrels of oil. While unlikely to reach commercial scale by Vanuatu's 2030 goal of nearly 100% renewable electricity, the technology offers significant land-use efficiency, requiring only 12 km² per 1 GW compared to much larger footprints for solar or wind. The document argues that developing this resource could reduce energy poverty, create jobs in engineering and geology, and attract foreign investment to Vanuatu.

The document highlights that just 1% of Venezuela's superhot rock geothermal resource could provide 355 GW of energy capacity, far exceeding the country's projected 2050 electricity demand of 297,505 GWh. It argues that this technology offers a low-land-footprint, firm power alternative that could leverage Venezuela's existing oil and gas subsurface expertise to decarbonize its electricity sector, which emitted 12 megatonnes of CO2eq in 2021.

The document argues that traditional investor-owned utility (IOU) financing for transmission projects risks increasing consumer rates and proposes public financing as a lower-cost alternative. Research focused on California indicates that a "lease-type" public-private partnership could save ratepayers up to $3 billion annually, or $123 billion over 40 years, by utilizing low-cost public debt, reducing taxes, and maintaining private sector operational efficiency. The brief outlines several public financing mechanisms, such as public bonds and loans, and provides policy recommendations for other states to implement similar cost-saving reforms, including the use of credit enhancements and the designation of state-level coordinators for high-priority transmission lines.

The document calls for G20 leaders to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels and ensure the Paris Agreement is designed for ambition to avoid global warming of 3°C or more. It emphasizes the need for a five-year process to ramp up emission targets starting in 2020 and the delivery of $100 billion annual climate finance by 2020. Additionally, it urges the G20 to fulfill its 2009 promise to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, noting that the G20 currently spends nearly $90 billion annually on fossil fuel exploration.

The report argues that the proposed 1.2 GW Karpowership gas power plants are not aligned with a least-cost investment pathway for South Africa. Drawing on a study by Meridian Economics and the CSIR, it finds that the grid should prioritize rapid renewable energy build-out and storage, with new gas capacity not being economically optimal until the mid-2030s. The document concludes that commissioning these plants by 2022 would create an unnecessary economic burden for ratepayers and that the procurement process (RMIPP) was biased against renewable energy options.

South Africa's Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy aims to maximise the economic value of its vast mineral reserves—including PGMs, manganese, and vanadium—by shifting from raw ore exports to local beneficiation and high-tech manufacturing. The strategy identifies a specific list of high, moderate-to-high, and moderate criticality minerals and proposes six pillars of intervention: geoscience mapping, value addition, R&D, infrastructure/energy security, financial instruments, and regulatory harmonisation. It emphasizes the need to overcome domestic bottlenecks in energy and logistics, foster regional integration within Africa, and navigate geopolitical tensions, particularly China's dominance in the supply chain, to secure a role in the global green energy transition.

The document details the environmental and social costs of coal-power generation in South Africa, specifically focusing on the Kusile power station. It highlights that water-related externalities for Kusile range from R0.95 to R1.86 per kWh, driven largely by water use in generation and mining. The text argues that the Draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2016 misrepresents the total cost of coal by ignoring these externalities. It further notes that coal mining and power generation consume 3% and 2% of South Africa's water respectively, with severe regional impacts in the Upper Olifants. The report emphasizes the long-term costs of acid-mine drainage and the disproportionate health and water-security burdens placed on poor communities, concluding that a decarbonised energy future would require four times less water by 2050 and create more jobs than the coal-reliant base case.

The report examines the carbon-intensive nature of steel production, highlighting ArcelorMittal South Africa's (AMSA) increasing emissions and its impact on local communities in the Vaal triangle. It argues that ArcelorMittal Group maintains a double standard by prioritizing decarbonization in Europe over the Global South. The document identifies financial institutions (such as ABSA and the IFC) and the automobile industry (including Ford and Toyota) as key stakeholders with the leverage to push for a fossil-free transition. It recommends that ArcelorMittal end coal use by 2040 and provide verifiable asset-by-asset transformation plans by 2025.

The report by the Fair Steel Coalition examines the systemic environmental and human rights abuses linked to ArcelorMittal and Ternium. It identifies 'sacrifice zones' where marginalized communities of color face severe pollution and health risks. The document details case studies of land dispossession in Liberia, air and water contamination in South Africa and Brazil, and a pattern of violence and enforced disappearances of environmental defenders in Mexico. It concludes that corporate sustainability policies are superficial and calls for mandatory due diligence, a just transition in steel production, and accountability for human rights violations.

The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) argues that South African local governments must be empowered to procure renewable energy to meet constitutional obligations under Section 24 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a healthy environment. The CER contends that the current reliance on Eskom's coal-fired power stations causes significant health crises, including thousands of premature deaths and high greenhouse gas emissions. It asserts that renewable energy is now the most cost-effective option and that interpreting the Electricity Regulation Act (ERA) to allow municipal procurement is essential for a just energy transition and the realization of sustainable development.